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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY. THE ROLE OF OBJECTS 
IN CONTEMPORARY EVERYDAY LIFE. 
The thesis explores the significance of material objects in the 
everyday life of contemporary individuals. It is suggested that the 
relationship between individuals and objects in modern /contemporary 
society is a peculiar one. This peculiarity derives from the essen- 
tial and crucial role things play: they contribute to shape and 
support the individual's identity in a context of fragmentation of the 
work experience and of the whole life, of anonymity and depersonal- 
ization of social relations, of bureaucratization and accelerated 
change. 
In the first part of the dissertation the topic is discussed and 
developed mainly at a theoretical level. A revisitation of well -known 
authors intends to recover what has been said - explicitly or other- 
wise - on the social meanings and uses of objects in modern society. 
A review and critique of express discussions of the functions performed 
by objects - e.g., the literature on consumer behaviour, on possession 
and exchange of goods in different cultures, on the psychological and 
symbolical significance of things - provide the framework to understand 
the complexity of our relationship to things and the multiplicity of 
meanings and projections attached to them. 
In the second part of the dissertation the results of a small - 
scale, exploratory, qualitatively oriented, empirical investigation of 
people who experience a peculiar relationship to objects are discussed. 
Through the analysis of this empirical material several interesting 
features of our relationship to things emerge quite clearly: gender 
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differences in the way of relating to the material world; the 
limited relevance of the concept of status symbol to explain the 
reasons why we surround ourselves with objects; the great emotional 
significance attached to things; the essential role objects play in 
providing the individual with material for the presentation of one's 
self and to communicate symbolically with others. 
It is concluded that the analysis of the meanings and uses of 
objects in everyday life provides interesting elements to understand 
how the individual copes with the problems contemporary industrial 
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PREFACE 
One of the main concerns of social theory has been,and remains, 
identifying the specific features of modern and contemporary society 
and pointing out the problems the latter poses for the establishment 
and maintenance of personal identity in the face of bureaucratization, 
depersonalization, accelerated change, etc. Both the works of the 
founding fathers of sociology, those of contemporary sociologists 
(such as Riesman, Berger, Luckman,) and those of social philosophers 
(e.g. Gehlen, Arendt,) are characterized by a long -lasting and recurrent 
interest in the features of modern life, in the problems the individual 
faces when living in a social system marked by the anonymity of relation- 
ships, the fragmentation of the work process and indeed of existence 
itself. 
My work relates to this tradition of social thinking by focussing 
on a particular subject which has a certain bearing upon how personal 
identity is shaped and maintained in contemporary society. More 
specifically my on contribution consists in analyzing the relation- 
ship between the individual and objects in contemporary society. To 
study this relationship means to analyze the role objects play in inter- 
action, the meanings they convey, the projections they embody. It 
means to shed light upon relevant aspects of social reality. 
Although this is a significant topic it has been often considered 
toe obvious and unproblematical or, on the contrary, too abstract and 
philosophical, to be at the centre of sociological reflection. The 
student willing to analyze this subject from a sociological perspective 
must therefore rely upon inquiries by scholars from different traditions 
and disciplines. This does not mean that there are no sociological 
studies on the subject, rather that there is almost nothing dealing 
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explicitly and directly with this topic. One of my goals is that of 
bringing to the fore those analyses and ideas which are implicit in 
various sociological works and which shed light upon this complex 
relationship. 
In order to study this subject it seems important to point out some 
general aspects which differentiate the contemporary relationship between 
individuals and objects from those existing in previous or in any case 
in different forms of social organization. 
The market economy and bureaucracy have modified the qualify of 
everyday life, of interpersonal relationships, by making the satisfac- 
tion of needs dependent upon more numerous and complex mediations. 
Since needs are culturally and socially diversified, the use -value of 
an object is dependent not only on its ability to satisfy natural needs 
but also on the cultural system. This determination of use -value by 
cultural meanings engenders a social process whereby men reciprocally 
define objects in terms of themselves and themselves in terms of 
objects. Objects are part of a communicative system through which 
individuals exchange information about status as well as about values, 
rituals, meanings, about their cultural system. 
Since objects perform the function of making evident status differ- 
ences in our society, they are subjected to an endless process of 
acquisition and consumption that is essential for the survival of our 
social system, which considers the freedom of acquisition as one of 
the most important values. In fact in an open society characterized 
by formal equality and achievable values, a syndrome of status anxiety 
is present, and objects, their ownership, become the most evident 
symbols of our social position, show the differences existing among us, 
who is above and who is below us in the social hierarchies. 
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We live in a society in which the individual does not work to pro- 
duce particular objects useful for his life but to reproduce the means 
for survival; often, working is consequently perceived and experienced 
as a means more than an end. Objects therefore have a meaning only in 
the sphere of consumption,and the ideal of man as an active and aware 
manipulator of environment and nature finds expression only in the private 
sphere: it finds a place in marginal activities, in hobbies, in do -it- 
yourself activities,losing in this way any kind of public recognition. 
Things.become goods for consumption and our relation to them is possible 
only in this sphere which is, as we shall see, in its turn problematic. 
Disappointment and discontent have their origin in consumption as well as 
in working experience or in public action. In a society as complex as 
the modern one, characterized by the multiple roles the individual has 
to play, it is not possible for a single domain to supply adequate 
grounds for the building of identity. 
The fact that to -day the only way we can relate to objects is as 
consumers, makes our relationship with them absolutely particular and 
different from that typical of other forms of social organizations, 
where the connection between production and consumption is immediate 
and direct. In fact in contemporary society - the society of mass 
production - things are produced to be consumed and this is the only 
way in which we can relate to them; our rhythms of consumption have 
become faster and faster losing any connection with natural ones. In 
this perspective it is possible to explain the existence of the "latest" 
model, the premature, planned, obsolescence of objects, the speedy 
change of fashion, the production of all sorts of objects which have 
no "physiological" utility at all but only a social one. 
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What is produced nowadays is not made according to criteria of 
durability but, on the contrary, according to criteria of fast obsol- 
extence. Consumption goods become extremely important both as material 
for the building of an identity and as supports in the interaction and 
confrontation with others, since objects constitute the system of signs 
through which we present ourselves, judge other individuals and are 
judged; we can (still) offend and humiliate with overwhelming bene- 
factions, with presents which cannot be repaid by others. If we can 
no longer argue, as did the members of the Melanesian tribes studied by 
Radcliffe- Brown, that the objects we gave to somebody else are still 
ours because our souls reside in them, surely we have toward them an 
attitude that cannot be explained only in terms of economic value and 
status significance. 
Objects perform at least another function: they contribute to the 
building of individual identity. With and through things we build an 
image of ourselves and we try to sell it on the market of interaction. 
Through the way in which we dress, the way in which we surround our- 
selves with particular objects, the way in which we organize the space 
in which we present ourselves, we communicate to others a series of 
signs through which one reads and interprets our values, power, the 
place we occupy in the social hierarchies. But this is not all. Through 
objects we communicate to others even feelings we do not dare admit to 
ourselves, to formalize in speech. The study of pathologies of behav- 
iour give us useful information on this symbolic communication through 
things. 
The goal of this work is that of clarifying some aspects and 
features of our relationship to objects which are rarely present in and 
considered by the sociological analysis but which are extremely 
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if we want to grasp the significance of things in our lives. 
More specifically my argument develops through three main compon- 
ents: 
a) A revisitation of well -known authors (e.g. Marx, Weber, Simmel, 
Nauss) which intends to recover what they said, implicitly or 
otherwise, on the relationship between individuals and objects, 
and on the peculiarity of this relationship in contemporary 
society. References to these well -known authors have not, of 
course, an exhaustive and detailed character. My goal is to 
emphasize a few aspects of their analysis, which seem relevant 
to the development of my argument. 
b) A systematic review and critique of express discussions of the 
social meanings and uses of objects,e.g., the literature on 
possession and exchange of goods among 'primitive° peoples, on 
the psychological uses of objects, on consumer behaviour, etc. 
c) A small scale, exploratory, qualitatively oriented, empirical 
investigation of individuals and situations having a particular, 
and thus peculiarly significant, relationship to objects. More 
specifically three different groups of people have been studied: 
1. Collectors of valueless objects; 
2. Individuals whose houses have been burgled; 
3. Religious people bound by vows of poverty. 
The first group has been chosen because its analysis sheds light 
upon the limited but too often overrated relevance of the economic 
value variables in explaining the motivations and reasons which induce 
people to surround themselves with objects, and upon the great impor- 
tance material things have in supporting the individual's identity. 
The analysis of the second group reveals the emotional and sent- 
imental investment which marks our relationship to things, the 
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projections they carry, their relevance for the maintenance of a 
stable self. 
The study of the third group'supplies interesting evidence on 
what happens to the self and identity of the individuals when they 
are totally deprived of material possessions for the rest of their 
life. 
Some other interesting elements emerge from an analysis of all 
three groups: e.g., gender differences in the way we relate to 
objects and rely upon them in structuring and supporting our identity 
and image of ourselves. 
One of the main functions performed by things is that of being 
carriers of meanings. Their importance and value do not derive from 
their intrinsic worth but from their ability to embody meanings, 
signs of relationships, markers of extended boundaries of the self. 
Things objectify relationships and in this sense perform a self- assur- 
ing role. This implies the strong dependency of the person on things 




The consumption ethic. 
Modern society is characterized - among other factors - by the 
coincidence of property with wealth and of both of them with rights to 
things by the penetration of the principles of exchange and sale- 
ability into every aspect of life. These factors have deeply modified 
the quality of social life, of interpersonal relationships. The div- 
ision of labour and the specialization required by modern technology 
have caused substantial changes in the ways of living and perceiving 
the world. 
Means and ends become separable, since we are perfectly able to 
perform successfully different tasks without knowing the ultimate ends 
of our action; calculability, precision and punctuality are forced 
upon life: 
"Money, with all its colorlessness and indifference, 
becomes the common denominator of all values; 
irreparably it hollows out the core of things, 
their individuality, their specific value, and 
their incomparability ".(2) 
The individual becomes progressively more dependent upon abstrac- 
tions that cause wider distance and more mediations between persons, 
more mediations in the satisfaction of needs. Money is probably the 
most evident symbol of this character of abstraction. Apparently it 
is an extension of rational and logical possibilities for the satis- 
faction of needs but actually it is a concentration of irrationality, 
it hides differences and discriminations under the veil of impersonality, 
it makes interpersonal relations less visible and more complicated. 
The miser's use of money, for example, is a direct contradiction, an 
exaggeration, and a perversion of money's social use. He does not 
fulfil his needs keeping it under the bed, he starves, does not feel 
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security, nor experiences an established social location but social 
isolation, mistakes means for ends since he does not realize the charac- 
ter of mediator typical of money. 
This separation between means and ends appears quite clearly when 
we consider that we live in a society in which the individual does not 
work to produce particular objects useful for his life but to reproduce 
the means for survival; working is consequently perceived and exper- 
ienced as a means more than an end.(3) It is in this context that 
Arendt speaks of the modern individual as 'animal laborans' as against 
'homo faber', constrained as he is to work for the simple reproduction 
of the means of subsistence. What once was proper of the slave - that 
is working for life - has become the common condition of the modern 
individual. The high level of technological sophistication we have 
reached in productive processes, as well as many other sectors of our 
lives, has had as a consequence the fact that fewer and fewer activ- 
ities require from the person an active and creative attitude. More 
and more often: 
"the person is reduced to being the occupier or the 
holder of qualifications, claims, characteristics, 
obligations, rights etc.; that is of abstract 
categorical determinations. ... An adaptation to 
spiritually meaningless, morally vacuous, and yet 
overpowering situations can take place in several 
ways: for instance as opportunism, as a surrender 
to the changing circumstances. .. . Another fairly 
frequent form of adaptation consists in taking a 
low profile, decreasing one's visibility, playing 
dead. A third and very significant one consists 
in what could be called feminization, meaning here 
that one emphasizes one's consumer occupations and 
a kind of passivity.(4) 
If permanence, stability and durability were the ideals of homo 
faber, abundance has become the ideal of the animal laborans and 
consumption is what dominates his spare time. The consumption ethic 
and not the work ethic becomes the prevalent one and provides motivation 
in contemporary society. The self -discipline, frugality, moderation 
and sobriety, characteristics of the ascending bourgeois are no longer 
the principles driving modern individuals in contemporary industrial 
society. The postponement of gratifications, the strategy of saving 
in order to invest in productive enterprises, give way to the need for 
immediate gratification, to "buy now pay later ". The logic of produc- 
tion itself becomes that of producing goods to be consumed as fast as 
possible, to make them obsolete in a very short time, so that they are 
immediately replaced by new ones. Thrift and industry have ceased to be 
the key to success and fulfilment. What has replaced the work ethic is 
the ethic of survival not in physical but in psychical terms, in terms 
of identity, of finding a meaning, an end in life. 
As Lasch points out: 
"The new ethic of self -preservation has been a long 
time taking shape; it did not emerge overnight. 
In the first three centuries of our history, the 
work ethic constantly changed its meaning; these 
vicissitudes often imperceptible at the time, fore- 
shadowed its eventual transformation into an ethic 
of personal survival ".(5) 
In reconsidering the Protestant ethic of the eighteenth century we 
cannot but stress the role played by the idea of self - improvement in 
two different spheres of the individual's life: the economic and the 
moral. Both are essential elements intertwined together. Making 
money was not the only aim of the Protestant who knew that self-improve- 
ment implied also "self- discipline, the training and cultivation of 
reason. Wealth is to be valued, but chiefly because it serves 
as one of the necessary preconditions of moral and intellectual cultiv- 
ation ".(6) 
The good and successful man of the eighteenth century does not 
work compulsively since he knows that there are other important functions 
5 
to be performed in society and that he will be recognized as called to 
salvation on the basis of his achievements in the world, of which success 
in business and wealth are only two aspects, although very important ones. 
The concept of self -improvement, so important and central in Franklin's 
thought,( 7) is not coincident or synonymous with self - advancement but it 
implies a deeper and more general effort to improve one's behaviour in 
many different aspects of life. 
Hofstadter, in his book on Anti- intellectualism in American life,(8) 
shows quite clearly this transformation of the social image of the 
bourgeois and of the businessman in American society in the last three 
centuries. At the beginning there was a justification of business in 
religioús terms, later it was claimed that business and trade served the 
character and culture; and when business progressively became the 
dominant theme of American life, and huge material wealth was growing in 
the new world, business no longer needed to seek a legitimation on a 
religious or cultural basis but found it in the rationality of business 
itself, in the welfare, security and comfort it produced. Material pros- 
perity and abundance became the two pivots of the new ethic, of the new 
moral ideals.(9) The progressive loss of moral meaning connected with 
the idea of success brings as a consequence the fact that the individual 
measures himself, his success and self -realization in a continuous com- 
parison with others, through a constant competition that adopts as stan- 
dard not a moral ideal but other people's actions, attitudes, etc. 
There is indeed in contemporary industrial society a progressive 
loss of institutional domains which can impart ethical sense to the 
individual's actions and behaviour, therefore the kind of confirmations 
we seek are evanescent. A phenomenon such as mobility (social and 
geographical) for example, has certainly been one of the consequences of 
industrial development and, in turn, has caused the erosion and the 
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loss of significance of some domains that previously were crucial for 
the construction of the individual's identity. 
Mobility, a fairly common experience for the modern individual, 
leads to changes in his milieux and weakens the relationships with the 
primary groups which socialized him; it compels the individual to 
abandon the norms and values he was brought up with and to constantly 
redefine them. As Riesman points out when he speaks of 'other direc- 
tion', the individual in modern industrial society needs more and more 
the approval and sharing of the new values he is "forced" to adopt by 
the people who find themselves in a similar social situation. This 
is essential to confirming and reaffirming his new identity. 
This loss of stable and durable domains of identification generates 
a kind of insecurity and anxiety that is not linked to the problem of 
social standing, but involves more generally the individual's condition 
and the meaning of life in contemporary industrial society. The 
decline of 'inner direction' means that people act less and less accord- 
ing to internalized value orientations, principles able to impart stable 
orientation in a changing situation. 
Competition, as we know it today, is quite a recent phenomenon that 
has deeply influenced interpersonal relationships among individuals.(10) 
This condition, quite obviously, generates a great deal of anxiety; the 
self- confidence of the bourgeois of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries gives way to insecurity, stress, dissatisfaction, search for 
identity, for a meaning in life. We can thus explain why the cravings of 
the modern individual have no limits, why he consumes compulsively, 
seeking immediate gratification and at the same time being perpetually 
unsatisfied. The contemporary individual is acquisitive, but in a 
different way from the bourgeois of the previous centuries. He seeks 
immediate gratification and satisfaction and not security for the 
future, he is not able to decipher his needs but tries to soothe the 
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state of anxiety that pervades his life. He does not look at the past 
in order to find an answer to his present questions nor is he able to 
postpone and give up something in the present to enjoy it in the future. 
The quest for identity. 
As has been previously said, the bureaucratization of careers in 
all sectors of public life, and more widely the increasing rationaliz- 
ation of the norms on which institutions are based (since they are deter- 
mined by the functional requirements of the institutions as such), bring 
with them anonymous social relations. This happens because the easy 
replacement and the interchangeability of managers and of the labour 
force is a basic requirement of large organizations. Parallel to this 
phenomenon, the mechanism of competition hinders the creation of personal 
relationships among employees: it is not possible to speak of real 
involvement of the person in his work since he is compelled to perform 
functionally defined roles, the situation in which he acts is defined 
bureaucratically according to the exigencies of the production process 
of the agency where he works. Even subjectively the individual is 
forced to define himself as an anonymous performer: 
"In consequence of the functional rationality of 
institutional norms, the institutional domains 
need insist only on performance control, while 
taking minimal interest in the whole person or 
his prescriptive 'inner life'. The primary 
public institutions tend to seem meaningless to 
the individual, their functional rationality 
cannot be converted into individual sense ".(11) 
Since the public realm no longer constitutes a satisfactory 
identificatory domain and since, on the other hand, the private realm 
does not constitute for the individual an adequate sphere of self - 
realization, he is compelled to a search for "essential identities" on 
a sort of identity market. The individual becomes a consumer of iden- 
tities of which some have a shorter, some a longer life, being subjected 
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to the obsolescence intrinsic to fashion. The very concept of obsol- 
escence is particularly apt to describe some characteristics of a 
consumer society where every product must be produced and consumed as 
fast as possible, where knowledge, beliefs, values, are quickly out- 
stripped by new ones: 
"Artists, scientists, etc., would operate rationally, 
in accordance with the spirit of the time, were they 
to cease striving in the work for a lasting, indeed 
a timeless, validity. It is in keeping with the 
context not only of a consumer society, but equally 
of a technical one where obsolescence has become a 
component of progress, that one should produce with 
an eye to speeding up turnover as does Bernard 
Buffet, with his 2,000 paintings in ten years. ... 
Since the effects themselves are so perishable, it 
would not make sense to expend too much effort in 
producing them ".(12) 
As Hirschman(13) correctly points out, neither the private nor 
the public spheres are able to satisfy people's needs and therefore 
the individual is alternatively shifting from involvements into the 
public arena (i.e. membership of peace movements, ecological movements, 
etc.) to withdrawal into the private ambit when public action is no 
longer able to answer the individual's quest. This sort of toing -and- 
froing between one sphere and the others is easily understandable 
since private life in its turn is not able to fulfil adequately our 
wishes but just only to sooth temporarily our dis- satisfaction. 
In particular, consumption activity is unable to give a satis- 
factory answer to one's existential problems. New products: 
"are unable to change in any way the tragic and 
frightening characteristics of the human predic- 
ament, such as anxiety, sorrow, disease or death. 
From this existential vantage point, the frantic 
effort made by people to acquire "trifling" objects 
always seems disproportionate to the result achieved. 
And even when objects are acquired to keep at bay 
another basic human affliction, namely boredom or 
ennui, the situation is similar: the time during 
which any object can truly amuse us is strictly 
limited; and because objects acquired for the 
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purpose of countering boredom reveal in rather 
short order their inability to do so in any durable 
fashion, yet continue to "hang around ", they them- 
selves come to exude the boredom they have been 
unable to conquer ".(14) 
On the other hand it is true that in contemporary society the 
attractiveness of public action resides in its ability to appear as the 
domain in which it is possible to fulfil the individuals' needs and 
aspirations to perceive themselves as socially useful, especially in a 
context of decline of religious fervor and values. But the motiv- 
ations to be present and active in the public sphere are more and more 
elusive. In modern acquisitive society, there are indeed few incen- 
tives to dedicate one's time and resources to 'higher purposes' and 
ideals, while the creation and accumulation of wealth is strongly 
encouraged and considered the prime task of the individual. This is 
what Hirschman calls the "ultimate ideological revanche of private over 
public action ", since the creation and accumulation of wealth are con- 
sidered the objective of private action. There is little doubt that 
in our cultural system one hasmore incentives to seek self -realization 
in the private realm than in public action, which nowadays tends to be 
perceived more and more exclusively as the arena where one fights for 
power, and less and less as a sphere where 'higher purposes' can be 
realized. 
What has been described so far is characteristic of, and peculiar 
to, contemporary industrial society, although, obviously, the process 
that brought about these features was not sudden or particularly rapid, 
and traces of it can be found in the previous centuries. As to this, 
it seems important to emphasize the progressive emptiness and loss of 
meaning and value of the institutional domains which previously gave a 
sense of identity and ethical significance, and a feeling of membership, 
to the individual. What emerges is the inability of modern society -op 
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substitute the obsolescent ones with new domains more adequate to 
contemporary life. This brings as a consequence the fact that iden- 
tity must be redefined apart from - if not against - the institutional 
roles the individuals perform in society. As Goffman has clearly 
asserted,(15) the individual does not actualize himself by performing a 
role but by keeping at a distance from it, he does not identify fully in 
the part. Roles come to be a sort of veil under which we hide ourself 
from others and, often, from our own consciousness. It is therefore 
mainly in the residual and interstitial areas not yet permeated by the 
anonymous logic on which modern society is based that the individual 
can seek a definition of himself. 
"Identity ceases to be an objectively and subjectively 
given fact and instead becomes the goal of an often 
devious and difficult quest. Modern man, almost 
inevitably it seems, is ever in search of himself. "(16) 
There are identity problems that are centered around the rational 
and formal nature of roles in a technological and bureaucratic envir- 
onment: we may have a very well defined role without deriving any 
satisfaction from it; therefore, we will seek different experiences 
able to intensify, stimulate, and enrich our life, to give us some 
satisfaction and a feeling of self -realization. Or, on the contrary, 
we may absorb ourselves almost completely in work and try to find in it 
the self- realization we are seeking. The individual may find refuge 
from the depersonalization of his working condition in private life, in 
free -time activities such as hobbies, sports, etc., where he can express 
the subjective elements of his personality that do not find adequate room 
in his public life; on the other hand, it can happen that the indiv- 
idual may find refuge in the very anonymity of his work condition and 
that he finds unbearable the non - anonymous relationships typical of the 
private sphere (interaction within the family, among friends, etc.). 
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However, it must be evident that there is no segregation - at 
least in terms of consciousness - between the working sphere and other 
sectors of individuals' life. The same frame of mind, the same kind of 
bureaucratic logic, the same attitude can be transferred from the 
public to the private: 
"Various hobbies, particularly those of the do- it- yourself 
variety, express the same feature of cognitive style in 
the private' life of the individual, but a problem- solving 
and deeply technological attitude may also carry over 
into the manner in which the individual looks at politics, 
the education of his children or the management of what- 
ever psychological difficulties he may be afflicted with".(17) 
As has been said, the private sphere has become extremely impor- 
tant for the individual who seeks to express a subjectivity that has no 
way and room to manifest itself in the over -institutionalized and over - 
bureaucratized public world. But, very often, the private realm is 
permeated by the same functional rationality that dominates the world of 
work. It is undeniable that work has always had an influence on social 
life. This is even truer, if possible, if one considers the tremendous, 
unprecedented impact of contemporary technological production upon every 
aspect of our lives. The enormous changes that, in a relatively short 
lapse of time, have taken place in the ways in which we live, work, eat, 
spend our leisure time, are educated, etc., have - quite obviously - 
modified our styles of thinking, feeling, experiencing, understanding, 
and relating to the outer world. The same kind of bureaucratic ration- 
ality that regulates and orders the world of work, imposes itself upon 
the consciousness of the individual as control upon impulsivity.(18) 
Self- control and the capacity to dominate one's impulses become the 
guiding principles of individuals' behaviour in a world in which the 
interaction among people becomes more and more difficult and complic- 
ated. The loss of meaning and of satisfaction that characterized the 
relation between the individual and work spreads also to the relation 
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between the individual and others. Anonymity becomes, perhaps, the 
most conspicuous feature of interaction in modern society, and material 
goods rather than human beings become the essential attributes and tools 
to reaffirm our identity. Our relationships with others, and ultimately 
with the self, come to be dominated by the same rules that define our 
relations with material objects.(19) 
Modernity has weakened the definitions of reality, the meanings 
that previously ordered the social world and made life easier to bear. 
As has been previously said, we no longer have institutional domains 
which give a sense of security and of identity to the individual. Private 
life becomes, in a sense, the "solution" to the dissolution of meanings 
and of certainty, but not a very satisfactory solution. If undeniably 
it offers a kind of equilibrating mechanism providing meaning and 
affords some room for the expression of emotional and irrational feelings, 
it is also true that the individual is left alone and without guiding 
principles to invent and construct his on self -made universe. This 
absolute and unprecedented liberty of the private sphere leaves us 
quite often in a state of anxiety since we are not able and do not have 
the instruments to make sense of and organize our life. 
Gehlen(20) points out that the private sphere is under -instituion- 
alized, in the sense that it lacks institutions to structure human 
activity and guiding principles to help the individual in the diffic- 
cult job of giving a meaning and constructing his universe. We often 
feel a terrible sense of 'homelessness',(21) but do not know what to 
do about it and therefore experience a sense of frustration, dis- satis- 
faction, anxiety. Hence an endless quest for something that might 
satisfy our needs, hence the proliferation of new institutions and 
groups, intended to provide an answer to the quest itself, hence the 
changes in the functions of old institutions (for example the church and 
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the family) seeking to adapt themselves to the new needs of contemp- 
orary individuals. 
The rise in recent times of so many new organizations, groups, 
clubs, associations (I am referring here to mystical sects, oriental - 
cults, sports associations, the great variety of voluntary and recrea- 
tional associations, etc.), must be interpreted as an attempt to fill 
the gap left by the under institutionalization of the private sphere, 
or better, by the lack of institutional domains able to give the indiv- 
idual a sense of identity. 
Parallel to the loss of its identificatory significance by work is 
the fact that in any case the time spent working is steadily decreasing 
(we start working at a later stage, end earlier, work fewer hours each 
day and have longer holidays), not to mention the large and growing 
number of unemployed. As a consequence, it is more and more impor- 
tant for the individual to find an adequate solution to his existential 
problems in private life. Individuals continuously build and rebuild 
refuges that have the intrinsic fragility of a private solution, always 
tested and threatened by "the cold winds of homelessness ". At the 
same time they create strategies for interaction with others, both in 
the world of work and in leisure activities.(22) 
The study of the relationships between people and things in every- 
day life gives us several examples of the strategies they follow in 
constructing an image of themselves and a universe able to give them a 
sense of security and of identity in the jungle of human relations. 
Obviously there are different solutions, different reactions, different 
ways of seeking release from the psychological tension, from the sense 
of anonymity that permeates our lives. Some people may - as has been 
said - try to find an answer in the world of work, others in public 
action, others in withdrawal into a private universe made to measure 
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for their needs, or better, for what they think their needs are: 
"Some individuals pursue idiosyncratic hobbies or 
other forms of highly private activities, others 
make fetish out of pets; one is totally engaged in 
the collection and the collation of the performance 
records of twenty years of athletic heroes, another 
builds innumerable bird houses which he stores in a 
shed. ... Other groups organize their life around 
an anonymous ritualization of a given set of 
activites. 
"(23) 
In this framework this research has sought to explore the role 
material objects play by contributing to the creation and realisation 
of these strategies. 
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CHAPTER I 
INDIVIDUAL AND MARKET SOCIETY: MODIFICATIONS OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS. 
From private to privacy. 
In the introduction some important features of contemporary 
society have been stressed. Another relevant aspect deserves some 
attention: the dissolution of the private realm into the social one 
due to the loss of sacredness of private property. 
By private property is meant here an individual's possession of a 
specific location where he lives with the family, is born and dies, 
where the individual masters the necessities of life.(1) The possess- 
ion of a personal place, distinguished, in ancient Greece, the citizen 
from the slave, the individual who belonged to the body politic from 
one who had no right of citizenship. From this point of view the 
stranger and the slave, although they clearly occupied two different 
positions within the community, were both in the same condition: they 
had no political rights, they had no access to the public realm since 
they were not allowed to be or become owners of land; and this not 
only in the physical sense but in the figurative one of a life that is 
rooted in the social environment. 
(2) 
In ancient Greece and Rome there was a clear conceptual difference 
between private property and wealth; between the unmoveable and the 
moveable property of Roman law. An individual could be a slave and 
be wealthy at the same time, and wealth never had a sacred meaning or 
character. 
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"Prior to the modern age, which began with the exprop- 
riation of the poor and then proceeded to emancipate 
the new propertyless classes, all civilizations have 
rested upon the sacredness of private property. .... 
Originally property meant no more or less than to have 
one's location in a particular part of the world and 
therefore to belong to the body politic, that is to be 
the head of one of the families which constituted the 
public realm. This piece of privately owned world 
was so completely identical with the family who owned 
it that the expulsion of a citizen could mean not 
merely the confiscation of his estate but the actual 
destruction of the building itself. .... Poverty.did 
not deprive the head of the family of this location in 
the world and the citizenship resulting from it. ... 
The sacredness of this privacy was like the sacredness 
of the hidden, namely of birth and death. .... "(3) 
In this perspective, private property had a fundamental political 
significance very different from the modern one, ,since nowadays we 
understand it as privately owned wealth. To own property was the 
essential requisite in order 'to transcend one's life and enter the 
world all have in common', that is to transcend the private realm and 
to enter the public one. But, to be really free, the individual had 
to be wealthy enough to possess slaves who mastered the necessities of 
life for their master's family. Therefore, private wealth became a 
prerequisite of participation in public life, of the individual's 
playing a political role. If the property owner had chosen to act in 
order to get richer instead of using his property to lead a political 
life, he would have sacrificed his freedom and become a voluntary slave. 
It is exactly this attitude toward property and wealth of the property 
owner, so different from that of the bourgeois, that explains why 
ancient cities were centres of consumption rather than centres of 
production. 
"It was not 'greed for gain' as a psychological 
motive that was tabooed; rather, it was 
any rational, continuously organized, and in this 
sense specifically 'bourgeois' form of acquisitive 
operation, any systematic economic activity that 
was looked upon with disdain ".(4) 
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It is only when wealth started to be perceived and considered as 
capital and no longer as something to be consumed in a shorter or 
longer time, that private property came to be considered coincident with 
it. 
"The change in common usage, to treating property as the 
things themselves, came with the spread of the full 
capitalist market economy from the seventeenth century 
on, and the replacement of the old limited rights in land 
and other valuable things by virtually unlimited rights. 
As rights in land became more absolute, and parcels of 
land became more freely marketable commodities, it became 
natural to think of the land itself as the property. .... 
In fact the difference was not that things rather than 
rights in things were exchanged, but that previously 
unsaleable rights in things were now saleable; or, to put 
it differently, that limited and not always saleable 
rights in things were being replaced by virtually unlimited 
and saleable rights to things.(5) 
Private property comes to be the right that the person has to 
things and, first of all, to himself as an individual, so that private 
property is considered an attribute of the person, the material things 
that he owns and exchanges, sells, buys or inherits during his life- 
time. When the distinction between unmoveable and moveable property 
comes to an end, the sacredness of private property comes to an end too. 
Property loses the significance of protecting the individual from the 
common world, and acquires a social value, i.e. it has an exchange 
value; it loses its particular sacred character and becomes ex- 
ternal to the person, who can exchange or gain it. In this process 
what is lost is a private realm where the individuals can isolate them- 
selves from the outer world, where life perpetuates itself, where the 
rhythms and times of nature govern the flow of everyday life. But 
with the dissolution of the private realm comes that of the public one 
too and both of them are absorbed in the social one. As H. Arendt says, 
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"Marx predicted correctly, though with an unjustified 
glee, the 'withering away' of the public realm under 
conditions of unhampered development of the 'productive 
forces of society', and he was equally right, that is, 
consistent with his conception of man as an animal 
laborans, when he foresaw that 'socialized men' would 
spend their freedom from laboring in those strictly 
private and essentially worldless activities that we 
now call 'hobbies " 
*(6) 
The modern concept of privacy, linked as it is to subjectivism 
and intimacy, is completely different from the private realm as it has 
been described above. The public realm is no longer the world every- 
body has in common, where the individual realizes himself as citizen, 
as homo faber and active member of a community, and all the feelings 
that no longer find an external realization turn inward: the private 
sphere becomes the real counterpart to a public world where the indiv- 
idual is not able to find satisfactory identificatory domains, privacy 
becomes a refuge from the stress and difficulties of public life. 
Introspection, auto- analysis, psychologization are all aspects of the 
personality of contemporary man.(7) This tendency toward intimacy 
and subjectivism originates from the fact that social life becomes 
frequently more and more difficult to bear as modernity weakens the 
definitions of reality which previously gave a sense of stability to 
the individual. Since modern society no longer provides stability, 
the person is compelled to seek it within his on consciousness,within 
his subjectivity. 
Modern society and modifications of interpersonal relationships. 
The founding fathers of sociology have been acute witnesses to the 
changes which characterized the emergence of modern society and to the 
transformations which they have caused to interpersonal relationships. 
In the following pages I take into account a few aspects of their 
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theories which seem relevant to the relationship between individ- 
uals and objects in the modern world. This, therefore, is not 
intended to be a critical discussion of the thought of these authors 
but only a reconsideration of a few aspects and elements of their 
theories which offer useful insights and tools to gain a better under- 
standing of the peculiarity of this relationship in modern /contem- 
porary society. 
Since Marx, sociology has been aware of the fact that the trans- 
formation of traditional social relations into market relations has 
deeply changed the quality and the functions of interpersonal relation- 
ships. What is typical of modern society is the fact that not only 
the goods, the products of labour, are sold on the market but human 
labour itself: man sells part of himself as a commodity, exchanges 
his labour power for means of livelihood on a free market dominated 
by impersonal laws. The market becomes the centre of every human 
activity and not only of economic ones. It changes the whole society. 
From a society based on custom, on status, on authoritarian 
allocation of work and rewards we pass into one in which the individual 
is no longer considered part of a rank or order but as the owner of 
himself free to sell his property (his labour power as well) on the 
market.(8) If the market as a place in which we exchange goods has 
always been where people produced more than they consumed, completely 
new is the logic that - in modern society - regulates this interac- 
tion: the logic of rational calculation, of freedom of trade, of 
absence of rules to regulate consumption, production, prices: the 
logic of impersonality. 
As Weber says "The market community as such is the most impersonal 
relationship of practical life into which humans can enter with one 
another ".(9) 
22 
According to Marx the most characteristic feature of capitalist 
society is the fact that workers are compelled to sell their labour 
power on the market. The worker transfers part of his power to the 
person who owns the means of production. In this sense the relation- 
ships between individuals in capitalist society are relations of power. 
As a consequence of the compulsive transfer of power from one to 
another, the individual loses his human essence. Previous to market 
society, work was essential for survival but, at the same time, it was 
also the demonstration of the individual's existence. The individual 
produced for his personal needs and only the surplus was exchanged. 
According to Marx the aim of work was that of producing useful objects 
and goods. 
With the selling on the market of his own labour the individual 
loses this/relation between himself and his labour product. What 
becomes essential is not the utility of the product but the exchange 
value of the labour power. The maintenance of the individual's life 
becomes the'aim of the activity and work is the only way to assure 
survival.(10) The worker gradually becomes indifferent to what he 
produces; what matters to him is the salary derived from the work. 
He no longer immediately exchanges his produce for the product he needs. 
The equivalent becomes an equivalent in money which is the immediate 
result of wage- labour and the medium of exchange. 
"The complete domination of the alienated object over 
man is evident in money and the complete disregard of 
the nature of the material, the specific nature of 
private property as well as the personality of the 
proprietor. What formerly was the domination of one 
person over another has now become the general domin- 
ation of the thing over the person, the domination of 
the product over the producer ".(11) 
As a consequence of the worker becoming a commodity, 
the more the 
value of the goods he produces the less his value. Human 
activity 
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becomes something opposed to man, his work becomes something objective, 
independent of him and to which the worker has to be subordinated. 
The manipulation of the external world - what makes the difference 
between human beings and animals - is no longer a process through which 
man makes something for a precise aim but a means for the worker's sur- 
vival. 
The relations between individuals and between them and objects 
lose every qualitative aspect and tend to be replaced by purely quantit- 
ative relations; the individual is no longer the one who leads the 
working process; he is incorporated as a mechanical part in a mechan- 
ical system which he has to obey. He can be easily replaced by another 
man; his personal gifts, his qualities are no longer important: the 
life of the whole society is fragmented and atomized in separated and 
isolated exchanges among commodities. 
"Clearly in a world perceived as consisting of things 
the relation between the subject and such things is 
crucial. Since .... things can not be acknowledged 
as of the subject's own making, the subject can 
relate to them only by possessing them, accumulating 
them, or consuming them. Since the subject does 
not recognize that the things he needs are of his own 
making, consuming and /or accumulating them does not 
convince him that he is reappropriating himself through 
them, growing subjectively by making them his own. 
His relation to them is purely dependent"., 12) 
According to Marx, then, capitalist society brings as a conseq- 
uence a peculiar and typical relation between individuals and objects 
and between the individuals themselves. 
Weber enlarges on the use of the concept of separation of the 
worker from his means of production: he applies it not only 
to the analysis of the economic sphere but also 
to that of any form of 
hierarchical and authoritarian organization. 
According to Weber what really makes a 
relevant difference between 
traditional and market society is the 
fact that in the latter the 
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principle of rationalization becomes predominant. But the predomin- 
ance of this process does not depend only on rational forces; charisma, 
for example, is an irrational element that has contributed:to this 
phenomenon. The process of rationalization does not involve only the 
economic sphere of society but finds expression also in bureaucratic 
organization. The modern bureaucracy is just like a machine and the 
individual becomes only a small part of it and has to accomplish deter- 
mined functions already planned. He has no choices and can be easily 
replaced. 
"The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares 
with other organizations exactly as does the machine 
with the non -mechanical modes of production. Pre- 
cision, speed, un- ambiguity, knowledge of the files, 
continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, 
reduction of function and of material and personal 
costs - these are raised to the optimum point in the 
strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially 
in its monocratic form. .... Individual performances 
are allocated to functionaries who have specialized 
training and who by constant practice learn more and 
more. The "objective discharge of business" primar- 
ily means a discharge of business according to calcul- 
able rules and without regard for persons ".(13) 
The more bureaucracy depersonalizes itself, i.e., the more com- 
pletely it succeeds in achieving the exclusion of love, hatred, and 
every purely personal, especially irrational, feeling from the exec- 
ution of official tasks, the more it becomes appropriate for the full 
development of capitalism. "Modern culture requires ( ) the 
emotionally detached, and hence rigorously 'professional' expert ".(14) 
The efficiency of modern bureaucracy is due to the depersonal- 
ization, to the specialization of the tasks. But this process of 
depersonalization is common to the whole modern society and brings 
as a consequence a disenchantment of the world. The advanced ration- 
alization imprisons the man in the Gehäuse der H8.igkeit of special- 
ization: 
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"the modern economic order is now bound to the 
technical and economic conditions of machine 
production which to -day determines the lives of 
all the individuals who are born into this 
mechanism, (....) with irresistible force ".(15) 
The modern individual therefore, finds it more and more difficult 
to seek an answer to his existential problems in an extremely special- 
ized and highly rationalized society based on the ethic of the market, 
that is, on an absolute depersonalization which is 'contrary to all 
the elementary forms of human relationships'.(16) 
From this point of view, Simmel's work provides us with one of 
the most interesting analyses and reflections on the consequence of 
modern culture on the individual, tracing the specificity of social 
phenomena back to the universality of psychological explanations. In 
his essay on "Faithfulness and Gratitude ", exchange is defined as the 
'objectification of human interaction'. This occurs because when 
individuals exchange objects among themselves the purely spontaneous 
character of their relation becomes projected into the objects. This 
objectification, this growth of the relationship into self -contained 
moveable things, becomes so complete that, in a fully developed economy, 
personal interaction recedes altogether into the background, while 
goods acquire a life of their own. Men act only as the executors of 
the tendencies toward shifts and equilibriums of values and relations 
which are inherent in the goods themselves. The objectively equal, 
is given for the objectively equal, and man himself is really irrel- 
evant, although it goes without saying that he engages in the process 
in his own interest. The relation among men has become a relation 
among objects: 
"Thus, if earlier, prior to the use of metal money, 
some handiwork was purchased with a cow or goat, 
these wholly heterogeneous things were juxtaposed 
and became exchangeable by virtue of the economic, 
abstract general value contained in each of them. 
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This heterogeneity reaches its peak in modern money 
economy. Because money expresses the general 
element contained in all exchangeable objects, that 
is, their exchange value, it is incapable of express- 
ing the individual element in them. Therefore objects 
in so far as they figure as saleable things, become 
degraded; the individual in them is levelled down to 
the general which is shared by everything saleable, 
particularly by money itself 
"(17) 
The individual has to bear alone the consequences of the capit- 
alist system since specialization makes every person different from 
the others and any comparison impossible. Simmel's man is not alien- 
ated because of the bureaucratization, he is the prisoner of sterile 
and frozen interactions. 
Simmel's theory of value, in which the sacrifice is the condition 
of value as such, and therefore value is considered a subjective calcul- 
ation between sacrifice and desire, is a clear exemplification of the 
author's subjectivism, his theory becomes the theory of the impotence 
and loneliness of man in modern society.(18) 
In Simmel we find a witness to the collapse of the humanistic 
culture under the pressure of specialization. The money economy has 
in fact brought about the 'calculative exactness' of practical life, which 
corresponds to the means and ends of natural science: 'to transform the 
world into an arithmetical formula'. 
"Only money economy has 
people with weighing, 
determinations, with a 
values to quantitative 
filled the days of so many 
calculating, with numerical 
reduction of qualitative 
ones 
".(19) 
The division of labour requires from the individual a more and more one 
sided competence. The reflection on values, the task of the human- 
istic scholar, becomes therefore an impossible undertaking: the free- 
dom of modern man - due to the fact that he can sell and buy every thing - 
"often means a selling and uprooting of personal values ".(20) The 
origin and the cause of what Simmel terms the objectification of 
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culture must be sought in the division of labour, in specialiation; 
the only human product that is free from this process of objectific- 
ation is the work of art because it requires "only one single person 
but it requires him totally, right down to his innermost core 
",(21) 
The process of the objectification of culture involves every 
aspect of human life. Objects lose the meanings of tools, of instru- 
ments to be used for specific functions and made to last as long as 
possible. The relation between individuals and objects come to be 
one of dependence of the person upon things, things that are perceived 
as independent from us. The feeling of being oppressed by the exter- 
nalities of modern life "is not only the consequence but also the 
cause of the fact that they confront us as autonomous objects. "(22) 
Modern man is surrounded by nothing but impersonal objects and all 
his life becomes limited only to social relationships which have the 
same characteristics of economic exchange. According to Simmel, every 
kind of interaction - even one that implies the innermost feelings - 
has to be regarded as an exchange. Therefore social relations are 
frozen in conventions and rules, the marital couple becomes a geomet- 
rical form, the dyad, a form completely depleted of every kind of 
feelings; the individual becomes trapped in a net of social inter- 
actions in which there is only the front region, the rule, the appear- 
ance. 
While in Marx and Weber market relationships, with their imperson- 
ality, with no room for brotherliness, expand to dominate all other 
forms of relationship, in Simmel the objectification of culture, the 
subordination of feelings and objects to their exchange value are 
consequence of the calculating character that has its symbol in money. 
For Simmel the power of commodities and money is due to the objectif- 
ication of the spirit. 
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The problem of exchange. 
Since every exchange by its own nature implies an objectification 
of the relationships of the persons involved in it, it is interesting 
to understand how the individuals cope with this problem in societies 
where the impersonal logic of the market has not permeated every sphere 
of life and where the exchange is actually perceived as carrier of 
values in opposition to those prevalent in the cultural system. There 
are in fact socieities in which the exchanges have to be hidden under 
different forms in order not to offend the feelings of brotherliness 
which exclude the exchange as interaction based on interests. As 
Weber says, 'the market is fundamentally alien to any type of fraternal 
relationship',(23) and presupposes the objectification of human person- 
ality since every individual projects part of himself in the object he 
exchanges. For this reason in the Silent Trade the two protagonists 
of the exchange reduce to the minimum level their social interaction: 
they do not speak, they hide every manifestation of their "self ", they 
behave as if the exchange took place without them. 
"The silent trade is a form of exchange which avoids 
all face to face contacts and in which the supply 
takes the form of a deposit of the commodity at a 
customary place, the counter offer takes the same 
form, and dickering is effected through the increase 
in number of objects being offered from both sides, 
until one party either withdraws dissatisfied or, 
satisfied, takes the goods left by the other party 
and departs". 
In this example the person hides any expressive manifestation of his 
identity in order to preserve brotherliness from the egoistic relation 
of exchange. 
Mauss in his famous essay "The Gift" gives us a description of a 
different way to solve the problem of brotherliness in exchange rel- 
ationships. While in the Silent Trade the protagonists exclude them- 
selves, their personal presence, from the frame in which the exchange 
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takes place, in the gift, what is hidden is the contractual character 
of the exchange. Mauss shows that under the altruistic ritual of the 
gift are hidden relations of power, egoistic interests. According to 
the French scholar the market has always existed and he wants to demon- 
strate how things and their exchange influence and modify the relation- 
ships among individuals and the individual identity: 
"We intended in this book to isolate one important 
set of phenomena: namely, prestations which are 
in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, 
but are in fact obligatory and interested. The 
form usually taken is that of the gift generously 
offered, but the accompanying behaviour is formal 
pretence and social deception, while the trans- 
action itself is based on obligation and economic 
self -interest 
His perspective is completely opposite to that of Durkheim. While 
Durkheim in fact, studies society to show that we can not reduce human 
behaviour to egoistic interest, that we can not reduce interaction to 
pure calculating communications, Mauss studies society to show that 
under the ritual of gift there is personal interest, there is competition 
for power. In the Potlach, for example, there is the obligation to 
make a return gift "under the penalty of losing mena, authority and 
wealth ". This form of exchange does not make a person, a tribe, richer 
than before; its meaning is that of establishing or confirming hier- 
archical relationships and, at the same time, of enforcing friendship. 
Therefore we can say that this form of exchange reveals a concept of 
interest completely different from that which is at the basis of modern 
transactions; through the waste and the showing off of gifts the indiv- 
idual wants to confirm his power, his place in the social structure of 
society. Through the donation and sometimes the destruction of things, 
the potlach shows the honour which wealth itself confers. 
Unlike modern transactions that are among individuals, both potlach 
and kula are forms of gifts exchange that involve entire communities: 
"for it is groups and not individuals which carry on 
exchanges,make contracts, and are bound by obligations, 
the persons represented in the contracts are moral 
persons - clans, tribes, and families, the group or 
the chiefs as intermediaries for the groups, confront 
and oppose each other. Further, what they exchange 
is not only exclusively goods and wealth, real and 
personal property, and things of economic value. 
They exchange rather courtesies, entertainments, 
rituals, military assistance, women, children, dances 
and feasts. ...." 
(26) 
In spite of this apparently voluntary form, this kind of exchange is a 
system of 'total obligation' that involves three different duties: 
1). the obligation to give gifts; 
2). the obligation to receive gifts; 
3). the obligation to repay the received gifts with others. 
The chief who refuses to give a potlach is considered by the others 
as a 'rotten face'. In fact in this frame "to refuse to give or to 
fail to invite, is like refusing to accept the equivalent of a declar- 
ation of war, it is a refusal of friendship and intercourse ". What 
Mauss seems to suggest in his essay is the fact that the gift exchange 
was a peaceable way to relate to others. In societies in which the 
borders between friendship and enmity can be broken very easily, in 
which a feast can become a massacre, the exchange of gifts plays the 
role of maintaining the alliances. But as the kula shows quite clearly, 
hidden under the form of gifts there is a big inter -tribes trade: 
"the trade is carried out in noble fashion, disinterestedly and mod - 
estly "(27) "pains are taken to show one's freedom and autonomy as well 
as one's magnanimity, yet all the time one is actuated by mechanisms 
of obligation which are resident in the gifts themselves ".(28) 
This competition to give more than the others implies a compet- 
ition for more power both inside the community, in order to maintain 
leadership, and outside, with other tribes, to establish a new 
hierarchy: "to give is to show One's superiority, to show that one 
31 
is something more and higher, that one is magister, to accept without 
returning or repaying more is to face subordination, to become a 
client and subservient, to become a minister ".( 29) In this way 
through enormous destruction of wealth, through excessive gifts and 
consumption, the hierarchy is established. Who returns the gifts must 
do so in a larger amount, but this is not made to compensate the loss 
of the first donor but "to humiliate the. original donor or exchange 
partner ". 
Up to now we have seen that according to Mauss the gifts, and 
therefore the objects, perform two different functions: 
1). the function of exchange and therefore that of division of 
labour; 
2). the function of establishing social hierarchies and there- 
fore of stratifying people according to their possessions. 
In analyzing this essay a third function emerges: that of poss- 
essing a part of the donor's personality: 
"the obligation attached to a gift itself is not inert. 
Even when abandoned by the giver, it still forms part 
of him. Through it he has a hold over the recipient, 
just as he had, while its owner, a hold over anyone 
who stole it ". .... This bond created by things is 
in fact a bond between persons, since the thing itself 
is a person or pertains to a person. Hence it follows 
that to give something is to give a part of oneself. 
.... In this system of ideas one gives away what is in 
reality a part of one's nature and substance, while to 
receive something is to receive a part of someone's 
spiritual essence 
".(30) 
Objects are therefore what creates the relationship between the 
protagonists of the exchange: they become the point of agreement 
and dispute between individuals. Mauss'indiTidual is always engaged 
in fights, in competitions for power, for personal interest. The 
gift offers a possibility of replacing the confrontation which would 
otherwise take place through the showing off of objects, through the 
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fights, through war. Therefore things have a moral meaning, an 
emotional value as well as a material one; and according to Mauss 
they still have this quality. We still have with objects a relation- 
ship that is not only economic - in terms of purchase and sale - but 
a personal one. Objects still are the element at the basis of our 
interaction with others; we can still offend and humiliate with charity, 
with presents that cannot be repaid by others. 
From Mauss' analysis of the gift the norm of reciprocity emerges 
as an essential element of the exchange (according to him there is a 
universally recognized obligation to reciprocate gifts which have been 
accepted). This concept is central to the analyses of many other social 
scientists: it is present for instance, in Parsons' and Merton °s 
analyses, it is at the basis of Homans' theory of exchange, it is cen- 
tral to Malinowski's interpretation of Trobriand culture as well as to 
Levi- Strauss' theory of the exchange of women. The principle of 
reciprocity is indeed often stressed as the basis on which the social 
and ethical life of civilizations rests. Simmel, for example, emphas- 
izes that cohesion and social equilibrium exist only if the reciprocity 
of service and return service is also present and if 'all contacts 
among men rest on the schema of giving and returning the equivalence.'(31) 
This principle implies a system of interdependent parts engaged in mutual 
interchanges. 
The norm of reciprocity does not give a satisfactory explanation of 
some forms of interaction and exchange among individuals: phenomena 
such as charity and beneficence, for instance, cannot be explained within 
this theoretical framework. As Gouldner correctly argues the weakest 
strata of the population (the old, the sick, children, etc.), that is 
many who need help, might never get it if the norm of reciprocity were 
the only one to guide human action. As he says "Reciprocity is the 
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norm of the 'realistic' world of work. Something for nothing is the 
ideal of the world beyond work, the world of fantasy and imagination ".(32) 
The relation between reciprocity on the one hand and magnanimity, 
beneficence, charity, etc., on the other is a contradictory relation 
between two different ethical ideals: the first establishes that one 
gives because of what has been or will be received from others; the 
second establishes that help must be given because others are in need. 
Although the principle of reciprocity- is the prevalent one in contem- 
porary society, we have still to acknowledge that to give something 
for nothing stimulates and stirs up greater emotion in the receiver 
just because of the extreme rarity of such actions: 
"there is no gift that brings a higher return than 
the free gift, the gift given with no strings 
attached. For that which is truly given freely 
moves men deeply and makes them most indebted to 
their benefactors. In the end, if it is recip- 
rocity that holds the mundane world together, it 
is beneficence that transcends this world and can 
make men weep the tears of reconciliation 
"(33) 
Although rare and marginal in modern society, 'the principle of 
giving something for nothing' is a very important one since it clearly 
shows that a utilitarian approach is not able to give an adequate 
explanation to the norms and principles on which modern society (as 
well as many past ones) is based. As I shall try to explain and 
show in the next chapters there are other important motivations and 
rules that influence our relationships to objects and among ourselves. 
Phenomena such as the free giving of blood and organs, the adoption 
of children, etc., as Titmuss(34) has magistrally pointed out - 
would not find a satisfactory answer if all relations were restricted 
to the principle of utility, or to that of exchange of equivalents. 
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Some conclusions. 
From what has been argued up to now some conclusions can be 
drawn: 
In the first place the fact that in modern industrial society the 
relationship between individuals and material objects is particular and 
peculiar, different from those which characterized other forms of social 
organizations. In the archaic societies described by Mauss, for 
example, the exchange was a transaction concerning not only things but 
moral meanings and symbols too. The individual and the things were 
deeply bound together, there was a sort of sacredness both to the indiv- 
idual and to the thing. In contemporary society, on the other hand, 
there is a separation of the individual from the thing just because the 
relationship between persons has become a relationship between things 
and we have lost the sacredness of the person: money, the impersonal 
object, has permeated all our relationships, has become our instru- 
ment of communication, the measure of every thing. In the next 
chapter we shall discuss and analyze this topic in greater detail. 
In the second place the fact that the modern individual is not yet 
completely trapped within the logic of calculating and of functional 
rationality and therefore his relationships toward objects should not 
be considered relations based only on the economic value, as concern- 
ing only the quantity, the cost. 
Nor is it possible to define the relationships between man and 
objects only in terms of status symbols, of symbols of power. Firstly 
because in to -day's complex society the criteria of differentiation and 
of social stratification are based on many other variables, secondly 
because objects may still have for us an emotional value even if, 
probably, no longer universally recognized. Indeed, as we shall see 
in the second part of the dissertation, we can speak even to -day of 
emotional feelings that link and create bonds among individuals and 
between them and the objects, but they have become far weaker and 
manifest themselves in more private contexts. 
Moreover, the multiplicity of messages conveyed by objects is more 
and more confused and covered up by the economic value that tends to 
be the predominant one and to objectify every relationship in the form 
of commodity, of exchange value. The task of the next chapter is to 
discuss and explain these processes and phenomena. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SYMBOLIC MEANINGS OF THINGS 
In every form of social organization culture patterns the 
exchanges among individuals and between them and the environment. In 
every society the symbolic structures expressed in cultural forms 
define ideas of utility, of value. They organize the choice and the 
manipulation of natural materials in order to produce particular 
objects, particular goods. 
What is peculiar to Western culture is the fact that economy has 
become the most important site of symbolic production: hidden under 
the abstract equivalence of objects - their exchange value - that finds 
its expression in the universal means of exchange (money), there is the 
fact that needs, desires and objects of desire (i.e. commodities) are 
organized according to cultural determinations. In societies organ- 
ized according to different criteria - I am referring here to the so- 
called 'primitive societies' - the main locus of symbolic production 
and differentiation is not to be found in the economy but in other 
social relations, mainly kinship, and the other spheres of activity 
are dependent upon and ordered by kinship status. 
Even a superficial analysis of the immense anthropological material 
that deals with the problem of exchange and its relation with the 
structure of power 
(1) 
shows that the criteria on which exchanges are 
based are dependent upon particular and rigid rules whose origins must 
be sought in the social system as a whole and not only in the economic 
one. In particular it is important to emphasize that if competition 
for power and prestige is present, it finds expression in the possession, 
ostentation, destruction of particular objects only, and does not amount 
to a generalized competition based on every kind of goods. There 
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are many societies in which the exchange of goods is strictly regul- 
ated and separated in two or three different channels of exchange, 
each dealing exclusively with particular objects and products, each 
with clear and rigid boundaries. There is no common denominator - a 
universal currency - able to establish the value of any object or 
product of human labour whatever. Rather, in each of these spheres 
of exchange everybody knows with what a particular item can be bartered). 
each sphere of exchange plays a distinctive role in the organization 
and in the structuring of social life. 
If we follow Salisbury's analysis(2) of Siane People, for example, 
we find that exchange takes three different forms to which correspond 
three "nexusus of activity ", of production. The first form of 
exchange includes everyday food, clothing, housing and tools. These 
are the products that ensure a minimum level of subsistence. They are 
derived from relatively abundant natural materials. The exchanges of 
these goods take place only among members of the same clan and in this 
way intra clan obligations are fulfilled. Barter is the traditional 
form used in these transactions. 
The second form involves the exchange of what Salisbury defines as 
luxury goods - snake skin, tobacco, salt, etc. These goods are 
produced or anyway provided by the personal initiative of individuals 
and are exchanged among the people only with other goods belonging to 
the same nexus of activity. They are used privately or when there are 
guests. In these transactions clan obligations are not involved. 
The third form concerns the production and the exchange of cere- 
monial goods, that is of objects or products essential for the perfor- 
mance of public rituals such as weddings, initiation ceremonies, etc. 
These goods are bartered at public events. These exchanges take 
place both in intra clan and inter clan situations and they necessar- 
ily impose a return obligation. 
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The boundaries between these spheres are quite rigid and (there- 
fore) there is very little crossing of them in the exchanges of goods. 
These barriers, that prevent the interchange of objects from one sphere 
to the others, reflect and embody the features that structure social 
relations. 
"Food, (for instance) is the commodity most often 
used as a token or a symbol of continuing relation- 
ships, for reciprocating gifts of labour, services, 
or 'material goods. Most commonly it indicates 
common membership in a group. Food given to 
strangers indicates that the stranger is, momentarily 
at least, treated as a member of the same group. 
.... Food, then, is given by individuals to preserve 
their membership in productive groups; its accep- 
tance by other individuals serves to maintain or 
enlarge the group itself ".(3) 
But not all foods are utilized to symbolize group membership since 
"it is not the mere fact of edibility or the universality of use 
that makes them into subsistence goods with this symbolic meaning "(4). 
products like pork and salt - universally used by Siane People - are 
not part of subsistence goods. Salisbury suggests that we could 
draw a line between indispensable goods (those of the first sphere) 
and dispensable goods (those of the second and third spheres). But 
"indispensable" does not simply refer to the mere physical subsistence 
of the individual, rather to the social one too. The concept of 
social subsistence implies that one is able to live according to the 
social status of the people who use determined goods, since their poss- 
ession and manipulation is an essential indicator of status and, at the 
same time, a basic requisite for maintaining one's position in the 
hierarchical structure of power. In this sense one can say that sub- 
sistence goods are used not only to satisfy every social obligation 
that an individual has to fulfil to be a member of the clan, but also 
to show that his fellow members accept his position in the society. 
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Therefore it is possible to assert that subsistence goods are essen- 
tial for the maintenance of the existing organization of the whole 
society, of the relationships within it. 
It seems to me that from this brief and partial summary of 
Salisbury's study one can grasp interesting ideas and elements in 
order to understand the relations that connect individuals with things 
and the role things play in shaping interpersonal relations. Salisbury 
shows how limited is an approach that concerns itself only with the use - 
value and the exchange -value of objects. The way in which things 
are organized in the three spheres reflects the way in which social 
relations are shaped. The hierarchical structure in which things are 
assembled reflects the hierarchy of values on which social life is 
based. The three different nexusus of activity and the consequent 
different grouping of things reflect the understanding of human needs 
according to Siane People: those related to the individual physical 
and social subsistence (first sphere); those related to the personal 
status and wealth of the individual (second sphere) and those related 
to ceremonial rituals (third sphere). 
Since there is such a rigid separation between the three nexusus 
of activity and of exchange there is no reason to increase the pro- 
duction of subsistence goods that cannot be exchanged with goods 
belonging to the other two spheres. Therefore a technological innov- 
ation that enables the same amount of good3 to be produced in a shorter 
time (the steel axe introduced in Siane territory by Europeans) does 
not stimulate an increase in the production of food but in the amount of 
time that the individuals can dedicate to social life, to interpersonal 
relationships and to other activities. The increased free time is 
absorbed almost completely in extending the sphere of prestige compet- 
ition (luxury goods) by producing and exchanging the material tokens 
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of prestige. 
On the whole it can be argued that among Siane People the relation 
between goods and their social uses is far more clear, and that the 
social meanings of objects are far more transparent than in western 
modern culture where we do not have different spheres of exchange, 
where everything can be bought or sold on the market and there are no 
restrictions concerning particular categories of goods or people. 
This does not imply that goods in modern society do not perform all the 
three roles that we recognize in the example concerning the Sianes, but 
rather that exchange value hides under its veil all the other meanings, 
roles and functions performed by things. There are no longer clear 
boundaries. All is mixed up and confused - exchange value becomes 
the only value immediately perceived, all the other meanings and charac- 
teristics of the objects are no longer clearly grasped. This implies 
that the products of human work have lost the material and concrete 
qualities. typical of a thing made to fulfil a particular need, to sub- 
mit to a particular obligation, and their enjoyment is no longer possible 
if we do not confront the necessity of accumulation and exchange, if we 
do not pass through the market. 
The problem of objectification 
Marx deals explicitly with this transformation of the products of 
human labour in commodities when he asserts that: 
"A commodity appears at first sight an extremely obvious, 
trivial thing. ... So far as it is a use value, there 
is nothing mysterious about it, whether we consider it 
from the point of view that by its properties it satis- 
fies human needs or that it first takes on these properties 
as the product of human labour. It is absolutely clear 
that by his activity, man changes the forms of the 
materials of nature in such a way as to make them useful 
to him. Nevertheless the table continues to be wood, 
an ordinary thing. But as soon as it emerges as a 
commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends 
sensuousness. It not only stands on the ground, but in 
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relation to all other commodities it stands on its 
head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque 
ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin 
dancing of its own free will ".(5) 
This mystic character that the product of work takes on as soon as 
it attains the form of commodity - according to Marx - is due to the 
fact that things no longer represent only the use -value, but the use - 
value itself becomes at the same time the material support of the 
exchange- value. Since commodity presents itself in this double form 
of utility and value carrier, it is something abstract and immaterial. 
It is from this double significance of the produce of human labour, 
whereby it shows one side or the other without giving the individual the 
possibility to grasp both at the same time, that the fetish character of 
the commodity emerges. 
It has been correctly argued(6) that Marx does not devote enough 
attention to the concept of utility, but he takes for granted that there 
is a clear and direct relation between human needs and use value of 
goods. But this relation is not at all clear and direct. We have to 
consider the symbolic value that every culture, every society attributes 
to objects, making them into important carriers of meanings. Marx in 
his approach to this question is very much whin a utilitarian pers- 
pective that considers the enjoyment of use -value as the natural and 
the original relation between human beings and objects. In this way, 
he misses the opportunity to take into consideration a relation between 
individual and things that goes beyond the enjoyment of use -value and 
the accumulation of exchange -value. 
In spite of this fact, Marx's analysis of the fetish character of 
commodities lays stress on important aspects of the relationship that 
connects individuals and things in modern society and has extraordinary 
similarities with the psychoanalytical explanation of fetishes that are 
the objects of perversion. There is indeed something more than a 
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terminological commonality between the two different phenomena: in 
the case of commodities there is an overlap between exchange value and 
use value, in the case of fetishistic perversions there is an overlap 
between a particular symbolic value and the normal meaning and use of 
the object. And as_the fetishist is never able to possess completely 
his fetish since it is the emblem of two contrasting realities (the 
fact that the woman does not have a penis and the refusal to acknow- 
ledge the absence - if we follow Freud's analysis), in the same way the 
individual who possesses a commodity is not able to enjoy it at the 
same time as utility and as value. According to Marx the fetishist 
character of commodities derives from understanding as autonomous 
reality what actually is the symbolic expression of a relationship among 
individuals and from giving to the first the social effectiveness and 
meaning which pertains to the second one. To Marx the fetishist denies 
a reality, to Freud an absence. 
Marx was in London when in 1851 the first World Exhibition was 
opened in Eyde Park, and he may have been struck and influenced by it 
in his analysis of the fetish character of commodities.(7) 
Indeed this and the following exhibition (Paris 1867) were among 
the first events that attracted a large number of people to specific 
places for the purpose of admiring industrial commodities: 
"World exhibitions were places of pilgrimage to the 
the fetish commodity. 'All Europe has set off to 
view goods" ' L'Europe s'est deplacee pour voir des 
marchandises) says Taine in 1855. .... The world 
exhibitions glorified the exchange value of commod- 
ities. They created a framework in which their use 
value receded into the background. They opened up 
a phantasmagoria into which people entered in order 
to be distracted. The entertainment industry 
made that easier for them by lifting them to the 
level of commodity. They yielded to its manipul- 
ations while enjoying the alienation from them- 
selves and from others ".(8) 
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In a context like that of the Exhibition the use value of the 
object has almost completely disappeared while that of exchange becomes 
the dominant and prevalent one. In the exhibitions the objects are 
shown to be enjoyed only by looking at them, not by using them. One 
could perhaps hypothesize that the period in which these exhibitions 
took place constituted a sort of threshold separating two different 
ways of perceiving and relating to objects. This is suggested quite 
convincingly by Benjamin when he explains the meaning of Grandeville's 
art: 
"The world exhibitions erected the universe of commod- 
ities. Grandeville 2 s fantasies transmitted commodity 
character on to the universe. They modernized it 
The literary counterpart of this graphic Utopia was 
represented by the books of Fourier's follower, the 
naturalist Toussenel. 
Fashion prescribed the ritual by which the fetish 
Commodity wished to be worshipped, and Grandeville 
extended the sway of fashion over the objects of daily 
use as much as over the cosmos. In pursuing it to its 
extremes, he revealed its nature. It stands in oppos- 
ition to the organic. It prostitutes the living body 
to the inorganic world. In relation to the living it 
represents the rights of the corpse. Fetishism which 
succumbs to the sex -appeal of the inorganic, is its 
vital nerve; and the cult of the commodity recruits 
this to its service ".(9) 
The circulation of a wide range of industrial commodities, the 
progressive enlargement of the public who had access to them, the 
penetration of fashion in a field (say of everyday objects like 
forks, combs, etc.), that had not been touched by it before, must 
have caused a certain uneasiness in the most perceptive witnesses of 
this process. Grandeville has certainly been one of them, Baudelaire 
another. It is not by chance that the phenomenon of 'dandyism' and 
the Beau Brummell style were very much appreciated by Baudelaire. 
The Dandy style is indeed the most conspicuous example of a relation 
toward things that goes beyond the use -value and the exchange -value 
of objects: the dandy deprives the object of its commodity character 
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and places it at the level of a god to be venerated. To be fashion- 
able and to occupy one's life with absolutely useless activities is the 
dandy's religion. The dandy wants to redeem himself and things from 
the shameful condition of commodities. He wants to establish a new 
relationship with objects; by rejecting the conspicuous and the opulent 
element that characterizes the relation with things of the upper classes. 
His elegance is sober, simple, the dandy does not want to attract the 
attention of the passers by. His refinement, under the veil of 
simplicity, gives him the possibility to distinguish from the others. 
Lord Brummell, the forerunner of dandyism, seems to embody all the 
aspects that the bourgeois of his time hated most in the aristocrats: 
an unrestrained selfishness, an absolute absence of work ethic, an 
irreverent attitude towards morality. But Brummell, in spite of being 
a model for the noblemen who emulate and admire him, isolates and 
distances himself also from his aristocratic fans and followers by his 
cool and arrogant behaviour and narcissism. Once he acquires his 
standing among the aristocracy, he immediately begins to show an absol- 
ute indifference for the principles on which the aristocratic world 
is based: he despises titles of nobility, prebends, etc.(1o). The 
dandy denies and refuses all the most important institutions and 
values of society of his time: work, family, money, etc., his life- 
style is opposed to them; unproductive, without stable personal rel- 
ationships, careless about time and money. 
The Marxian analysis of the fetish character of commodities is 
based upon the presupposition that no object can have a value if it is 
not useful, that is to say if it does not satisfy human needs. There- 
fore to Marx production should be directed toward the use -value and not 
to the exchange -value. The enjoyment of use -value is hence opposed 
to the accumulation of exchange- value, as something natural is opposed 
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to something aberrant. The dandy, on the contrary, wants to free the 
object both from its use -value and its exchange -value in order to place 
it into a sort of sacred position, he wants to annihilate his own 
needs, his own wishes, he wants to become an object. It is in a 
similar way - through the dehumanization of the work of art in the 
sense of reducing the artist himself to the condtion of a commodity 
facing another commodity - that Baudelaire tries to overcome the prob- 
lem.of the objectification and reification of human relations and of 
art as a product of human labour: "I am an old boudoir full of faded 
roses'. (Baudelaire, Les Foules) 
Sacrifice, waste, unproductive expenditure 
It is through this process of transcendence of the use -value and 
the exchange -value of commodities that the individual tries to free 
himself from the objectification of human life. This attempt to 
destroy any kind of utility and exchange -value of objects has some 
aspects in common with the archaic forms of economy which show quite 
clearly that human activity related to objects is not limited only to 
production, conservation and consumption. Several examples in 
which 'archaic man' follows different criteria can be found: those of 
destruction and unproductive wastage. I am referring here to such 
phenomena as the rituals of prodigality, the sacrifices and the potlach, 
that cannot be explained if a utilitarian approach is used. As has 
been already suggested Mauss' analysis of sacrifice and of archaic forms 
of exchange shows that in 'primitive' societies the object is never 
only an object of use but is endowed with a power, a mana, and is 
deeply connected with the religious sphere. The sacred character 
embodied in an object is not implicit in its intrinsic qualities but 
it is added to it. Therefore when a thing loses this sacred character 
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rituals of sacrifice (destruction) and of giving with prodigality 
(gift, potlach) restore it. Sacrifice is therefore a very impor- 
tant kind of relation connecting individuals and things; and certainly 
this way of relating is not less relevant than that of utility. 
The concept of sacrifice is indeed strongly present in every 
culture and it is questionable whether it can be subordinated to that 
of utility. By the sacrifice of wealth, of people, of animals, of 
things, the individual establishes the social structure of a society, 
values and beliefs, he establishes relations with gods and other 
individuals. In the rituals of sacrifice there are two important 
elements: the first one is the communion that takes place not only 
between human beings and gods - to whom the sacrifice is dedicated - 
but also among the individuals taking part in it. Durkheim, Mauss 
and Weber(11) emphasize the importance of this element. Sacrifice 
must be understood as a communion, a ceremony of eating together - of 
alimentary communication - which is important in order to produce a 
fraternal and solid communality between the sacrificers and between 
them and the god. 
The second but no less important element is that of donation, of 
giving. The sacrifice in fact implies both an act of communion and an 
act of renunciation. It is a mistake to undervalue the importance of 
donation in the sacrifice(12) since it is not true that donation comes 
as a consequence of the principle of property that materializes every- 
thing it touches and alters the idea of sacrifice making of it a market 
between gods and human beings. This element of giving is in fact 
always present in every sacrifice: the sacrificer communicates with 
his god by giving an offering to him. The two elements are inter- 
dependent and both are fundamental aspects of the sacrificial act. 
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The idea of sacrifice and that of unproductive expenditure are 
very important in Bataille's work(13) as two relevant characteristics 
of human attitude toward things. In "La notion de dépense" he 
claims that 
"classical economics thought that primitive exchange 
took place under the form of barter; it had no 
reason to suppose that a way of acquisition such as that 
of exchange could have had as source not the need of 
acquisition ... but the opposite need: that of destruc- 
tion and loss ". 
(1La.) 
According to Bataille - who relies to a large extent on Mauss' 
analysis - the gift and not the barter has been the archaic form of 
exchange; and together with the gift the conspicuous destruction of 
wealth (i.e. potlach) has been another very important aspect of 
primitive forms of exchange. 
I am not concerned in this context with the problem of verifying 
Bataille's assertion; I want only to emphasize the importance - too 
often forgotten - of sacrifice and of economic loss in the analysis 
of the relationship that connects the individual with things. 
"It is the attribution of a positive quality to the 
loss - from which nobility, honour and status 
derive - that gives to this institution (the gift) 
its significance value ".(15) 
Wealth is oriented to loss in the sense that the power of a rich 
person is characterized and made visible as the power of wasting. 
Honour and power are linked to the destruction of wealth and not 
necessarily to the accumulation of wealth for accumulation's sake. We 
can find several examples of this kind of conspicuous and unproductive 
expenditure not only in the anthropological field but also in phenomena 
such as the evergetism of ancient Greek cities and of republican and 
imperial Rome, in the behaviour of noblemen and sovereigns in past 
centuries.(16) 
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In P. Veyne's extremely interesting work on evergetismÇ17) it is 
possible to find several very striking examples of unproductive expen- 
diture. In ancient Athens and Rome the idea of charity did not exist, 
while that of magnanimity was very important as a virtue of the rich; 
personal wealth was considered as a sort of fideicommissum, as a 
possession on which the whole community had some rights. Evergetism 
is to be understood as a private donation to the public's, benefit. It 
implies that the community (the city mainly) expects the rich to contri- 
bute to public expenditure. There is not a formal obligation but a 
strong expectation: the individual will not deserve honour if he does 
not perform acts of evergetism. At the same time there will be a 
certain degree of competition among the rich to outdo one another in 
magnanimity. These gifts or donations are not given to particular 
sectors of the population only (like charity or the donations that are 
given with the purpose of helping specific groups or institutions - 
cultural, religious, etc.) - but to the whole society. Evergetes 
are individuals who help the community with their personal wealth, they 
are mecenates of public life. 
Although evergetism stimulates a general consensus among the lower 
strata of the population, it can not be defined as a sort of social 
redistribution enacted under the pressure of class struggle, nor would 
it be correct to ascribe to this phenomenon a religious meaning. It 
has a civic one. But which, then, are the reasons that cause acts 
of evergetism? "Evergetes give in order to achieve social distance 
or for patriotic or civic ideals, in any case for an interest in this 
world ", (that is, for motivations opposite to those of charity).(18) 
In discussing evergetism it is necessary to emphasize the fact 
that honour, social distance, recognition of the individual's position 
in the community are all acquired through the extremely generous gift of 
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part of the person's wealth to the community, through individual sacri- 
fice and the loss of personal belongings. To a certain extent it 
could be argued that to give a potlach, to make an act of evergetism, 
or to consume conspicuously are the same thing: in order to perform all 
these actions the person has to be rich and in all the three cases he 
wishes to make visible, to prove and to communicate his position in the 
social structure of prestige, he wishes to manifest the social distance 
that separates his standing from that ofihe majority. All these three 
acts have become common praxis in different societies because they satisfy 
not only the specific needs of those who give a potlach or an act of 
evergetism or consume conspicuously, but also some needs of the public. 
People expect these behaviours, they openly demand the circus or the 
feasts, they expect the rich to make their wealth visible. All these 
three forms of consumption are less relevant in order to obtain esteem 
from the others than to maintain one's own rank in the social hierarchy. 
Though there are common elements among them, important differences 
cannot be overlooked. One of the most relevant is the fact that a 
potlach implies a total obligation since it is the whole community that 
participates in the ritual through the chief. The clan brings its 
contribution to the chief and he says "Since this will not be in my 
name. This will be in your name and you will become famous among the 
tribes when you will be told to give what you have for a potlach ".(19) 
Every member gives his contribution and therefore the potlach is the 
ritual destruction of common goods performed by the chief (who must 
himself contribute conspicuously with personal possessions) on behalf 
of the whole community; evergetism, on the other hand, is character- 
ized by the donation of particular goods or services to the whole 
community by a single member in order to thank his people for the 
honour done him by choosing him to hold an important public position 
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within the society.(20) In this case, furthermore, we are faced by 
an act of individual ritual prodigality within the individual's comm- 
unity, while potlach, on the contrary, takes place in an inter clan 
situation. 
The phenomenon of conspicuous consumption is different from the 
previous ones because it is characterized by individual consumption for 
the individual's sake, it has nothing to do with conspicuous magnan- 
imity and generosity, nor with the competitive destruction of wealth 
and goods in order to fulfil a spiritual constraint ( potlach). Both 
potlach and evergetism imply the direct involvement of the whole comm- 
unity even if in different ways: in the case of potlach all members 
cooperate collecting goods to be sacrificed but, at the same time, they 
benefit from taking part in the ceremonies, feasts and exchanges that 
the potlach enacts. There is a rigid reciprocity, therefore what 
one clan has sacrificed will be - in a short time - sacrificed by 
members of another clan. The chief proves his power and prestige to 
his people, each clan member tries to outdo the others in a competition 
of generosity. Gifts bind together the giver and the receiver, 
"souls mingle with things, things with souls ".(21) There is a clear 
obligation to give and indeed such an obligation is the very essence 
of the potlach. The chief who is not able to perform this ritual of 
prodigality loses his authority over the clan, the village and the 
family; he loses his rank among the chiefs, his social credibility. 
The evergete is not formally obliged to give a donation - if he were, 
this act would have the character of a redistributive tax - but he is 
strongly expected to do so by the population. It is exactly this 
particular character that gives to this phenomenon a special and 
peculiar quality. 
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The social pressures which drive the rich Greek or Roman citizen 
to pay for a monument or to offer a circus to the city are different 
from those which oblige the chief of a clan to give a potlach, and far 
stronger than those that induce conspicuous consumption in modern 
individuals. This is quite clear if we take into consideration the 
fact that evergetism is after all the reciprocation of a received priv- 
ilege or honour. Certainly in it there is a fair part of ostentation, 
of self -realization, of expression of personal superiority, of a desire 
to overcome others in prodigality and munificence. Still, it is quite 
different from the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption that we know in 
modern society. Evergetism is different also from mecenatism since it 
involves munificence towards the whole society and'not towards one 
sector only (i.e. the arts). 
The materialistic character of modern society 
In the modern market economy exchanges have mainly an acquisitive 
purpose. Conspicuous waste still has the meaning of maintaining and 
showing the person's position in the social hierarchy, his power of 
expenditure, but it no longer has the aim of destroying somebody else's 
wealth and degrading his position in the social structure of power and 
status when he is not able to reciprocate, to fulfil the obligation, 
to return the gift, or the destruction and wastage of goods, in an 
equivalent or possibly greater style as in the potlach. Nowadays 
unproductive expenditure in such a wide and conspicuous form as that 
characterizing the socio- economic structure of previous social organ- 
izations is no longer present. This does not mean that this form of 
spending has completely disappeared: it is still present although in 
a more limited and reduced form. In modern society it is no longer 
possible to find the orgiastic, the extremely generous and, incommen- 
surable aspect that characterized competition for power and wealth. 
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Notwithstanding this fact, we have to recognize that the principles of 
loss and of sacrifice are still present when we analyze the way in which 
individuals compete for status and prestige. 
The difference between the contemporary manifestation of the phenom- 
enon and previous ones lies in the fact that the forms that this compet- 
ition takes on nowadays are far more discrete, private and limited than 
those we find in situations like potlach, medieval feasts, or the court 
life -style during the absolutist period. There is no longer destruc- 
tion of wealth, there is no longer wastage (in the sense of the examples 
just listed) but acquisition of luxury goods that have the task of 
showing off our unnecessary expenditure capacity. Social standing is 
still connected - although not in the same way it used to be - with the 
fact that wealth must be partially sacrificed to unproductive social 
expenditures like entertainments, sports, etc., but social obligation 
towards expenditures for reasons of prestige is fax less strong and 
compelling than it was in previous times. 
The shift in the ways of competing for social standing, in the 
extent to which the individual sacrifices part or all of his wealth to 
this purpose, has paralleled the shift in the meaning of property, of 
possession. Indeed it can be argued that in a social environment 
characterized by conspicuous destruction of wealth and by a high level 
of sacrifice - as, for example, the societies in which rituals of 
destruction such as potlach were present - the emphasis must have been 
on the ability to accumulate in order to destroy, in order to give away, 
without any relation with productive investments, or accumulation for 
accumulation's sake. Greed must have been dis- associated from the 
idea of preserving, of keeping. The idea of saving and devoting the 
bulk of personal income to productive investments and only a small 
part of it to luxury and unproductive expenditures is after all quite 
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recent, and it is connected with the beliefs and values of the ascend- 
ing and ascetic bourgeoisie. 
Various factors explain why people in different social and histor- 
ical periods devote part of their wealth to luxury expenditure, and 
the differences in the ways in which luxury manifests itself. If we 
dedicate a church to a saint or a library to the city, or if we buy a 
diamond, we make in all three examples a luxury expenditure, but there 
is quite a difference between the first two examples and the last.(22) 
It is possible to distinguish between an idealistic or altruistic kind 
of luxury and a materialistic or egotistic one. This second kind - 
according to Sombart - spread all over Europe during the period of the 
first capitalism (from Giotto to Tiepolo).(23) The sources of this 
materialistic luxury are to be found in the development of the modern 
state with the princely courts, in the diffusion of wealth, the for- 
mation of private patrimonies, and in the creation of big cities. 
It is above all since the end of the XVII century that luxury 
expands among wider sectors of society. Proof of this can be found 
in an analysis of household bills and inventories which are very 
interesting documents and which give an understanding of the diffusion 
and the distribution of wealth among the population.( 
24) 
The stratum of nouveaux riches that grew progressively had no other 
means but money to distinguish themselves, therefore they led a luxur- 
ious life based on a materialistic concept of luxury. If luxury in 
the middle ages showed itself mainly in a public context (tournaments, 
public banquets, feasts), with the spreading of wealth among those who 
were not of the noble class, it develops more and more widely in the 
private sphere, in the domestic life. In this way luxury loses the 
character of periodical event that it used to have not only in medieval 
times but also in manifestations such as potlach and evergetism. 
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This phenomenon reaches its apex in the eighteenth century: 
"The desire for luxury turned towards furniture: 
an infinity of wrought delicate pieces, less 
clumsy than the old furniture, adapted to the 
new dimensions of boudoir, drawing room and bed 
chamber, but also highly specialized to meet the 
new requirements of comfort and intimacy ".(25) 
At the same time this privatization of luxury brings as a con- 
sequence a progressive disappearance of the character of waste and 
destruction typical of previous luxury expenditures, and a progress- 
ive tendency towards what we call an acquisitive - or to follow 
Sombart's terminology - a materialistic character. 
Besides - and this is quite relevant to us - if in the middle ages 
the most important manifestation of individual power and wealth was 
displayed by the ability to support a large retinue and several servants, 
luxury is later identified with the individual possession of luxury 
goods. This change has obviously been parallel to that in the mode 
of production, since the demand for these goods, even if for a long 
time quite limited (there were very few people who could afford these 
luxuries),required wider and faster production. In this sense Sombart 
is quite right when he stresses that "the objectification of luxury 
is extremely important for the development of capitalism ".(26) As we 
said, luxury loses its periodical and ritual character and becomes a 
constant and continuous aspect of the life of the wealthy. The times 
of consumption of luxury goods get shorter, fashion makes its appear- 
ance and dictates its laws: 
"fashion is not only a matter of abundance, quantity, 
profusion. It also consists of making a quick change 
at tYe right moment. It is a question of season, day 
and hour. In fact one cannot really talk of fashion 
becoming all powerful before about 1700. At the time 
the world gained a new lease of life and spread e'cery- 
where with its new meaning: keeping up with the 
times ".(27) 
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The individual wants to satisfy his wishes as quickly as possible. 
And the satisfaction is based mainly on the consumption of material 
things. 
As long as wealth had been hereditarily transferred within the 
same household, the single individual enjoyed the material privileges 
linked to his rank without feeling an exclusive love for wealth. He 
was not afraid to lose it and he grew up in such a state without even 
imagining the possibility of a different way of living. As Tocqueville(28) 
rightly points out, in aristocratic societies material welfare is not 
the aim of the nobleman's life, it is a way of living. It is for this 
reason that the acquisitive character that marks contemporary life- 
style was absent or anyway weaker. In this respect it is of some 
interest to analyse the history of edicts and laws that tried to reg- 
ulate the use of luxury goods within the society. Their analysis is 
interesting because it shows both the attempt of the aristocracy to 
oppose the rising of the nouveaux riches, and with them of different 
values and life -styles, and the progressive changes made by the aris- 
tocrats since, these legal restrictions, being generally unsuccessful, 
they were compelled to fight and compete with the rich bourgeois at 
the same level, on the same ground. It is clear that this shift in 
the aristocrats' life -style is not due only to the competition with 
the nouveaux riches but also - and perhaps above all - to the central- 
ization of the state: this caused the birth of a court life -style 
that strongly stimulated competition among noblemen based on the dis- 
play of conspicuous and luxury goods and on the access to particular 
privileges.(29) 
In this respect it is important to emphasize an essential differ- 
ence between aristocrats and bourgeois: that is the fact that the 
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bourgeois, even the richest, save part of their income and invest it, 
while the aristocrats dedicate all their income (land revenues mainly) 
to consumption without investing any money. In the aristocratic 
society any activity connected with "earning" was considered dishonour- 
able. Therefore it is quite obvious that with the increasing role 
played by the bourgeois in society the character of waste, of glamorous 
consumption that characterized previous social systems has gradually 
disappeared. Luxury expenditure loses not only the orgiastic charac- 
ter typical of potlach but also the compulsory one it had in the 
absolutistic period. 
The acquisitive character of modern society 
In contemporary society the process of destruction of wealth and 
goods in the sense previously explained has almost disappeared and the 
ideas of waste and loss (in the sense of unproductive ways of spending 
money) are very often related to the acquisition of conspicuous items 
to be kept, preserved and displayed but not to be sacrificed, not to 
be destroyed. Actually if we think of the position of antiques among 
what is considered valuable, we see how strong is the emphasis on pre- 
serving, on keeping, on acquiring in order to display not to destroy, 
not to give with magnanimity. The sacrifice we make when we decide to 
acquire something that is not necessary for our survival (in social 
terms) is a sacrifice different from that of the individual who gets 
involved in a potlach, who makes an act of evergetism, who dedicates a 
church to a saint or a building to the city. 
The former and modern idea of sacrifice is present in Simmel's 
definition of value and exchange: 
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"Every value has to be acquired by the sacrifice of 
some other value. ... To recognize value as the 
result of a sacrifice discloses the infinite wealth 
that our life derives from this basic form. Our 
painful experience of sacrifice and our effort to 
diminish it leads us to believe that its total 
elimination would raise life to perfection. But 
here we overlook that sacrifice is by no means 
always an external obstacle, but is the inner 
condition of the goal itself and the road by which 
it may be reached. We divide the enigmatic unity 
of our practical relation to things into sacrifice 
and gain, obstruction and attainment, and since the 
different stages are often separated in time we 
forget that the goal would not be the same without 
impediments to overcome.. 
The fact that sacrifice is defined as a 'painful experience' 
implies a definition of giving - also in the case of giving to obtain 
something else - as something opposed to the individual's instinct and 
a definition of keeping or acquiring as positive qualities. Simmel's 
analysis of this phenomenon is very much influenced by a way of under- 
standing exchange through cost benefit analysis, as a situation in which 
the individual has to consider merely his personal convenience to acquire 
or to give away a product and in which the counterpart does just the 
same and no other feelings are involved. In this sense Simmel's 
approach to the problem is very close to that of marginal utility econ- 
omics. 
The definitions of value and exchange that we find in Simmel's work 
are those of the modern bourgeois individual who is supposed to behave 
in an impersonal and objective way, who has no longer deeply solidary 
relations with other individuals but an individualistic attitude. As 
has been argued, Mauss' approach to the problem of exchange is com- 
pletely different.(31) According to him giving is something more than 
an evaluation of the convenience to sacrifice something in order to 
attain something else, giving, in fact, is an extension of the self and 
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therefore the obligation to give is strictly connected and tied up 
with the notion itself of social bonds and roles. It is just for 
this reason that a refusal to give is a refusal of friendship and 
alliance, it is the equivalent of a declaration of war. The exchange 
of gifts, "of things which are to some extent parts of the persons" 
are at the same time exchanges of objects and of acts endowed with 
social meaning. The gift is an extension of the giver's personality, 
for this reason it is not inert, it is not neutral. Mauss thought 
that this particular character of exchange had been progressively 
weakened by the development of modern economic life, by the progressive 
predominance of the exchange value on all the others, by the progress- 
ive orientation of the individual toward a rational and calculating 
attitude in relation to the external world, by the cold and impersonal 
character of individual relations, by the competition that marks our 
relationships with others. However we could still grasp a symbolic 
meaning in exchanges since irrational and emotional behaviours and 
feelings quite often determine our way of relating to others, of enter- 
ing an exchange. The motivations according to which one exchanges, 
buys, sells, destroys or accumulates cannot be explained only according 
to the rationality of the market, according to the economic convenience 
to sell or purchase. 
Psychological and psychoanalytical analyses of modern individuals 
seem to confirm Mauss' approach to the problem: 
"to the extent that "our possessions are projection 
carriers, they are more than what they are in them- 
selves, and function as such. They have acquired 
several layers of meaning and are therefore symbolical, 
though this fact seldom or never reaches conscious- 
ness. .... When therefore I give away something 
that is "mine ", what I am giving is essentially a 
symbol, a thing of many meanings; but owing to my 
unconsciousness of its symbolic character, it adheres 
to my ego, because it is part of my personality. 
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Hence there is, explicitly or implicitly, a 
personal claim bound up with every gift. There 
is always an unspoken "give that thou mayest 
receive 
".(32) 
Simmel too seems to recognize a symbolic value in the relation- 
ships which connect individuals and things when he claims that: 
"It is a basic fact of mental life that we symbol- 
ize the relations among various elements of our 
existence by particular objects; these are them- 
selves substantial entities,but their signific- 
ance for us is only as the visible representatives 
of a relationship that is more or less closely 
associated with them. Thus, a wedding ring, but 
also every letter, every pledge, every official 
uniform, is a symbol or representative of a moral 
or intellectual, a legal or political relation- 
ship between men. Every sacramental object 
embodies in a substantial form the relation between 
man and his God. The telegraph wires that connect 
different countries, no less than the military 
weapons that express their dissension, are such 
substances; they have almost no significance for 
the single individual, but only with reference to 
the relation between human groups that are crystal- 
lized in them. .... The projections of mere 
relations into particular objects is one of the 
greatest accomplishments of the mind; when the 
mind is embodied in the objects, they become a 
vehicle for the mind and endow it with a livelier 
and more comprehensive activity. The ability to 
construct such symbolic objects attains its 
greatest triumph in money. For money represents 
pure interaction in its purest form, it makes 
comprehensible the most abstract concept, it is an 
individual thing whose essential significance is 
to reach beyond individualities".(33) 
The symbolic character that Simmel describes and discusses is quite 
different from that present in Mauss' analysis of the gift or in 
Jung's discussion of 'Transformation Symbolism in the Mass'. What 
Simmel calls symbolic significance is in fact the objectification of 
a relationship in an object; it is the freezing and crystalliz- 
ation of social relationships and their embodiment in a thing that 
becomes their emblem. The object is dead, is inert, since it is 
not the extension of the giver's personality; it is just the 
marker of a relationship. If we follow Simmel's analysis we can 
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replace the emblem (i.e. the wedding ring) with another one and the 
symbolic significance that is embodied in it will still be present; 
if.we take into consideration Mauss's analysis this will not be 
possible since what gives the object its particular meaning is the 
relation between the persons who actually exchanged it and not the 
objectification of a relation. The lost gift cannot be replaced by 
an identical object bought on the market since its particular meaning 
depends upon the relation between persons, not upon the cultural meaning 
embodied in the object. The two interpretations do not exclude each 
other but are complementary. Simmel deals with a cultural meaning 
given to the object that in fact transforms it into an emblem, a sign, 
that is understandable by every member of that particular culture; 
Mauss deals with a subjective personal meaning that makes the object 
a symbol of a bond, of a relation between particular individuals. 
Simmel's analysis of money and of modern culture is very close - in 
this respect - to Marx's analysis of the fetish character of commod- 
ities: as the fetishism of commodities implies the covering and neg- 
lection of use -value, thus objectification entails the obscurity of 
its significance. Exchange -value dominates the individual life and 
money has become the form in which objects are expressible: 'the 
significance of money is substituted for the significance of things' 
and this process has permeated every form of exchange, even the most 
personal and private ones such as that of gift giving: 
"Presents are often valued only if the giver has spent 
money on them; to make a present out of one's own 
possessions seems to be shabby, illegitimate and 
inadequate. .... the awareness of a sacrifice on 
the part of the giver develops in the receiver only 
if the sacrifice is made in terms of money ".(34) 
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I think it is important - at this point - to emphasize that 
notwithstanding the fact that the fetish character of commodities has 
covered up all the other significances, values and roles that things 
have and perform in our lives, they are still important and relevant 
for the individuals. The problem is that this process of object- 
ification has made them more complex and their understanding more 
difficult. Objects convey at the same time different meanings and 
values and perform different roles. Today we no longer have at our 
disposal rigid distinctions and boundaries between things that fulfil 
a particular role and things that perform another one. Unlike Siane 
people, who have a diversified system of communication and of exchange, 
in modern western culture we can use a single channel to convey all 
our messages; and there is little doubt that the exchange value, 
which has in money its expression, has become the essential vehicle 
we have at our disposal. 
This process has brought as a consequence the fact that in modern 
society it is more and more difficult to perceive the complexity of 
our relation to things, their significance in our life; all tend to 
be confused with the exchange value of commodities, with their monetary 
expression, with the material possibility for us to acquire a part- 
icular product, to sacrifice past of our income in order to achieve 
something. This fact has produced also a confusion in the perception 
of needs, in the understanding of wants. Modern industrial society 
with its emphasis on impersonal relationships, individualistic 
behaviour, competition, working relations between employer and employee 
based on strictly economic grounds, is a clear manifestation of this 
phenomenon. But nevertheless it is important not to underrate the 
individual's capacity to react against this trend. We have seen what 
was the Dandy's reaction and answer to this problem, Baudelaire's 
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attempt to deny and oppose the objectification of art; other less 
glamorous attempts can be found in the life of normal individuals. 
In this sense Mauss is right when he claims that "homo- oeconomicus 
is not behind us, but before, like the moral man, the man of duty, the 
scientific man and the reasonable man ".(35) He is right when he 
emphasizes that although our relationships with fellow human beings 
and with the external world have generally changed, still the modern 
individual has not been reduced to the state of a thing facing another 
thing but tries to assert himself as a human being. 
It is often in the peripheral areas of our everyday life, in the 
marginal activities and hobbies, in our private contexts that we try 
to establish a satisfactory relationship with the world, that we try 
to recover aspects, feelings and meanings we have been gradually 
deprived of. If we analyze in this perspective, phenomena such as 
the diffusion and the expansion of do- it- yourself activities, the 
increasing interest in crafts- (weaving, pottery, leatherwork, etc.), 
in collecting, etc., we realize that all these are attempts to find 
an answer to a feeling of uneasiness and dissatisfaction that permeates 
the existence of modern individuals. These are attempts to satisfy 
needs and wants that do not find any fulfilment in the public life of 
the individual. In this way we try to avoid the objectification 
that permeates our relationships and our lives. From this point of 
view it is important to pay more attention, than is usually given them, 
to these residual activities. They in fact constitute a way of rel- 
ating to things that tries to avoid the impersonality of the market, 
the objectification of relationships, the overlap of different meanings 
and their confusion. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONSUMPTION GOODS: WHY DO PEOPLE BUY? 
Consumption as a communicative system 
What makes the relationship between individual and objects in 
contemporary society a peculiar one is the fact that objects nowadays 
become the main channel through which to communicate to other people 
information about values, status, etc. They are signs through which 
we can assess the standing of people in society, the individuals' 
reference groups, their values and beliefs. As has been argued, in 
every form of society objects perform the function of making apparent 
the social differences among persons, and conspicuous consumption and 
waste often play an important role in confirming and legitimizing the 
social order, the structure of power. Wasteful expenditure has been 
indeed a traditional way in which the aristocrats affirmed their pre- 
dominance. If therefore it is possible to argue that objects have always 
had a symbolic value it is also necessary to stress that in previous 
societies this quality was related to other elements such as ceremon- 
ials, lineage system, etc. 
A particular feature of modern society is the fact that all these 
previous elements and systems have progressively disappeared and there- 
fore objects, their ownership and conspicuous use, become the most 
important system of signs through which we are able to signal our and 
decipher other people's social position, determine our and other people's 
self perception. Through things we distinguish ourselves from others, 
and since rigid criteria of class and estate differentiation no longer 
exist(1) it is mainly through objects that we build a universal system of 
signs by which we analyze and understand the world.(2) 
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It is a universal system because - at least formally - everybody can 
own and use all the objects he wants, but, at the same time, this 
universalization carries as a consequence an oversimplification and 
reduction, since the individual is more and more defined only by his 
objects. This phenomenon induces the person to an endless process of 
differentiation from others through his belongings. It could be said 
that this universal system promotes anxious competition over material 
possessions. 
In this framework, consumption activity becomes a way in which we 
relate not only to objects but also to other people, to the world, and 
therefore it must be studied and analyzed as an important and fund- 
amental aspect of our sóciety and not as a particular and limited 
sphere, as a well defined activity. What really makes unique the 
meaning of objects in our society is the fact that they become signs 
and in this way their functional utility, their use -value, tends to be 
less and less significant while they obtain their meaning from being 
consistent with the abstract system of signs in which they confront 
themselves with other objects. As Baudrillard says "at thispoint the 
object is consumed not in its materiality but in its differentiation ".(3) 
If one accepts this interpretation it follows that our relation to 
objects, which have value for their quality of signs, is a relation 
quite different from that we have to objects which have value as 
concrete products. The logic according to which we buy and consume 
objects is that of the manipulation of signs, it is not that of need 
and satisfaction. It is in this perspective that we can speak of an 
endless process of consumption since there are no limits to this 
competition through signs. 
People have always owned, wasted, exchanged in any kind of society 
and objects have always had a symbolic value; in this way they have 
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enforced and legitimized the authority of the leaders, of the sorc- 
erers. What has changed in modern society is the fact that things no 
longer display the authority and the power of the person to whom they 
belong, by whom they are wasted; they just classify and establish the 
hierarchical structure of purchasing power. Today everybody can have 
a crown as long as he can afford to buy it, therefore the crown has 
lost the meaning of symbolic representation of power and the ascriptive 
values it possessed in different social and historical contexts. 
Moreover, objects have been gradually losing the character of 
sacred things that in previous societies was connected with all objects 
that symbolized power (religious, magical, political) and authority. 
That sacredness made people experience their social ties more strongly. 
Nowadays this sacredness is less and less present. We can still 
perceive its presence - but in a faint and vague form - only in rare 
and extra- ordinary situations. Shils and Young in the essay on 'The 
meaning of Coronation' give us an example of it. 
"The coronation of Elizabeth II, like any other great 
occasion which in some manner touches the sense of the 
sacred, brought vitality in family relationships. The 
coronation, much like Christmas, was a time for drawing 
closer the bond of the family, for reasserting its 
solidarity, and for re- emphasizing the values of the 
family - generosity, loyalty, love - which are at the 
same time the fundamental values necessary for the 
well -being of the larger society ".(4) 
Rituals and sacredness are more and more marginal in our society. 
The significance of objects from this perspective is decreasing. 
Things are less and less able to render visible the ties that are at 
the basis of the social system. Thus, notwithstanding, I think that 
we can still speak of a sacred meaning of objects when we refer to 
the special ties that we have with certain objects, or when we 
think of the exchange of gifts that, just because they are gifts, put 
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themselves outside the territory and the logic of economic exchange, 
of exchange of equivalents.(5) The fact is that nowadays these are 
exceptions, while the "normal" relation between individuals and things 
tends to be more and more a relationship based on the objects' property 
of classifying the hierarchical structure, of emphasizing values and 
standing. This is what characterizes our society as a society of 
consumption. From this perspective it seems interesting and useful 
to our purpose to understand how the phenomenon of consumption has been 
studied and explained. Through the analysis of this literature we can 
in fact grasp a better understanding of the motivations, reasons and 
needs which induce contemporary individuals to surround themselves with 
objects. 
Consumption goods and needs satisfaction. 
The analyses social scientists have produced on consumption reflect 
the characteristics this phenomenon takes on in contemporary society. 
There are several different approaches to the problem of consumption, 
each contributing in some way to a better understanding of the question 
why do people buy. A question that is of essential importance if we 
are to answer the more general problem of the meaning of objects in 
everyday life. By analyzing the literature on consumption it is poss- 
ible to point out several different approaches. I do not intend to 
review the literature on this subject but only to summarily analyze 
some contributions which shed light on problems relevant to understand 
the meaning and role things play in everyday life. 
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The utilitarian approach. 
The traditional economic model - grounded in utilitarian theory - 
is based on the presupposition that the individual buys and consumes 
according to his convenience. Implicit in this idea is the concept 
that human beings have needs and their aim is the satisfaction of them; 
consumption is equivalent to the process of needs satisfaction. Since 
human being are never satisfied, this process of consumption is endless: 
"accomplishment tends to raise levels of aspiration. 
Having achieved what we want, we often raise our 
sights. It is not the gratification of needs but 
their failure and frustration which make us renounce 
further goals and ambitions ".(6) 
Goods - in this theoretical framework - cease performing any function, 
playing any role as soon as they are bought; since in this way the 
need is satisfied and the utility of the objects disappears. The aim 
of human action is the search for welfare, for happiness, which is the 
satisfaction of needs. The individual works, produces, in order to 
be able to consume. The satisfaction is only in consumption not in 
work; production therefore is dependent on and subordinated to con- 
sumption. 
The fact that consumption is identified with needs satisfaction, im- 
plies a restrictive conception of needs since they - in this framework - 
find expression only in the form of goods, of commodities, whereas 
they manifest themselves in a process of indefinite development of 
which consumption is only an aspect. There is no definition nor dis- 
cussion of what needs are and of what satisfaction means. Goods are 
considered products for the satisfaction of needs, for consumption. 
There is no attempt to verify whether they perform different roles 
besides that of satisfaction of individual and personal exigencies, 
nor an attempt to analyze these concepts. There is no attempt to 
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analyze and decipher needs, their complexity, the way in which they 
manifest themselves, the different modalities of satisfaction.(7) 
As Hirsch points out: 
"satisfaction is derived from relative position alone, 
from being in front, or from others being behind. 
Command over particular goods and facilities in part- 
icular times and conditions becomes an indicator of 
such precedence in its emergence as a status symbol. 
Where the sole or main source of satisfaction derives 
from the symbol rather than the substance, this can 
be regarded as pure social scarcity. 
Such satisfaction may also be associated with absolute 
physical scarcities. Thus to at least some people, 
part of the attraction of a Rembrandt, or of a part- 
icular landscape is derived from its being the only one 
of its kind; as a result, physically scarce items 
such as these become the repository of pure social 
scarcity also". 
(8) 
To limit the analysis of consumption goods to that of the indiv- 
idual's satisfaction is inadequate, since goods perform different 
roles besides this one and anyway satisfaction is not absolute and 
individual but relative and social. 
Concepts such as utility, scarcity and value cannot be uncritically 
used but must be discussed and analyzed since it is the cultural sys- 
tem which defines the utility of goods, their exchange value and the 
relationship between value and scarcity. Scarcity in fact does not 
automatically imply an increase in the value of the goods. What we 
spend for an ox tongue, for example, is proportionally less than for a 
steak even if from a single animal we obtain only one tongue but 
several steaks. Social and cultural elements determine the value 
and utility of goods. If the analysis is limited to the level of 
the single individual, some relevant aspects of the problem are missed. 
The utilitarian approach neglects important elements in the explanation 
of consumption activity; in particular it fails to grasp other uses 
goods have besides that of satisfaction of specific needs.(9) 
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Induced needs. 
A different interpretation of consumption is available in that 
sociological tradition where an important weight is given to the 
individual's need of conformity with reference groups, with social 
values. Riesman's analysis of °other- direction', that is the tend- 
ency of individuals to be increasingly influenced by their peers, is 
probably the most popular contribution to this perspective.(1o) The 
relationship between individual and objects present in the utilit- 
arian model is replaced, in sociological analysis, by the relation 
between individuals and norms; mainly the norm of conformity, of 
'keeping up with the Joneses'.01) While in the utilitarian model the 
individual is considered essentially free and independent, according to 
this second model he is dependent on a society that conditions personal 
choices and creates new needs. This interpretation is quite evident 
in the work of authors such as Packard, Dichter, and in Galbraith's 
economic version.(12) 
In these works there is present an image of society that in a way 
reduces the individual consumer to a sort of puppet, obedient to the 
will of the producers. Implicit in these analyses there is the idea 
that if hypothetically producers did not stimulate consumption on 
purpose and create new needs, it would be possible to reach a sort of 
equilibrium between wants and needs. As has been said, it is res- 
trictive to identify needs with goods, with commodities. It is 
meaningless to speak of a single need related to a single good since 
the reasons for which people want goods are more complex and needs 
constitute an indefinite system that cannot be satisfactorily related 
to the process of consumption which has to do only with the moment of 
satisfaction and often, as we shall see, with a very precarious satis- 
faction. In fact not all our needs can be satisfied through the 
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consumption of goods. Consumption, therefore, may often constitute 
a palliative which soothes temporarily our uneasiness, anxiety, etc., 
which cannot find a real and complete attainment. To speak of a 
situation of equilibrium does not make sense; it is not possible to 
consider needs as commodities, as one as the reciprocal of the other; 
as Riesman pointed out the criterion according to which we want objects 
is 'objectless craving'. 
Objects as symbols of status. 
Through objects people define themselves as part of a community, a 
group, a society, a culture. Through objects people communicate to 
others their position in society, their values. In every social envir- 
onment objects play these roles, but in industrial society they become 
more important as markers of the individual's standing since the person 
has no longer at his disposal other systems (birth, caste, etc.) to 
define his position in the social structure. Things, their display 
and ownership, constitute an essential communicative system. Through 
the consumption of goods both a system of social differentiation and 
a system of social integration are built. Through things, in fact, 
individuals differentiate themselves from others, but since objects are 
also expressions of the culture in which they are produced they, in 
this sense, constitute a common denominator, an element of integ- 
ration among the people who use them. Goods constitute a basic device 
for making sense of the world around us, they are the common ground on 
which individuals interact and engage in rituals. 
Consumption is not an activity pursued only in order to reach satis- 
faction and enjoyment; it is an activity of communication, the 
person does not consume for himself, for his pleasure, but for what 
consumption means in general terms in his relation with other indiv- 
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iduals. It is a social activity, an activity that has sense only in 
terms of relation among individuals. 
Veblen's analysis of the leisure class still remains, in this res- 
pect, a very important contribution to the understanding of consump- 
(is) tion and more generally of the uses of objects. His concept of 
vicarious consumption shows very clearly that people do not buy, 
possess things for private enjoyment but to make evident their standing 
and power in the community. This concept is very useful for the 
understanding of leisure, that must be considered as another compul- 
sory activity that finds its sense only if considered as a social 
'occupation'. Veblen aims to demonstrate that objects have always 
had - even in the most primitive forms of society - the quality of 
distinguishing signs which enabled individuals to attribute to things 
specific qualities, specific meanings that became attributes of their 
possessors. According to him goods have little to do with the satis- 
faction of needs and their physiological utility: 
"The motive that lies at the root of ownership is 
emulation, and the same motive of emulation 
continues active in the further development of 
all those features of the social structure which 
this institution of ownership touches. The poss- 
ession of wealth confers honour, it is invidious 
distinction'.(i 
This process becomes progressively more common and predominant as the 
number of the members of the society increases, as social mobility 
becomes a common pattern of modern society, as other systems of iden- 
tification and definition a 'people's position in the hierarchical 
structure disappear, and consequently it becomes difficult to appraise 
a person without referring to objects in their quality of status 
markers. 
According to Veblen the wealthy people create life styles, patterns 
of consumption, through display and ostentation of particular expen- 
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sive goods, through vicarious consumption and leisure. The imitation 
of these models is the common attitude of the individuals who are 
immediately behind them in the ladder of social stratification and 
this imitation carries on down to the bottom of the system. Objects - 
in this theoretical framework - are considered in their quality as 
signs of prestige, of authority. A person is defined by the objects 
he uses, displays and possesses. Appearance replaces reality: we 
are what the objects we display show, what we appear to be. It is 
extremely useful to analyze the function performed by objects as pos- 
itional goods, as status symbols, because in this way the social char- 
acter of consumption and the basic importance of the role it plays in 
the interaction among individuals stands out very clearly. There is 
in fact quite a difference between raising our standing while our 
friends and acquaintances remain at the previous level and the con- 
temporaneous raising of everybody. The value and the differentiat- 
ing meaning of positional goods, that is of those objects or services 
that make social differences evident, are relative since they result 
from the comparison with other consumption goods. 
(is) 
Two objections can be moved to this approach to consumption and 
more specifically to Veblen's theory. 
In the first place, it does not pay enough attention to the fact 
that different models of economic and consumption behaviour corres- 
pond to different social contexts. The bourgeois concepts of equil- 
ibrium between debit and credit, of productive investment, of accum- 
ulation, saving, profit, are completely unknown and absent in previous 
social organizations. From this point of view Polanyi's works on the 
role of economics in ancient societies shed light on very important 
aspects.(1 1 
i) 
As Elias correctly points out in his book on absolut- 
istic courts( Veblen seems to be still largely influenced by 
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bourgeois values which he takes for granted and applies uncritically 
to the analysis of the economic behaviour of different societies. But 
in so doing Veblen does not perceive the social constraints that 
strongly influence consumption activity aimed to prestige. I an not 
denying that in contemporary industrial society, within certain limits, 
a social pressure induces individuals to conspicuous consumption and 
to competition through the purchasing and the display of status sym- 
bols. But it seems important to me to emphasize the substantial diff- 
erence that exists between this conspicuous expenditure and those 
typical of different periods of our history or of different social 
and cultural contexts. In fact contemporary forms of conspicuous 
consumption have a far more private and individualistic character than 
they had, for example, in the absolutistic court societies. The link 
between consumption and the struggle for power in modern society is 
definitely weaker. The social constraints on expenditure for pres- 
tige reasons are therefore far less strong. 
In the second place Veblen's analysis is not very convincing when 
he asserts that the upper class creates life -styles which are prog- 
ressively taken up by individuals of lower standing. Within the upper 
class itself there are in fact diversified models of consumption that 
in their own turn distinguish the various strata of the bourgeoisie. 
The big merchant has different tastes and consumes differently from 
the industrialist, and different again are the consumption habits of a 
businessman, of a professional. As Bourdieu points out(1$) life- 
styles depend upon a considerable number of variables such as social 
origin, economic capital (which influences differently consumption 
behaviour according to whether it is inherited or personally achieved), 
educational capital (which can derive only from the school system or 
also from socialization within the family), place of residence, 
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(big city, agricultural setting, etc.). 
Life -styles are not created by the élite and progressively trans- 
mitted to the lower strata. Tastes,consumption models, are not 
mechanically transmitted from a social group to another following a 
pyramidal hierarchical order. Social differentiation does not mani- 
fest itself essentially in a conscious and endless competition based 
on status; it is above all an unconscious process. Social differ- 
entiation is produced and maintained in the most private and personal 
behaviours (such as the way in which one eats, the books one reads, 
the music one listens to, etc.), in the activities one perceives as 
the most significant and creative. 
Goods as differentiating elements 
The phenomenon of fashion is a demonstration of the role goods 
play in differentiating people, in creating visible distinctions 
among individuals. According to Simmel fashion represents an anxious 
effort of élite groups to set themselves apart by introducing ephem- 
eral insignia to which corresponds a parallel effort by non élite 
classes to identify themselves with the upper strata by adopting these 
insignia. 
"Fashion .... is a product of class distinction and 
operates like a number of other forms, honor espec- 
ially, the double function which consists in revol- 
ving within a given circle and at the same time 
emphasizing it as separate from others. ... Thus 
fashion on the one hand signifies union with those 
in the same class, the uniformity of a circle 
characterized by it, and, uno actu, the exclusion 
of all other groups'.(t9) 
According to Simmel fashion arose as a form of class differentiat- 
ion in a relatively open class society. In societies where social 
mobility is absent fashion does not exist because there is no reason 
to distinguish oneself from others: everybody knows his place 
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and that of the other members of the society, in some cases specific 
laws or regulations prevent part of the population from using deter- 
minate objects,(20) from carrying on particular tasks, consuming 
certain food or drink,(2 *) In these situations our need to differ- 
entiate from others through fashion does not exist, but nevertheless 
objects perform the role of making visible the hierarchies, the struc- 
tures of power, the social differences of the system. There is no 
fashion in the sense that these objects - signs of social differences - 
maintain their social meaning through centuries since the permission 
or prohibition to use them is dependent on specific, and in some cases, 
rigid rules that often find their origins in religion.(2 1) There- 
fore they lack the basic characteristic of fashion: the fast death: 
what is fashionable today cannot be fashionable tomorrow. The phen- 
omenon of fashion is present only in open societies, where it becomes 
an important element. The presence of fashion therefore is the clear- 
est sign of a society in which objects are used in a competition by 
means of differentiating markers. 
Patterns of consumption and identification processes 
Nowadays fashion is present in every aspect of consumption, either 
consumption of goods or of culture, of ideologies, etc. I believe it 
is restrictive to explain such a complex phenomenon only in terms of 
envious imitation in a contest of status competition as Simmel and 
Veblen seem to believe. They do not explain for which reasons envy 
should be the spring of human action. 
As Alberoni points out, the aping of other people's patterns of 
consumption is not necessarily an expression of emulation and envious 
(2h) 
imitation of the better off. In particular he emphasizes the 
important role played by the 'powerless élite' i.e. stars and famous 
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personalities of the film and the television world, etc., in creating 
models and patterns of consumption that are imitated and followed by 
people having different social positions. This concept is important 
because it shows that individuals do not identify themselves only with 
people of their same standing, or immediately next to them in the 
hierarchy of social stratification, but also with others who are 
completely different from them in what concerns both social position 
and occupation. The imitation of other people's patterns of behav- 
iour and consumption is not necessarily based on the envious compet- 
ition for social standing. This concept of 'powerless élite' contri- 
butes to clarify the role played by goods in building the individual's 
identity and the role of mass media in spreading new models of behav- 
iour and patterns of consumption among the public. 
As Burns says: 
"The primary characteristics of mass society are the 
gradual sealing of the individual from consensus 
through immediate relationships into a more self - 
regarding, autistic, form of living and the deriv- 
ation of cultural norms from élite groups. By 
élite is meant not an aristocracy, or Wright Mills's 
oligarchic power élite, or even the minority of 
leaders of thought, values and behaviour - Bagehot's 
ten thousand -. The word is used here much more 
in the literal sense of the chosen, chosen in the 
way pin -ups are chosen ".(24p 
They are 'powerless' because they are an elite as long as people rec- 
ognize them as such, that is to say as long as people consider them a 
valid model of self -identification. As soon as they are no longer 
adequate to this task they cease to be part of an élite, they are 
simply forgotten. This process of fast consunp tiaz of the 'powerless' 
élite is easily understandable if it is related to the phenomenon of 
fashion of which it is part. As has been said, fashion - by definit- 
ion - cannot last. Modern industrial society based on rapid and endless 
consumption of every aspect of life, (information, culture, leisure,. 
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goods, etc.) finds in the fashion system one of its most important and 
essential elements. 
"People who consciously follow the fashion do so because 
of the separate prestige of the elite group. The 
fashion dies not because it is the fashion and not because 
it has been discarded by the élite group but because it 
gives way to a new model more consonant with the devel- 
oping taste. The fashion mechanism appears not in 
response to a need of class differentiation and class 
emulation but in response to a wish to be in fashion, to 
be abreast of what has good standing, to express new 
tastes which are emerging in a changing world ".2f) 
The fact that somebody buys objects that look like those used by 
a famous star and tends to dress in the same way, shows that in some 
respects, this celebrity is his model, and he wants other people to 
know that the celebrity is his reference for what concerns some 
patterns of behaviour. In this example emerges very clearly the role 
played by objects in communicating to others the ideal membership of 
a person in a world of conformity and differentiation that is not based 
on the criterion of standing, of hierarchical social position. 
Objects are organized in a communicative system not only to emphas- 
ize and signal status but also membership or conformity to determinate 
values and cultural models. In some environments a book by Marx lying 
conspicuously on the bookshelf is intended to communicate the ideolog- 
ical adhesion of the owner to a given tradition, and whether or not the 
book has been read is not relevant at all. What really matters is 
the value of the object in its quality of sign that establishes attach- 
ment or affiliation to particular values, ideologies, groups. 
We do not buy goods only in order to satisfy personal needs, nor 
because producers continuously induce new needs and wants, but also 
because goods are essential if we are to interact and communicate with 
others. If it is true that in modern industrial society objects often 
perform the function of 'status- symbols' it is important also to clarify 
84 
that anxiety concerning status is not the sole element to influence 
peoples' choices. Goods can be consumed in order to pursue other 
aims, and envy and competition are not always the motives according to 
which individuals decide to buy things. This applies even in an envir- 
onment characterized by generalized competition among people, as in 
modern society. In this sense Veblen's idea of invidious distinction 
as the spring at the basis of consumer behaviour in every kind of social 
organization (from tribe to industrial one) is not always correct. 
Envy and competition are not necessarily eternally present in the inter- 
action among individuals, emulation does not always imply envy of the 
model. Saying this I do not seek to undervalue the role that these 
feelings and attitudes play as incentives to consumption but to point 
out that there are other aspects and elements which must be taken into 
account. As Lasch points out: 
"The propaganda of consumption turns alienation itself 
into a commodity. It addresses itself to the 
spiritual desolation of modern life and proposes 
consumption as the cure. It not only promises to 
palliate all the old unhappiness to which flesh is 
heir; it creates or exacerbates new forms of 
unhappiness - personal insecurity, status anxiety, 
anxiety in parents about their ability to satisfy the 
needs of the young. Do you look dowdy next to your 
neighbors? Do you own a car inferior to theirs? Are 
your children as healthy ?, as popular ?, doing as 
well in school? Advertising institutionalizes envy 
and its attendant anxieties". 
(2 
Consumption goods as communicative channels. 
For Baudrillard and Douglas& Isherwood,( gonsumption entails above 
all exchange not only of goods but also of cultural and social meanings. 
The 'utility' of an object must be understood not only in terms of use - 
value and exchange- value, but also in terms of the cultural meanings 
that govern the use of objects. Both contributions emphasize the 
essential role played by objects in making visible and defining the 
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values, rituals and hierarchies of society. Goods are basic elements 
that allow people to make sense of the world, to understand what is 
going on, and to establish and maintain social relations. They con- 
stitute an essential communicative system that allows the exchange of 
information among members of society. 
Any approach that does not take into consideration these important 
aspects cannot grasp the real place that things have in our life: why, 
what and according to what criteria, we buy. If one analyzes objects 
and the way in which individuals use them from the perspective adopted 
by Baudrillard and Douglas & Isherwood,a redefinition of concepts such 
as goods, consumption and waste becomes necessary. At the same time 
explanations of the phenomenon of consumption, based on needs satis- 
faction and envious emulation as the most relevant elements to explain 
such behaviour,become inadequate. 
Goods assume meaning as markers that communicate in a visible way 
the values of the person to whom they belong. The whole environment 
of objects must be considered in order to understand the logic accord- 
ing to which things are assembled together to communicate their message. 
Consumption is seen as a process through which the individi,.1 con- 
stantly defines and re- defines a hierarchy of values, makes sense and 
establishes an order within what surrounds him. The logic of buying 
and consuming is that of manipulating markers, signs, it does not rest 
merely on the functionality of the single objects, or on the satis- 
faction of the single need. 
In this theoretical framework the concept of waste loses its 
moralizing negative connotation. In specific situations conspicuous 
consumption and waste can find an explanation as essential elements of 
legitimation of the power structure of society, of social differences; 
as compulsory rituals that it is necessary to perform in order to 
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demonstrate that one fittingly occupies one's social position. It is 
not a matter of differentiating and distinguishing oneself from others 
but of demonstrating that social distinctions based on various criteria 
are still meaningful and perpetuating them. As has been already pointed 
out several examples of this attitude toward wealth and goods can be 
found both in the destruction of goods in potlach, in the luxurious and 
sumptuous display of medieval feasts, and in the conspicuous life -style 
of noblemen in past centuries. These ways of relating to objects cannot 
be interpreted as behaviour originated from a personal need for distinc- 
tion nor from envious competition for status. 
I think it is worth analyzing in some detail both Baudrillard and Douglas, 
and Isherwood's- contributions to the understanding of the phenomenon 
of consumption and of the roles and meanings of goods in society because 
of the wide perspectives and deep insight of these studies. 
a) Baudrillard's analysis 
According to Baudrillard the relationship that ties individuals to 
objects in modern society is peculiar and different from any kind of 
relationship present in other forms of society. In his opinion objects 
have always constituted a system through which people make sense of the 
environment in which they live, define their hierarchies of values, 
communicate them to others, etc. But in previous forms of society, 
this was coupled with, or subordinated to, other systems of social iden- 
tification (status, caste, rituals, birth, etc.). In modern society, 
on the other hand, all these criteria have been gradually absorbed into 
a single one of social standing. Consequently, we now possess a 
system of communication, through the exchange of objects, that is access- 
ible to everyone. It is universal. No one is formally excluded 
from the manipulation of any object. Formal constraints on ownership 
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are absent. This universalization has the further consequence of 
obliging the individual to define himself through objects, through 
his ability to manipulate them. In this way the individual is pushed 
toward a stronger and stronger wish to differentiate himself from 
others through things. 
Differentiation is the basic element explaining why we buy and how 
we choose the goods with which to construct the environment we live in. 
Thus, in modern society, objects are not consumed primarily for their 
use -value but are manipulated as distinctive signs. Differentiation 
in Baudrillard's work, has two meanings, two ways of being expressed: 
conscious and unconscious. The first expresses itself in the con- 
scious competition for status or standing. The second reflects the 
fact that the rules people apply in order to differentiate themselves 
are written in a code they are not personally aware of. Individuals 
may think they act freely and in accordance with their personal taste 
and need when they buy a certain item, but actually their choice 
follows the rule of the code. 
Consumption activity is thus a form of sign manipulation. For 
objects to become consumption goods, i.e. objects -signs of difference, 
they must lose their connection with their practical utility. They 
become relevant because of their capacity for differentiation. In 
this sense the logic of consumption is the logic of difference. An 
object is exchanged with another because of their meaningful difference. 
All objects hide in themselves the logic on which relations among 
individuals are based. 
According to Baudrillard when we speak about the relation between 
individuals and objects we must take into consideration that four 
different logics are present in it.(20' 
They are: 
1). the functional logic of use -value, of practical action, 
of utility; 
2). the economic logic of exchange- value, 
of market; 
3). the logic of symbolic exchange -value, 




)4). the logic of sign -exchange- value, of difference of 
standing, of consumption. 
The functional logic is the only one present in an environment 
characterized by isolation, where exchanges and interactions are absent. 
Objects in this environment can only fulfil the function of physio- 
logical utility. Even if, for us, objects continue to have a use - 
value, i.e., their physiological function, this is subordinated to the 
making of distinctions. Consider, for example, a piece of antique 
furniture. It can have utility as a piece of furniture but the most 
important aspect is its age which conveys prestige: it is a prestig- 
ious sign. As to the logic of exchange -value and that of symbolic 
exchange- value, according to Baudrillard they cannot co -exist with that 
of sign exchange -value. The latter is the logic of difference and 
cannot co -exist with that of equivalence or ambivalence. 
Baudrillard's concept of symbolic exchange -value is derived from 
Mauss' concept of gift. It is characterized by the fact that in this 
context the object becomes the manifestation of a relationship among 
individuals that commits them to a 'total obligation'. The object 
must be given and it must be reciprocated with a bigger one. The 
individuals are bound in a total relationship. The object in this 
context receives part of the donor's personality: 'the obligation 
attached to a gift itself is not inert. Even when abandoned by the 
giver, it still forms a part of him. ....,( 9) This bond created by 
things is one between persons 'since the thing itself is a person or 
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pertains to a person. Hence it follows that to give something is to 
give part of oneself' . () 
The exchanged object, in this context, has a symbolic value that is 
different from the mere functional or economic one. 
The object in consumption society has become a sign, it no longer 
gets its meaning from the actual relation and interaction between people. 
Instead its meaning is grounded on a difference in relation to other 
object -signs. An example will illustrate this point: 
Everybody needs a shelter (use -value) but according to one's place 
in the division of labour, in the social hierarchy, one has a council 
house, a hut, a flat, a palace, etc., (exchange- value). It is poss- 
ible to have ambivalent feelings towards the place in which one lives 
because one was born there, built it, inherited it, etc., (symbolic 
exchange- value). It is also possible to regard the place in which 
one lives as a demonstration of standing, as any other object that is 
subject to the rules of fashion, as a sign of differentiation (sign 
exchange-value). (3?) 
Baudrillard argues that the logic of differentiation, of sign - 
value, is the predominant one in modern society and characterizes it 
as a consumption society. According to him the criterion of 'standing' 
tends to permeate every communication, every interaction. Relation- 
ships and differences become based on a system of object -signs and the 
reading of social position is more complicated and less visible than 
in previous forms of society. There has been a shift from a relation 
between persons in which the object exchanged abolishes itself in the 
relation that it has created and acquires from it a symbolic value, to 
a situation in which the object is no longer the expression of a rel- 
ationship between individuals but something to be manipulated in its 
quality of sign, of difference. Baudrillard gives the example of the 
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gift, other examples can be found in those rituals which, still to- 
day are able to create'mana', bonds between persons. 
It seems to me that Baudrillard presents a very interesting theor- 
etical framework within which to analyze consumption activity in 
modern society but I find it restrictive to identify 'standing' as the 
prevalent criterion in the process of differentiation through things. 
As has been previously said, anxiety toward status, competition for 
social standing definitely induce us to use objects in their quality of 
status symbols, of signs of status differences. But the criterion of 
standing is not necessarily the prevalent one, or, at any rate, other 
motivations different from those linked to the wish of signalling 
status, may induce people towards a differentiation through the use of 
objects. Surely status differentiation has a great relevance in 
contemporary society when one compares it with situations character- 
ized by less competition and where legal or customary impediments to 
formal equality are present. In this sense I do believe that 
Baudrillard is right in saying that the logic of sign exchange_value 
is the prevalent one in the interactions and communications among 
people in contemporary society, but I do not see any reason to reduce 
it exclusively to communicative exchanges about social standing. 
The object -sign communicates not only information about standing and 
social differences, it can also communicate affiliation to specific 
groups or subcultures, adhesion to particular ideologies, membership 
of determinate institutions or organizations. The same object in 
different contests and situations can assume two completely different 
connotations and in this way makes evident the differences. See for 
example the use of safety pins in Punk subculture and their use in the 
dominant culture: the same object gets two different meanings and 
has two different uses. The logic used by the Punk is that of 
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differentiation, it uses objects in their capacity as differentiating 
signs. A safety pin is usually treated as a makeshift device to 
keep together two pieces of cloth; it should not be visible, the use 
is private, personal. It would be embarrassing if someone should 
discover that we use safety pins instead of sewing on buttons or what- 
ever must be mended. In the Punk context the safety pin is exhibited, 
displayed, it takes on a decorative function, its use is public. In 
this example the logic underlying the use of the pin is a logic of 
differentiation of sign value. But the Punk does not want to differ- 
entiate himself from his neighbour who is more successful, he wants to 
differentiate and keep at a distance from the social system as a whole; 
he symbolically rebels and refuses the dominant cultural and social 
values. He challenges, at a symbolic level, the inevitability of the 
dominant culture stereotypes (which are taken as "natural "). 
b) Douglas &I sherwood.'s contribution. 
Douglas & Isherwood's interpretation of consumption is quite differ- 
ent from that of Baudrillard. Indeed for these two authors the aim 
is to provide a definition of consumption general enough to be applied 
not only to the study of modern society, but also to that of tribal 
ones: "... so if we define consumption as a use of material possess- 
ions that is beyond commerce and free without the law, we have a 
concept that travels extremely well, since it fits parallel usages in 
all those tribes that have no commerce ". (3$) While Baudrillard 
sees a cleavage, an essential difference between contemporary con- 
sumption society based on the prevalence of the exchange sign value 
and all others, Douglas & Isherwòod7ook.for common ground, for anal- 
ytical categories that make possible an understanding of consumption 
activity in very different forms of social organizations. 
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They find that in every society, in every culture, a difference 
exists between objects that can be freely bought and exchanged and 
others that cannot be given to anyone indiscriminately. The present 
difference between a cash payment and a gift exemplifies this for us. 
One uses cash to pay for professional services, but gifts as thanks 
for personal ones. As Gouldner says "the donor gives because of 
what the recipient is, not because of what he does ".(3) In 
Baudrillard, this distinction is reflected in his logic of exchange - 
value as against that of symbolic exchange- value. The relation 
between recipient and donor is total, constituting a refusal of the 
logic of equivalence, of exchange value. 
A basic problem for every society is that of acquiring common 
meanings so that people understand each other without having to re- 
define the meaning of objects for every interaction. For Douglas. and 
Isherwood rituals play an important and essential role in this res- 
pect. They are the "conventions that set up visible public defin- 
(3.) itions". Things very often have a big part in ritual perfor- 
mance. Consumption itself is a form of ritualistic behaviour through 
which one builds an intelligible universe, and redefines social categ- 
ories. In this sense consumption activity is a way of exchanging 
information. Through objects an individual creates his personal 
environment, gives information, establishes a relation with others. 
At the same time, through the acceptance, refusal, offer or denial of 
objects, meanings and values are confirmed or undermined. 
The aim of the consumer is, therefore, that of gaining control 
over, and keeping under his power, this information system as much 
as he can. Strategies of exclusion and intrusion for the purpose of 
control are different, of course, according to the social structure of 
various societies. To analyze the strategies utilized in different 
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social organizations, Douglas & Isherwood utilize'grid- group' analysis. 
Briefly, we may say that weak group societies are characterized 
by strong individualism, almost non -existent control by groups.over 
individual choice. People pursue their own personal interest. Strong 
group societies, on the other hand, are characterized by subordination 
of the members of the society to group interests. Thus the interest 
of the individual coincides with that of the group of which he is a 
member. While strong grid societies are characterized by insularity, 
i.e. lack of interaction and exchange, weak grid societies are just 
the opposite.(3 
The aim of 'grid -group' analysis is transcultural comparison among 
societies that, despite extreme differences (e.g. from tribes to 
modern industrial society), otherwise reveal similarities within this 
analytical framework. According to the type of social organization, 
control over the information system can be pursued either by a prom- 
inent group or by single individuals competing among themselves and, 
of course, also the strategies of exclusion and intrusion are different. 
In modern industrial society (weak grid -weak group), where ascri- 
ptive advantages are largely absent, income becomes the relevant, even 
the determinant, variable explaining access to or exclusion from the 
control of the cultural values, of the meanings of interaction. Since 
one needs objects to know what is going on and to interact, a lack of 
marking goods means isolation. Poverty is isolation, marginalization. 
The manipulation of marking goods becomes more and more problematic 
and difficult in modern society because there are many more things 
than in any other form of society and the individual has to increase 
very rapidly his knowledge of them to maintain his position in the 
system. At the same time it becomes progressively more difficult to 
find marking goods since "each item sends its signal but each also 
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represents a special field of social relations with its appropriate 
consumption activity ".(36) 
Douglas& Isherwood oonsider personal availability - that is the 
possibility to use one's time and resources quite freely - a basic 
element, a prerequisite, of control over the marking goods system. 
This means that ownership of goods enabling an increase of personal 
availability is a relevant aspect in the analysis of consumption. 
Such availability requires freedom from high periodicity tasks like 
cooking, tending the sick, minding the children. These kinds of 
tasks have always been associated with low status for the people in 
charge of them. Their high periodicity means they must be carried 
out every day and more than once a day. Associated with these tasks 
are low status objects - characterized themselves by high periodicity 
of use - (e.g. common china set as against the 'good' set used only 
on special occasions; margarine as against butter, etc.). "Period- 
icity of use does not merely sort out the upper class of people. .... 
To be poor is to be periodicity constrained in the process of house- 
hold management ".(37) 
According to Douglas& Isherwood then, any explanation of consumer 
behaviour that sees in objects only the answer to needs is inadequate: 
"goods are now to be seen as the medium, less objects of desire than 
threads of a veil that disguises the social relations under it ".(38) 
In some respects, this approach is close to that of structur- 
alists. For them, as for Levi- Strauss, things are good to think, 
and this explains their place in the cultural system. 
"Levi- Strauss distinguished among three communication 
systems constituting social life: the communic- 
ation of goods, the communication of women, and the 
communication of words. .... The argument here is 
that they can never be synthetized without becoming 
part of a theory of consumption. The meanings 
conveyed along the goods channel are part and parcel 
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of the meanings in the kinship and mythology 
channels, and all three are part of the general 
concern to control information. Only when 
they are scanned together will they yield their 
meanings to cultural anthropology ".(39) 
Douglas & "Isherwood's analysis contributes to the explanation of the 
essential role played by things in defining and providing information 
on the cultural system in every society: through goods and their uses 
it is possible to understand the differences between sexes, ages, 
public and private situations, conception of time, family and kinship 
relations. If this role played by things is usually recognized and 
studied in anthropological works, it is usually undervalued in the 
sociological approach to the problem of consumption. What emerges 
from this study is the idea that an analysis of consumption is an 
analysis of culture, of social values, of relationships among indiv- 
iduals; "consumption is the very arena in which culture is fought 
over and licked to shape ".(40) 
Some conclusions 
The various perspectives that have been examined suggest differ- 
ent considerations in order to understand why people buy things and 
which are the 'uses' of goods. One can summarize them as follows: 
1). goods are bought and used to satisfy individual needs; 
2). goods are bought and used to satisfy needs that are 
induced by the producers in order to sustain production; 
3). goods are bought and used in order to satisfy the need 
of differentiation, of distinction for what concerns 
status; 
4). goods are bought and used in order to create and 
communicate differences, to signify membership or 
exclusion, adhesion or refusal; 
5). goods are bought and used because of their quality of 
making visible and evident the structure, the values, 
the rituals of the social and cultural system. 
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From a logical point of view none of these interpretations excludes 
the others; actually what emerges from an analysis of the literature 
on consumption activity is the necessity of approaching the problem 
from a perspective that takes into consideration the various and com- 
plementary elements. No adequate explanation can be found in just 
one of these interpretations. In particular I would like to analyze 
in some detail the concept of 'differentiation', of distinction. To 
differentiate oneself from somebody else means an implicit refusal of 
a certain kind of model, of ritual, of behaviour. There can be 
several reasons that drive people to this. Those connected with the 
problem of standing are only some; others may be found in the wish to 
oppose and differentiate from the dominant values of the society. In 
this context to differentiate oneself from others through goods means 
to give particular connotations to determinate objects, connotations 
that do not correspond to those common in the prevalent cultural system 
and that do not have anything to do with the functional use of the 
object in itself. Several examples of this phenomenon can be found in 
the literature that deals with the problems of subcultures. All the 
groups that for very different reasons do not share some values pre- 
valent in the society utilize objects giving them particular meanings, 
make of them insignia of their beliefs. These objects become signs 
of affiliation, sources and public demonstrations of identification 
with specific values. 
This means also that the dominant cultural system attributes 
meanings to objects, behaviours and rituals. The fact is that the 
'prevalent style' is so deeply rooted in society that one is not aware 
of it and takes it for granted. In this sense Baudrillard is right 
when he says that the differentiation process takes place at an 
unconscious level as well as at a conscious one. The consumer 
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perceives his choices as independent and taken according to his per- 
sonal taste, but the process of differentiation is irresistible, and 
it follows the rules of a code of which he is not aware. 
The study of consumption cannot be reduced to supply and demand, 
to needs and wants, to envious competition, to imitation or differen- 
tiation. Consumption is a complex phenomenon that involves all these 
aspects and must be considered as such. Objects nót only make evid- 
ent and communicate the status of a determinate person, they also pro- 
vide us with more general information about the cultural system. 
Their production reflects the culture of the society in which they are 
made and, at the same time, through this social production the social 
individual is created. 
The relation between individuals and objects is a complicated one, 
we do not use things only for their physiological utility but for the 
different connotations objects assume in our culture. The process of 
production itself, therefore, is subordinated to something more than 
material necessity. The utility of an object is not a quality intrin- 
sic in it but it is related to external and objective connotations. 
As Sahlins says: 
"It is by their correlations in a symbolic system 
that pants are produced for men and skirts for 
women, rather than by the nature of the object 
der se or its capacity to satisfy a material 
need. 
... No object, no thing, has being or movement 
in human society except by the significance men 
can give to it ".(41) 
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COLLECTING: A PRIVATE SOLUTION TO IDENTITY PROBLEMS 
Our interactions with others are cool and impersonal, the purely 
and deeply personal traits of one's life, are mostly absent from 
social contacts with other individuals. As Simmel correctly pointed 
out: 
"It is tactless, because it militates against interaction 
which monopolizes sociability, to display merely personal 
moods of depression, excitement, despondency- in brief, 
the light and darkness of one's most intimate life".. 
is at the basis of sociability and implies the res- 
training of human interaction within precise boundaries. The individ- 
ual has to control his behaviour, he plays the role of the sociable 
person hiding his individuality under the impersonal freedom of a 
mask. The fact is that our interactions and relationshúps are 
imprisoned by cool and impersonal rules which prevent the expression 
of personality and the finding of a satisfactory sphere of identif- 
ication and self -expression. In this sense one can speak of the 
unsociable character of sociability, of the fact that no individual, 
even the most successful and integrated in the social system, can 
entirely solve in it the problem of his own identity. A feeling of 
"selflessness" as Goffman puts it permeates the individual's life, 
and the multiplicity of roles one has to play makes even more diffic- 
ult the solution of this problem. This explains why the quest for 
identity is a universal problem in contemporary society. 
Disappointment and dissatisfaction are indeed common aspects of 
the individual personality whatever one's success in professional 
life, whatever his working conditions, status, education, etc. As 
I have said,(2) in contemporary society it is highly probable that 
the individual will look for remedies more in private than in public 
life. It is for this reason that we will take into consideration 
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those attempts to solve one's identity problems which are carried 
out in the private realm. As Goffman clearly observes, it is 
often in the 'cracks', in the apparently less significant and impor- 
tant spaces that our self resides: 
"Without something to belong to, we have no stable self, 
and yet total commitment and attachment to any social 
unit implies a kind of selflessness. Our sense of 
being a person can come from being drawn into a wider 
social unit; our sense of selfhood can arise through 
the little ways in which we resist the pull. Our 
status is backed by the solid buildings of the world, 
while our sense of personal identity often resides in 
the cracks ".(3) 
The immersion in private life is perceived as a liberating 
experience, as the only way to express oneself without being 
constrained by social rules and rituals. Obviously, immersion 
in private life means very different things according to the 
personality, sex, age, education, status, etc., of the single 
actor. Anyway it is above all in the free time activities that 
one tries to find an answer to boredom, routine, frustration. One 
wishes foram escape, an area where he can abstract from every- 
day reality and construct an identity from new symbolic material. 
The existence of these areas is socially accepted and legitimate; 
their existence is institutionalized not because the individual 
perceived them as such but because society recognizes their impor- 
tance as safety valves and for this reason regulates and monitors them 
and, because sectors of the leisure time industry exploit them by 
creating a wide market of products related to these activities. 
The hobby is one of these free areas. Under this label an 
incredible number of different activities finds its place: 
modelling, collecting, gardening, do- it- yourself activities, etc. 
What distinguishes a hobby from a normal working activity is 
sometimes only the fact that the hobby is voluntarily undertaken, 
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the time dedicated to it is not sold on the market, and it is per- 
ceived as an adequate opportunity for self -expression. Nevertheless 
it can have many aspects sim;lar,to or in common with the world one 
tries to escape from routine, repetition, etc. 
What interests me in the hobby is the fact that it is focussed 
on a world of non -human objects: one has to deal with paint, wood, 
glue, butterflies, stamps, flowers, etc. In almost ̀ every activity 
that finds its place under the label "hobby" a great deal of time is 
spent in searching, buying, classifying, organizing, arranging, and 
mastering this inanimate world. It is a small and fragile world made 
of material things, and the interaction between the individual and 
this world is not alien to obsessive and ritualistic features. All 
these activities have a solitary character; the individual, in this 
way, tries to isolate himself and to suspend consciousness, since 
there is no human being to interact with, to respond to. Often, the 
only people the hobbyist interacts with are the dealers of useful 
tools and, in some cases only, other individuals who share the same 
passions and with whom he makes exchanges, comparisons, etc. Both 
these categories (dealer and hobby -mate) have essentially a functional 
role more than a social one. 
Most of the hobbies are pursued at home, a private and safe place, 
and quite often in a particular and specific place within the house 
that delimits space further, creating a sort of home within the home, 
a solid defence against the external world. But these precautions 
are not sufficient to prevent the infiltration of the external world 
into the hobbyist's den. As has been said, hobbies are socially 
accepted and institutionalized; they generally coexist peacefully 
with people's everyday life. But precisely the fact that these 
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activities are carried out within normal life -plans brings as a con- 
sequence a contamination of these free areas by the very features 
one wants to escape: routine, intrinsic banality of the activity, 
ritualization of the experience by mass media, commercialization of 
all that concerns the hobby (specialistic magazines, clubs, shops, 
etc.). 
"Anyone of these enclaves can be invaded by the same aware- 
ness which makes for cynicism and distancing about the 
'non free' areas of our lives. The tenuousness of these 
free areas arises from their coexistence with other phen- 
omenally dissonant worlds. They represent the attempts 
of man to preserve an area of 'natural' behaviour at a time 
when the multiplicity of roles and activities available 
threatens to render everything relative ".(4) 
I would like to develop further the analysis of the hobby, of 
the role it plays in the individual's life by taking into consid- 
eration a specific but, at the same time, particularly significant 
example for the understanding of the role things play in our life. 
The collector's world 
A discussion of the phenomenon of collecting may shed light 
upon important aspects of these private enclaves of free expression 
and upon the meanings, functions and roles that things take on in 
everyday life.(5) 
A hobby so widely spread and popular as collecting(6) involves 
people from every background, with different working experiences and 
levels of education. I have deliberately chosen to study collectors 
of objects of little or no economic value. By keeping under 
control the "economic value" variable one can understand better which 
motivations and reasons compel so many people to surround themselves 
with material objects that have nothing to do with the communic- 
ation of their spending power and status. 
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Through this analysis one may gain a better understanding of 
the meanings, roles, values, functions, projections that people 
attribute to the material world with which they build their refuges 
against anxiety, insecurity, feelings of "selflessness." By separ- 
ating oneself from the extended world and building one's private 
universe through the collected objects, the individual transfers 
himself to an imaginary made -to- measure world which reflects and 
responds to his most intimate needs, wishes and passions. A collec- 
tor of war memories, for instance, at the same time half -ashamed and 
half -proud of himself, showed me a portrait of himself wearing an 
old military uniform. This is perhaps an extreme example of how 
through their beloved collections these individuals escape from every- 
day life and live - at an imaginary level - fantastic experiences, 
which respond to their needs and desires. In this sense, one can 
say that collections are, at least to a certain extent, personal 
phantasmagoria of the world. Schematically, one can say that 
there are four main motivations at the basis of collecting; a) 
the desire of possessing; b) the need of free expression, of spon- 
taneous activity; c) the need to test oneself; d) the need to keep 
the world under control. 
The desire of possessing 
The tendency to accumulate and keep large amounts of objects, 
many of them of little or no use, is a typical feature of several 
individuals and is probably due to a sense of insecurity, it is in 
a way a sort of defensive behaviour against an unpredictable (and 
therefore unsafe) future. It is quite common to meet people who 
store used wrapping paper, empty jam járs, boxes of every shape, 
etc. But this is not enough to make collectors out of them. 
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Collectors love their objects and collecting means to them the 
possibility to project in them particular needs, to expand their 
personalities. They do not perceive their behaviour as a tran- 
sitory attempt to find satisfaction to their needs but they in a way 
embody themselves in their collections. They are not able to give 
a rational explanation of this activity, of why they hoard a specific 
kind of object. Usually they tend to rationalize their behaviour by 
saying that in this way they preserve from destruction and disappear- 
ance these humble but beautiful products of human genius, in order 
to transmit them to future generations. But then, the collectors 
themselves, are the first to admit that this is not the real motiv- 
ation, they just do not really know from which springs their behaviour 
originates, they stress that for them collecting is not a means to 
an end but an end in itself. The collected items are devoid of any 
trace of functional value: the can of beer is carefully emptied 
because the liquid can damage the beloved container, the packet of 
cigarettes is opened, reduced to a unidimensional state, and relig- 
iously located in a plastic envelope, wine, spirits, mineral water, 
soft drinks labels are carefully detached from the bottles and kept 
in albums, etc. 
Possessing the objects is what really matters, not their 
usefulness. Actually, if the item is new - that is it has never 
been touched by other hands - it is more appreciated. The collector 
is deeply jealous about his collection, he does not generally like to 
show it and does not like the idea of lending, even if temporarily, 
a piece or two to somebody else. Jealousy is a feeling strictly 
linked to the idea of property since it arises when something belong- 
ing to us, i.e. in which we have particular rights, is taken or used 
by somebody else who has no rights in it. 
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....For a collector - and I mean a real collector, 
a collector as he ought to be - ownership is the 
most intimate relationship that one can have to 
objects. Not that they come alive in him, it is 
he who lives in them. "(7) 
It is crucial to understand the great importance that possess- 
ing has for the collector. There is a long list of anecdotes about 
collectors - extremely respectable individuals - who stole or comm- 
issioned thefts of particular objects possessed by other collectors 
or by institutions such as libraries, etc., in order to own the 
objects.(8) These objects, whatever they are, are desired because 
they satisfy important needs, such as that of self- expression, of 
ownership, of testing oneself, because they represent and embody 
personal meanings and values. In this. way they supply important 
material for the integration of the individual's personality. 
These considerations, that in the case of collectors arise and 
stand out in an extreme way, are more generally valid in order to 
explain some aspects of the general relationship tying individuals 
and objects in everyday life. In the case of collectors the relev- 
ance and emphasis are simply stronger: 
"The sense of ownership, in fact, is a special form of 
positive - animist feelings, ....Freudian psychology 
has made us familiar with this feeling and process 
under the name of 'ego identification': the soul of 
the object is an imaginary partial projection of the 
libido of the ego, and we value the object just 
because part of our ego is narcissistically incorpor- 
ated within it. 
Examples of this possessive animistic aspect of the 
sense of ownership are to be found by any close obser- 
ver of the manner in which children regard their 
property objects, their toys, schoolbooks, badges, 
possessions. "(9) 
A number of examples of this attitude towards things can be 
found in everybody's life; our car, armchair, etc. In all 
these cases other than utilitaristic considerations influence our 
relations with personal belongings.(10) 
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The need tr free expression 
Something has already been said about the need of private 
enclaves for the individual's self -expression. But it is necess- 
ary to add some further remarks. Variables such as routine, repet- 
itiveness, alienationfrom work,do not seem to be relevant in order 
to explain why people need these free areas. One can find collec- 
tors in almost every possible occupation: from the industrial 
designer, to the successful painter, from the worker in the large 
factory to the architect, etc. Both extremely rich people and 
people of modest means collect the same kind of objects with the 
same determination and emotional involvement. 
Variables such as gender and age seem to be far more important 
in order to explain this phenomenon. In fact the great majority 
of collectors are middle -aged males.(11) 
We can therefore say that there are modalities of relating to 
things that are more typical of one sex and of a particular age. 
(On this more below). 
There are types of collection such as stamps, coins, etc., that 
probably share some elements with the speculative character of the 
accumulation of money. In fact both stamp and coin collecting can 
be pursued - and indeed often are - as forms of investment more than 
as an area of self -expression. In the interviews the collectors 
often criticized these forms of collecting as speculative and there- 
fore alien to the mentality of the "true" and "pure" collector, who 
is far from the idea of accumulating objects as a form of investment. 
Other forms of collecting such as art, ancient books, etc., may have 
an ambiguous flavor, since the two motivations (collecting and invest- 
ing) can coexist. For this reason I decided to limit this enquiry 
to collectors of valueless objects; in this way one can analyse the 
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relevance that things have in our life apart from utility and value. 
From this point of view I think that the "pure" collector is an 
interesting character since we find in him amplified characteristics 
of our own ways of relating to objects. 
Collecting is, as I said, a spontaneous activity since the 
collector acts for the sake of his personal satisfaction, neither for 
economic interest nor for conspicuous display nor for prestige reasons. 
His activity is not imposed on him by anybody. It is undertaken 
voluntarily often against pressures and derision - above all from the 
family - to abandon it or - at least - to devote to it less time and 
resources (emotional, economic, etc.). Indeed, collecting if it is 
not restrained and kept under control, can become the dominant interest 
and passion of the collector's life: 
"It is a sort of disease. When it affects you it transforms 
your life, everything - work, family, etc., - comes after 
it. One has to build barriers and obstacles in order not 
to be completely possessed by it. ....I think the family 
is a good antidote because one has duties to his children 
and has to devote some time to them." (Interview no. 3) 
On the other hand, for collectors their passion is something 
absolutely essential for personal survival; an unbelievable emotional 
investment is made in it. Many of them dream of reaching the age 
of retirement to dedicate themselves full time to their beloved 
activity: 
"I pity people that have no hobbies, passions, because they 
do not know what to do. I have the opposite problem. 
I never have enough time. I spend all evenings, week- 
ends, holidays busy with it: searching, restoring, class- 
ifying, corresponding with other collectors And 
then, in the most difficult periods of my life collecting 
has given me the strength to keep going." (Interview no.7) 
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The need to test oneself 
Oddly enough, the stimulus to a continuous enlargement of the 
collection has to be sought more in the solitary challenge of the 
individual to himself, in order to reach an abstract ideal of 
completeness, than in competition with other collectors. I say 
"abstract ideal of completeness" because the collector deliberately 
chooses his hunting territory in order to avoid the risk of com- 
pleting the series of objects too easily. Actually, quite often, 
there is no possible logical end to his collecting and anyway, when 
seldom it happens, the collector immediately starts a new collection. 
The great majority of collectors then, maintain several collections at 
the same time although they have a favourite one. 
The criteria according to which they consider one more important 
than the others are not usually related to the size of the collections 
but to biographical and personal reasons; the oldest, ' the 
etc. 
In a way it is possible to say that collecting is an endless 
challenge to oneself, to reach a target that it is almost impossible 
to reach and, if reached, is moved further on; to acquire a sophis- 
ticated and deep knowledge of the field in which this challenge takes 
place and of all the necessary techniques to preserve the fruits of the 
chase. 
This effort to continuously surpass oneself more than to compete 
and confront oneself with others makes collecting a solitary activity, 
where others come into play above all because of their functional 
roles: to make exchanges, to barter or to buy when the items collected 
are present on the market. It is very rare for collectors to make 
friends with other collectors. 
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They usually keep their collections jealously apart from the 
world, they do not like to talk about them. Female collectors seem 
to be even more reticent than men, they keep their passion under a 
deeper blanket of secrecy, they do not like bartering, making exchanges, 
showing their collections in exhibitions, etc. 
Collectors generally do not like to show their "treasures" above 
all to other collectors and this, I believe, must be interpreted as a 
preventive defence against the jealousy, competition, terrible hatred 
that comparisons will inevitably set in motion. The direct compet- 
ition with other collectors is frightening and therefore avoided in 
order not to suffer too much. To see a collection larger, more 
complete, than the one possessed, is such a dreadful experience that 
it is carefully avoided. 
"I have lost friends in this way; I used to correspond 
and exchange information about my discoveries, my researches, 
then when they asked me to see my collection I accepted. 
But after the visit they disappeared completely. I wrote 
them but had no reply, no telephone calls, etc. Then I 
have been robbed of several objects that could have been of 
interest only for a collector. So I decided not to show it 
any longer to anybody. Now I am the only one authorized 
to enter my kingdom, not even my wife can enter it because 
I arranged the objects according to a certain order and I 
am the only one to understand it." (Interview no. 9) 
Others, in order to exclude competition from their activity 
chose to collect items that are not commonly gathered by others 
(cfr. mineral water labels). 
Competition is deliberately kept at the margins of this activity 
probably because the emotional investment in collecting is so strong 
that if one started to compete with others one would be completely 
overcome by passion and collecting would become more a suffering than 
a way to express and find an answer to one's needs. 
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The need to keep the world under control 
To complete the analysis of the most important characteristics 
of collecting one has to take into consideration the need to give 
order and a sense to the world, to classify, to keep the universe 
under one's control, to eliminate uncertainty. The single object 
for the collector is not important in itself but as a part of a 
series, of a whole. 
According to the people interviewed, to classify, that is to give 
a logical order to the collection, is one of the greatest pleasure, 
together with the discovery and the possession of a new object. Every 
item is religiously registered, catalogued, ordered according to 
various criteria. In a word, their private world must be under control, 
neither uncertainty nor doubt can enter the collector's kingdom. 
Every item is a distinct element that has its proper place. 
This aspect of classification is indeed extremely important - 
if not essential - to distinguish a collection from an assemblage of 
similar things. "The collection is a logical class of items accum- 
ulated and rationally ordered according to various criteria ".(12) 
In this concept the idea is implicit of a systematic and methodical 
plan to be pursued with extreme precision. 
"I have organized my collection in a libidinous way; I 
like to organize, I have a penchant for organizing. In 
a way I could say that I have a double collection; wine 
labels coming from foreign countries are classified both 
according to the criterion cf nationality and of wine 
brands; then I have the Italian wine labels that are 
classified both according to the alphabetical order and 
according to the name and kind of wine. I recently made 
photocopies of all my labels and I classified them accord- 
ing to the wine brands. But since the photocopies are 
in black and white near each of them I wrote the descrip- 
tion of the colours ". (Interview no. 6) 
Classifying "is a manifestation of a taxonomic propensity akin 
to bureaucratic rationality':(13) It is therefore an expression of 
a way of relating to the world that is typical of modern society. 
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The originality of the collector lies in the creation of his own 
unique taxonomy. 
The pure collector 
All the characteristics we have described in discussing collectors 
are indeed present, with a different intensity, in our way of relating 
to the world. We are all aware of the importance that certain part- 
icular objects have for us and of the difficulty with which we part 
with them just because we identify in them,and through them we build 
our identity; at the same time we know how it is important some- 
times to isolate ourselves in a personal world in order to assemble 
together our identity; how annoying and embarrassing it can be to 
find ourselves in an environment where things and people are out of 
place, and the sense of anxiety it can stimulate.(14) There are 
then, persons that, although they are not collectors, have strong 
similarities with them in their way of relating to objects. In the 
miser personality, for example, one finds a similar need of possessing, 
a similar tendency to emphasize quantity. But the prevalent feeling 
in the miser's personality is the insecurity that induces the person 
to hoard money or other valuables because of the uncertainty of the 
future. In a sense the miser's need of possessing is similar to that 
of the collector, but what the miser seeks is the accumulation of money 
and not of particular (and often cheap) objects. There is no hunting 
for the beloved and wished objects, but a rigid control of personal 
(15) consumption in order to save and accumulate as much as possible. 
Both in the miser's accumulation of wealth and in the conspicuous 
hoarding of precious objects, typical of some rich people (above all 
the nouveaux riches who have to legitimize through consumption the 
recently acquired status), many important elements typical of the 
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"pure" collector are lacking: there is no personal effort in 
seeking and "hunting" the objects, no passion and love towards them 
since they are appreciated only for their exchange- value. For this 
very reason they will be more easily sold or exchanged with new ones 
while, in the case of the collector, the real end is their mythical 
completeness. 
An attitude towards objects similar to a certain extent to that 
of the "pure" collector may be found in the amateur collector. Both 
the amateur and the collector are practitioners with a definite and 
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:ending purpose about them. Both of them pursue their activities because 
they enjoy them and their pursuit is enduring. They are serious about 
their leisure activities. Still there are important differences 
between their personalities: what attracts the amateur towards the 
acquisition of objects is above all an intellectual interest, it is a 
search led by a cultural interest which one has in particular objects, 
for their rarity, oddity or whatever other quality. It is not a 
desperate effort to reach completeness; quantity is not a relevant 
feature of his pursuit. He does not consider his objects as part of 
a series, but appreciates the particular qualities of a single object, 
its uniqueness. 
"The amateur is very different from the collector. He 
seeks perfection, harmony and beauty. He loves objects 
not in function of their place within a series, but 
rather, for their differences that attract him ".(116) 
Collecting: a male activity 
As has been previously said, collecting is mainly a male activity. 
This aspect of the phenomenon deserves sóme attention since it 
implies that there are gender differences in the way in which we relate 
to the material world of objects. 
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In a kind of list(17) of collectors of objects of little or 
no economic value made in Italy in 1977, out of 1229 collectors only 
86 (7 %) were women. From an inquiry I made on advertisements in a 
specialized magazine in 1981(18), it emerges that out of 454 collec- 
tors 48 (10.6 %) were women. 
Besides, all collectors interviewed stated that women were a 
small minority among them and this is asserted also in all the liter- 
ature on the subject.(19) 
Furthermore, the universe of collectibles is divided into 
female and male objects. There are in fact "feminine objects" such 
as hat pins, perfume bottles, thimbles, dolls, fans, etc., which are 
the classical objects of female collections, while walking sticks, 
war medals, war memories, car and train models, etc., are part of the 
male world of collectibles. Of course, there are also objects with 
a neutral state, in the sense that they are collected by both sexes 
(post cards, commercial cards, matches, etc.). This sexual segre- 
gation of objects can be explained by considering that each sex is 
more attracted by objects that are in some way related to their life 
experience and that collections are, to a certain extent, extremely 
mediated phantasms gorias.of the world. So the train ticket collec- 
tion, for example, might have some relation with desire and love 
for travelling, the idea of adventure and so on. 
Apart from the differences in the items collected by the two 
sexes, another element of diversity may be found in the way in which 
males and females organize their collections. Men find great 
pleasure not only in hunting and possessing their beloved objects 
but also as we have seen in organizing and classifying them accord- 
ing to various and personal criteria. Women, on the contrary, 
tend to be more accumulators than collectors, in the sense that they 
usually hoard large quantities of things of the same kind but do not 
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classify them, do not order them according to any logic, nor, 
generally, become experts in studying, restoring, repairing, etc. 
of them. Unlike men, they do not like to exchange any object they 
possess even if they have more than one copy of it; they usually 
keep their collections in private places (bedroom, drawers, etc.) so 
that they are not accessible to the sight of strangers and guests. 
Many women chose to meet me for the interview in a "neutral" terri- 
tory (cafeteria, place of work, etc.). They did not like the idea 
of showing their collections, while men usually were very proud of 
displaying them and talking with somebody who had no competitive 
interests in collecting, but showed curiosity toward their activities 
and took them seriously (often collectors have to submit to the deris- 
ion of relatives and friends). 
Another interesting difference is related to the period of life 
in which the two genders collect. Men, as I have said, usually 
become collectors around the age of forty even if some of them have 
been collecting in their youth too.(20) Female collectors, instead, 
do not pursue this activity while they have young children but later 
on in life, when children are grown up and when they retire from work 
(if they had outside employment). Usually women say that they had 
no time for any hobby while the children were 'at home?, they had a 
lot of housework, and, sometimes, an outside job. Some of the 
women I interviewed started collecting just when they retired. 
Others, who were collectors in their youth and adolescence, interr- 
upted it for about thirty years (from twenty to fifty), that is when 
they got married and started a family, and resumed collecting at 
about fifty -five,when they had more time at their disposal. 
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Time is indeed a necessary requirement for collecting, since 
a considerable amount of it has to be devoted to the search for the 
beloved objects, to going to exhibitions and specialized markets, to 
particular meetings points where collectors of specific objects 
periodically meet and exchange their materials. Then time is 
needed to correspond with collectors living in other cities and 
countries in order to obtain new material, etc. 
For a married woman with children, housework and often a jòb it 
is indeed problematic to find the time to accomplish all these actions 
which are necessary if one wants to pursue an activity such as collec- 
ting. It is not by chance that the only woman I interviewed who 
was collecting with a "male style" was unmarried and without any 
domestic duties. In fact for a married woman it is extremely 
difficult to have a rigid timetable so that she has the certainty of 
some time for herself in a given day, at a particular time. Certainty 
that is necessary if she wants to go to those particular markets and 
to attend those meetings that happen only once in a while and for a 
few hours only. Her duties towards the family prevent her from 
dedicating time to this activity: 
"I would have felt guilty if I had got up early every 
Saturday morning to go to the collectors' meeting point. 
I would have woken my husband, then there were the 
children " (Interview no. 15) 
Besides, one has to dispose not only of time but also of money 
in a very free way, since it is spent for buying useless and almost 
valueless objects (many of these objects in fact have a value and a 
price only in the collectors' world and nobody would give a penny 
for them in the "normal" market). Therefore, it is difficult. - 
if not impossible - to justify the purchase on rational grounds. 
(Some of the women confessed to retaining some of the household 
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budget so as to have some "secret money" to be spent on collecting.) 
Even when both husband and wife work, the woman tends to be less free 
in the use of money. Male collectors quite often do not commun- 
icate to anybody in the family how much money they spend in this 
activity unless it is a great expenditure (the purchasing of a whole 
collection from another collector). Women feel always guilty toward 
the family if they use their money and time for personal and private 
purposes: 
"I think that I can spend this money for something more 
useful, for the house, for the family, etc " (Interview No.17) 
These two elements - time and money - contribute to explain why 
less women than men collect. But I do not think that they give 
a wholly satisfactory explanation of this different behaviour. There 
are gender differences in the way in which one interacts with the 
material world, in the meanings that one attributes to objects, in 
the projections one makes. 
In the case of collecting, for example, there is not only a 
difference in the sense that it is mainly a male activity, but also 
in the ways in which the two sexes pursue their collecting. 
As I have said men - in this activity - show a greater prop- 
ensity to classify, to organize their collections according to a 
bureaucratic order. Condet in his work on collecting emphasized 
this fact by arguing that "woman's character will push her to seek 
above all the intrinsic qualities of the collected object, and it 
will make of her a dilettante ".(21) But still one has to explain 
why, from this point of view, women behave differently. I would 
argue that the answer must be sought in the fact that men, being 
more inllved in public life, have absorbed far more than women the 
principles and the logic on which modern industrial society is based. 
120 
Contemporary society requires from the individual specific qualities, 
particular ways of behaving which emphasize bureaucratic, technical, 
instrumental, functionally rational requirements.(22) 
"From the process of industrial production comes a tendency 
to view objects and relationships as mechanistic components 
that fit together interchangeably and whose quality and 
efficiency are subjected to quantitative measurement. 
Technical and even social aspects of bureaucratic and 
industrial systems are thus rationalized. A 'taxonomic 
propensity' to organize the world is both required and 
nurtured by bureaucratic rationality".(23) 
This kind of attitude toward the world has permeated men more 
than women who have been traditionally segregated from the public 
sphere and relegated in the private realm, where they are encouraged 
to play an expressive more than instrumental role. And even when 
women have a public life they are expected to behave in an expressive 
more than instrumental way. 
24) 
This different attitude toward the 
world, this different attribution of meanings to material objects as 
well as to human beings emerges quite clearly, as we shall see, also 
from the interviews made to people who have been robbed. 
If among male collectors the irrationality of collecting is 
compensated for by the rationality of the method through which the 
end is pursued, among female collectors this opposition does not 
exist: neither rationality of the end nor rational strategies in 
order to pursue it, nor rational order are present in their hoarding 
of objects. For this reason one is inclined to say that women tend 
to be more accumulators than "true" collectors. 
All the above considerations induce us to consider male collect- 
ing as more contaminated by the logic, criteria and principles 
that are predominant in public life; exchange, functional ration- 
ality, taxonomic propensity, emulation, etc., are all fundamental 
elements of male collecting activity and permeate and mark these 
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private enclaves. Female collecting is, in a certain sense, more 
passional, more irrational and emotive. 
Furthermore, some needs that in the case of men find an 
answer in collecting (such as the need of order, of keeping the 
world under control), in the case of women probably find satisfaction 
in other areas such as compulsive tidying up of the house ( a number 
of female collectors declared this attitude), which are more "natural" 
to the kind of socialization they received,and therefore women do 
not need to look for a safety valve in other spheres. 
What I argue is that the different socializations of the two 
genders within society induces them to find satisfaction in different 
directions, in relating to the world (animate and inanimate) in 
different ways. In particular - since we are concerned here with 
the individual's relationships with the material world - it should 
be stressed that the two genders interact with objects in different 
ways, find diverse solutions to satisfy similar needs, attribute 
various and different meanings to the world that surrounds them. 
Moreover, the need of order, of keeping reality under control, 
is linked to the anguish that the ideas of transience and uncertainty 
produce. In this context the creation of a personal universe of 
objects, clearly defined in time and space, built according to rigid 
and precise criteria, becomes an attempt to circumscribe and keep 
under control one's anxiety. This explains the emotional involve- 
ment that is present in collecting. The individuals consider their 
collections as their creatures; they are no longer an assemblage 
of material inanimate things, they are perceived almost as living 
entities. This personification well represents the objectif- 
ication of the need of possessing and love and emerges quite clearly 
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in the way in which collectors talk of them. 
As I have suggested, women have other domains where to give 
vent to their anxieties and find an answer to these needs. Besides, 
probably, maternity in itself gives an answer to the anguish related 
to transience, to death. (Several collectors told me that this 
activity had some, although confused, relation with the fear that 
the idea of death generated in them). The emotional involvement 
present in collecting is expressed in the anxiety - common to all 
male collectors - concerning the destiny of their objects after the 
collector's death. They are terrified by the idea that their collec- 
tions might be split and shared among several people, or that they 
might be sold to somebody who lacks the competence to understand 
and appreciate them. 
"I gave my life to these objects and I would like them 
to keep on living after my death ". (Interview No. 6) 
For this reason it seems that several collectors - when they think 
they are close to death - separate themselves from their collections 
by giving or selling them to other collectors, so that they are sure 
they will be rightly appreciated and loved; or when it is possible, 
(that is when the collections have particular characteristics), they 
decide to give them to museums or other institutions. 
Women, on the other hand, do not seem concerned about the 
destiny of their collections; they say they do not care about it. 
Age and collecting 
A few remarks on collecting by children seem appropriate,( 5) 
since interesting analogies and differences with adult behaviour 
can be found. Collecting appears to be a quite popular activity 
among children of both sexes, being equally frequent among 
boys and girls. 
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As among adults, there are objects collected prevalently only 
by one sex and objects attracting above all the other one. Age 
too plays an important role in the definition of the objects that are 
collected; there are collections that are an adolescent affair while 
others are pursued during infancy. 
"The collection of miscellaneous trivial things, - buttons, 
spools, strings, glass, beads, pins, broken dishes, etc., 
- begins at about three or four years of age, and lasts to 
about seven or eight years. The collection of picture - 
buttons is an adolescent affair, together with badges.... 
"(26) 
Since the collected objects represent an extremely mediated phantasma- 
goria of the world, it is clear that according to the age, sex, 
place in which one lives, personal history, etc., it will alter the 
kind of object on which one's attention is fixed, phantasies are 
reflected and needs projected. Apart from differences in the kinds 
of objects which are collected, there are differences related to the 
size of collections; the influence exerted by friends, the love for 
quantity in the pre -adolescent period, (from eight to eleven or 
twelve years), collections reach their height in quantity and genuine- 
ness. There is more interest in the things themselves, as well as 
in the collecting of them. The interest is more directed, more 
purposeful, answers the call of inner needs more strongly. The 
imitative element is very strong at this period. With regard to 
'inner need' we notice that the play interest reaches its height here, 
as shown in the marble, doll, etc., collections. The interest in 
nature too is more prominent at this age than at any other, shown in 
the collection of flowers, stones, mosses, butterflies, shells, eggs, 
etc. As regards 'imitation' we find that there are some types of 
collections more wide - spread at this age than earlier or later. 
At this age, too, the 'possession' idea of childhood seems to develop 
into love of quantities. The largest collections come now. 
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Collecting progressively dies out in adolescsre giving way to 
other interests such as 'the sentimental and social, the hunting 
and the trading'.( 
27) 
Although collecting among children is evenly distributed between 
sexes, there are different ways of carrying out this activity. Boys 
seem to play a more active role in order to enlarge their collections 
(seeking, exchange,etc.,) while girls rely more on other people's 
cooperation and help (the objects are given to them). This charac- 
teristic is reflected in adult collecting. While men are very 
active and enjoy very much searching, hunting, bartering and trading, 
women very often declare that they enlarge their collections through 
gifts and the cooperation of relatives. When they buy objects they 
do it in their husband's company, so that the purchase itself has 
almost the flavour of a gift. 
Among children the interest in quantity and the imitative 
behaviour seem to be the two most important motivations toward 
collecting, while competition with others seems to play a minor role. 
In contrast with imitation, or doing as others do, rivalry, or doing 
more than others do, seems to hold a comparatively small place, and 
in contrast with interest in quantity, interest in variety, in kind, 
is insignificant. The fact that imitation among children is an 
important element of collecting is interesting. It shows the 
sociable character of this activity, since they do what others do 
and interact by exchanging, trading, etc. Since competition plays 
a minor role it does not engender anxiety as among adults and there- 
fore does not produce isolation, anti - social attitudes and so on. 
A last remark on this subject. Classification and organ- 
ization of the collection according to some criteria are not relev- 
ant characteristics of children's collecting. 
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"The large majority of the collections are simply "kept 
together ", with more or less care. They may be in 
"no order ", just "mixed together ", "arranged anyway ", 
kept "in a pile ", or, as may be stated more definitely, 
they may be kept in the barn or the shed, in a drawer, 
a box, bag, envelope, book, trunk, " 
This low interest in classification that we find in children is 
remindful of the behaviour of female collectors. For both of them 
one could say that obtaining a large quantity of a particular kind 
of object is more important than organizing them according to a criter- 
ion, than reaching completeness (since, if the collection is not 
"ordered ", it is not possible to know which are the missing objects). 
In the case of children and women the desire to possess is by far 
the predominant and most relevant one. The methodical persever- 
ance typical of collecting is essentially an adult male attitude. 
This kind of attitude is linked to and derives from a way of 
perceiving the world that is produced by modern society and that 
gradually permeates every aspect of the individual's life. Children 
and women are affected by it to a lesser degree, since they have 
been traditionally asked to play a more expressive than instrumental 
role. 
Some conclusions 
The deep reasons of this quest without end must be sought in an 
attempt to address anxieties and dissatisfaction of different origin, 
which make human relationships difficult and problematic. What 
the collector asks of his beloved objects is the possibility of an 
absolute and exclusive identification. Objects, from this point of 
view, answer in a better way than human beings these demands, since - 
for their nature - they are passive recipients of the collector's 
passion. Once possessed, they cannot escape and you are their only 
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master. You can build a personal world with precise rules - you 
can create a personal sphere in which to feel safe. Each collector 
establishes rules and laws (kind of object, period of production, 
place of production, kind of material, etc.) which govern this world, 
and can autonomously and freely make a plan and work for its realiz- 
ation. Sometimes it may be the only chance the individual has to 
test himself in such a complete task since it implies both the planning 
and the actualization of a project. It is, in a way, a personal and 
private attempt to achieve that completeness (though only in abstract 
terms) which has almost disappeared from everyday existence. 
Hunting, discovering, possessing, classifying, are all essential 
and basic aspects of collecting and all extremely important ones. 
The universe built to measure by each collector is perceived and 
experienced as a safe space since it is obsessively ordered according 
to criteria established by the single collector. There cannot be 
unpredictable events, nor uncertainty nor insecurity; actually, 
collecting is certainty and security. The collection is the most 
faithful creature the person can possess. It has precise spatial and 
temporal borders and therefore it is free from anxiety connected with 
the sense of transience. 
In collecting there is an overturning of the rules of the game 
governing everyday life where the individual has to submit to the 
obligations and constraints typical of social life, where the bureau- 
cratic order imposes itself tin our existence, where insecurity, 
competition, anxiety, hurriedness, struggle against time character- 
ize our daily lives. Collecting therefore seems to be, within 
certain limits, a constraint -free area where it is possible to 
express oneself freely, to overturn the rules that dominate public 
life. But in fact, it is deeply contaminated by these very rules: 
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it is threatened by routine, compulsion to repeat, monotony. It 
reflects, to a certain extent, the world from which one wants to 
escape, it is an odd mixture of irrationality (the attraction and 
fixation to a particular kind of object) and rationality (the 
criteria according to which one classifies), of passion and cool 
precision, of loneliness and creativity. The collector talks to 
and interacts with things; his passion is a solitary one, others 
are excluded and the collection itself becomes a substitute for 
human relationships, and a far more docile and tranquillizing one 
as the collector himself establishes the limits of his world, the 
rituals to be respected. 
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CHAPTER V 
SELF AND THINGS: A NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP 
Deciphering needs 
In the previous chapter we discussed the role played by objects 
in building a private world where the individual attempts to satisfy 
needs and aspirations that do not find an answer in other spheres of 
the person's life. We stressed the importance that an activity such 
as collecting has in relieving feelings of anxiety, insecurity, and 
in creating a sphere where self -expression and subjectivity can 
freely manifest themselves. The objects, in this context, are pro- 
jection carriers, are necessary building material for constructing 
and maintaining the individual's identity. Although, collecting is, 
after all, a fragile and private universe which is, to a large extent, 
itself contaminated by the logic and by the functional rationality 
typical of and prevalent in the external world, it is subjectively 
perceived as an area of freedom, as a safe realm, as an answer to 
'homelessness'. 
"Collecting helps me to insulate myself from this world. 
I created my world and my life and I want to go 
on in this way till the end of my life .. In 
this way I feel free." (Interview no. 19) 
One can find several other examples of individual behaviour 
showing the enormous importance that things have as projection 
carriers, as substitutes for human relationships, as essential 
material for achieving a sense of identity. Winnicott's(1) 
analysis of transitional objects is, from our point of view, 
particularly significant. It shows in fact the importance objects 
have, in child development, as part of the process of under- 
standing the outer world as something separate from the self; in 
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achieving the ability to carry out exchanges with others in symbolic 
codes. The child projects particular feelings and meanings on to 
the object, and uses it in a symbolic way. 
Fetishist relationships to things provide a different example 
of the emotional involvement that may be externalized into objects, 
of the different needs that may find satisfaction in the possession 
of particular objects. Following Freud's analysis one can under- 
stand which are the needs that seek satisfaction in fetishist 
fixations: 
"We can now see what the fetish achieves and what it 
is that maintains it. It remains a token of triumph 
over the threat of castration and a protection against 
it. It also saves the fetishist from becoming a 
homosexual, by endowing women with the characteristic 
which makes them tolerable as sexual objects. .... "(2) 
It is possible to find several examples of behaviour that 
clearly constitute (often confused) attempts to soothe the anxiety 
and feelings of dis- satisfaction through a particular relationship 
with material objects. The unhappy housewife who consoles herself 
compulsively buying the latest products is a stereotype containing 
in itself a certain amount of truth. We give a present to our- 
selves to relieve our depression, or, just for opposite reasons, 
we reward ourselves with a prize because we succeeded in overcoming 
an obstacle, a difficulty. It is in a way a process of personality 
splitting: we are, at the same time, the giver and the receiver, 
there is no strengthening of relationships in this way. In this 
case buying is a palliative, it has nothing to do with real satis- 
faction-of personal needs, nor has it any social character. It 
simply eases, temporarily, our dissatisfaction. 
In psychoanalytic literature(3) we find numerous examples of 
the fact that spending calms anxiety and depression; it increases 
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trust in oneself and diverts the individual from his anguishes. 
And the purchases are usually objects of little value and no 
utility whatsoever. This 'solitary' consumption activity is linked 
to the difficulties one meets in seeking gratification in everyday 
life, in seeking an antidote to loneliness and social isolation. 
In this sense, it may be argued that it is a phenomenon typical of 
modern industrial society with its stress on consumption as the 
solution to any problem.(4) But, at the same time, in the society 
of mass consumption it becomes more and more difficult to perceive 
and decipher one's needs, to understand the best available means to 
satisfy them. Needs and wishes constitute, in fact, a complex 
set of feelings, and the relationship between them and the possible 
kinds of satisfaction is very often ambiguous. Besides, indus- 
trial society has generated a continuous process of creation and 
fast replacement of goods with new, more sophisticated and special- 
ized ones. This has brought as a consequence a continuous adjust- 
ment of the individual to these new modes of needs satisfaction.(5) 
Yesterday's needs and wishes are not necessarily those of 
today. The way in which they manifest themselves changes, as well 
as the way in which they are satisfied. In contemporary society 
the relationship between needs and modes of satisfaction tends to be 
more and more complex. The individual is faced by an ever 
increasing number of goods and is compelled to choose among them 
according to his economic and cultural resources. This process of 
selection implies an effort to interpret and understand one's needs 
in relation to the goods which are available. 
Secondly, but no less importantly, one is often unable to under- 
stand the origin of the sense of dissatisfaction or of anxiety that 
characterizes his life. Therefore, it is impossible for him 
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to interpret correctly the relation existing between a presumed 
need and the way in which it can possibly be satisfied. As to 
this aspect, one can find everal examples in daily life. I am 
referring here to needs which find expression in activities such as 
collecting, consuming enormous quantities of food (typical of certain 
forms of psychological obesity), or the opposite refusal of food by 
the anorexic person, shoplifting by well -off middle -class people, etc. 
The motivations and reasons which induce these patterns of 
behaviour must be sought in an unsuccessful or deficient satisfaction 
of different needs, such as those of acceptance, security, approval, 
love, etc. Often the individual is not able to understand the 
cause of his sense of dissatisfaction; he perceives only his 
inability to find what he seeks and needs on the market in the form 
of goods and services. At the same time, he often realizes that 
there are no solutions at his disposal, and buying, hoarding, collec- 
ting, stealing, become ways of relieving him of anxiety, depression, 
even if, quite obviously, only temporarily. 
An exemplification: the phenomenon of shoplifting 
Shoplifting, in this context, is an example of these desperate 
and confused attempts to seek an answer to psychological needs through 
the illegal appropriation of objects.(6) One has to distinguish 
between shoplifting performed by adolescents and shoplifting by adults. 
Among young people, in fact, shoplifting is quite common. The 
youngsters, of both sexes, who practice these actions seek in them 
excitement and adventure. There is no doubt that daring and desire 
to maintain prestige among friends, or daring involving self-reassur- 
ance and 'proving' oneself, are common characteristics among adoles- 
cents. Shoplifting and other small thefts have a place in many sub- 
cultures of juvenile bands and find in them their legitimation.(7) 
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Among adults, the great majority of shoplifters are women: 
"They are female, always middle- class, well off, 
aged between 46 to 60. The object they steal 
is very often quite useless to them. It obviously 
isn't nicked for gain ".(8) 
It seems that the motivations that induce this behaviour have little 
to do with excitement (as among young people); rather, they arise 
from tension, anxiety, depression. Some authors(9) stress the 
importance of a sense of inferiority that would find in the theft 
an overcompensation. Indeed, we find some confirmation of this 
hypothesis in the literature on the subject. 
Depression and a general state of dissatisfaction seem to 
be the commonest background to shoplifting. In_ many cases, in fact, 
shoplifting is the equivalent of a cry for help: 
"It is like a miniature suicide. .... It similarly 
draws the attention of a negligent husband ".(10) 
Another important element to be taken into account in order to 
explain this phenomenon is resentment. The connection between 
resentment and theft has been often pointed out in the psycho- 
analytic literature and it has been associated with an attempt to 
find a substitute for love withheld by parents, and, at a desper- 
ate level, to replace the primordial sense of satisfaction pro- 
vided by the mother's breast.(11) Indeed, from studies on shop- 
lifting motivations it emerges that after a loss (such as the death 
of the husband) a deep and bitter resentment may lead to shoplifting. 
This seems to suggest that the loss has awakened an earlier sense 
of deprivation. 
Resentment as a cause for shoplifting is fairly common too 
among children. 
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"Resentment) is common in children in whom theft 
often combines a substitute satisfaction as well 
as a wish to hurt those who have deprived them ". 
(12) 
A third common motive is connected with the desire to maintain 
our standing in the eyes of the public or in our own eyes; to feel 
that we are adequate, in the sense that, for example, we can afford 
to give presents to our children. 
A fourth set of motives has to do with meanness: 
"They were generally honest women who had a passion 
for saving, whose budget was completely organized, 
and for whom any avoidable payment was painful. 
This restricted form of avarice in a meticulous 
individual, has deep roots in the personality" 
'(13) 
Possessing is comforting for the individual and relieves 
anxiety. Many people, as I have said, buy just for these reasons; 
r others appropriate themselves of objects through illegal means. In 
this way the original needs are not satisfied, they are simply tempor- 
arily soothed and will emerge again and again. 
Shoplifting is usually carried out by women who would never steal 
from a private individual. This is the only anti- social act they 
accomplish. Much of it is impulsive, "the suddenness and strength 
of the desire may cause a breakdown in what was felt as a comforting 
but legitimate shopping) expedition ".(14) 
Still, one has to explain why shoplifting is prevalently a 
female behaviour. An explanation could be found in the fact that 
women spend far more time than men in shops and shoplifting is the 
most gentle anti -social action possible in a sphere that is preval- 
ently a femine one. Secondly, it seems important to stress that 
shoplifting is an extremely impulsive and irrational behaviour that 
has some resemblance with the modes in which women hoard their collec- 
tions. There is no planning, no pursuing of a project, but the 
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instinctive and irresistible need to possess, accompanied, perhaps 
(in the case of shoplifting), by the excitement of doing something 
against the law carries. 
Men, probably, have at their disposal different and multiple 
areas to express similar feelings: I am thinking of sports, or fast 
car driving, where one reaches excitement, gives vent to aggression, 
etc. Women have far fewer domains at their disposal to ease their 
fears and anxieties. Compulsive consumption and shoplifting are 
different ways to soothe similar types of stress and dissatisfaction. 
At the basis of both manifestations there is the fact that, in our 
society, possessing relieves anxiety and comforts the individual. 
Women, probably, for cultural and social reasons are more inclined to 
express their feelings in certain ways, men in others. Anyway, the 
fact remains that traditionally men have had and have far more 
spheres and opportunities to vent their needs and their dissatis- 
faction; women, having been traditionally relegated in the private 
sphere and in a subordinate position, have had fewer opportunities 
available to express and manifest their needs. 
Identity and Things: the robbed 
If possessing relieves anxiety, to be suddenly deprived of one's 
belongings triggers off strong emotional reactions. From them it 
is possible to understand the meanings and projections reflected on 
material objects, the importance they have for people. In this 
context, the analysis of people's reactions to burglary should 
provide interesting insights into this subject.(15) The majority of 
the victims, of both sexes, react with anger, fear and upset at dis- 
covering the crime, but the emotional reaction of women is far 
stronger and lasts longer. They are shocked, become afraid of 
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remaining alone in the house, some of them have recurrent nightmares 
for months after the burglary. Women telling of their experience 
tend to use stronger and emotive language: "I was petrified,.... 
I was deranged, ....I cried loudly, etc.," and report having uncon- 
trolled reactions (panic, weeping, trembling, etc.). 
"When I discovered the theft, it was as if I had 
had a stroke, I thought I was going to die, I 
just ran out of the house crying loudly, I went 
to a neighbour ". (Interview no. 1) 
"It was a horrible shock, the worst of my life. 
Nay husband had to call the doctor. Even now 
Cafter eight months' any time I come back home 
and open the door I feel uneasy, I am afraid it 
might happen again ". (Interview no. 3) 
"I went icy cold, I was petrified. I did not want 
to move from the house because I wanted to defend 
it, but, at the same time, I wanted to run away 
immediately in order to forget and cancel from my 
mind this horrible fact because it was too much 
for me. ... (Interview no. 11) 
Men's reactions, although they show distress, are on the whole 
far less emotional. They give the impression of being more angry 
than shocked, less psychologically injured although disheartened. 
"I was very sad, in the evening I felt physically 
very tired as if I had climbed Everest ". 
(Interview no. 29) 
"I felt uneasy, for a month I had a feeling of 
insecurity, I felt discouraged ". (Interview no. 30) 
"Their Cthe burglars coming was predictable. Nay 
first reaction was one of anger because these 
robbers had been idiots. They chose the wrong 
objects Cthey ignored some more valuable items . 
I had the very same reaction that I have when a 
a colleague makes some mistakes in his work. 
hate human imbecility ". (Interview no. 24) 
This last interview, shows more clearly than any abstract 
discussion, the different kinds of reactions that the two sexes have. 
No woman would answer in such a way. In similar cases (when not 
all the valuable objects are stolen) they declare themselves lucky. 
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They say: "in this misfortune I have been lucky; they could have 
stolen this object too ...." On the other hand, the angry attack 
on the burglar because he was not clever enough, the comparison with 
a work situation, are typically masculine kinds of reaction. They 
remind us of what we said about male collecting: the fact that men's 
mentality, their way of facing problems and of dealing with reality 
are far more influenced by the logic and functional rationality char- 
acteristic of the public sphere. 
Several women had prolonged reaction to the burglary; some got 
sick, others had psychological problems, etc.(16) They felt extremely 
insecure in the house and kept on thinking and talking about the burglary 
in the following months. Several of them, telling me about this 
tragic experience, cried again although in some cases more than ten 
months had passed. 
"Every evening I check all the house, I look under 
the bed to make sure no one is in the place. I 
often dream that a burglar comes in and kidnaps my 
child. ....(Interview no. 10) 
Men seem to get over the event in a shorter time although a sense 
of disillusionment and distrust toward humanity remains: 
"You can no longer trust anybody. ..." (Interview no. `) 
"I lost any faith in people ". (Interview no. 26) 
The most serious long -term psychological effects are experienced 
almost exclusively by women. In_ particular, it seems worth noting 
that female victims perceive and describe the intrusion of the burglars 
in their homes as if it were almost a physical assault: they use the 
same words to express both experiences (burglary and sexual assault). 
They speak of violation, contamination, pollution, desecration. All 
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the women I interviewed stated that the intrusion of a stranger in 
their home was the worst aspect of the burglary. All of them said 
that after a few days they had overcome the sorrow for the loss of 
valuable and cherished objects, but the idea that some dirty indiv- 
idual (dirty in the sense that being a burglar he was morally defic- 
ient and therefore impure and contaminating) had violated their 
privacy, had insinuated himself in what they consider a sacred place, 
had opened-their drawers, cupboards, touched the most intimate things, 
remained most disturbing. Rituals of purification were carried out: 
they cleaned and purified all the house: "I used alcohol to disin- 
fect all the house ". Some of them threw away bottles of spirits 
because they were afraid the burglars had drunk from them, and still 
declared they did not feel confident, they did not feel safe, they 
felt as if they had been victims of a physical violation. 
"What I cannot accept even now Cafter ten months] is 
the fact that someone has violated my place. I 
cannot overcome this fact. It made me feel uneasy, 
insecure, unsafe. Even now when I lock the front door 
I have the impression that it is still open. The 
home was the only place where I felt safe and now I 
have lost this feeling of safety. I know physical 
fear and this fact has aroused the fear that someone 
may assault me ". (Interview no. 4) 
"I had the physical feeling of being touched, abused ". 
(Interview no. 6) 
"They touched all my clothes, my underwear was thrown 
on the floor, they opened all my letters. Even now 
when I think of it - and I do it very often - I feel 
a real revulsion, I cleaned and disinfected all the 
house and still I feel it is not like before, it is, 
how can I put it, impure ". (Interview no. 9) 
The home, which was previously perceived as a safe refuge 
over which the occupants had control, had suddenly revealed itself 
as accessible, penetrable by unseen strangers. To regain this lost 
sense of security is very difficult, above all for women who rely to 
a larger extent than men on the home as a meaningful and safe space 
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where it is possible to express oneself freely. The victims immed- 
iately after the burglary install new locks, anti -theft devices, 
whereas previously thr basically believed that others would respect 
their privacy. 
The analogy between sexual assault and home violation is under- 
standable if one takes into account the enormous importance that the 
home has in the building and the maintenance of woman's identity. 
The violation of the home, as well as the more serious violation of 
the body, is n fact for a woman a violation of the self. Men, although 
they state that the intrusion of one's privacy is the most disturbing 
feeling they derived from this experience, do not have such a deep 
psychological reaction to the intrusion itself. Probably, this is 
due to the fact that they generally have a less deep emotional attach- 
ment to the home,even if it is an important place too for them. But 
there is not the same intense emotional relationship that ties women 
to their homes. 
Even after several months, the previous conception that the 
victims (of both sexes) had of the home, and the sense of security they 
derived from it, are not restored. This reflects the fact that the 
home is fundamental in the process of construction and maintenance of 
a stable self; and this is probably more relevant for people who feel 
particularly insecure. Therefore, one can hypothethize that the less 
people are self - confident the more they will react to home violation. 
Besides, it is necessary to stress a second element related to 
the importance people attach to the home; the fact that it is per- 
ceived as private territory (in ethological terms).(18) Therefore, 
its violation sets in motion deep, almost instinctive, reactions in 
order to safeguard its security. This is suggested by the presence, 
as we said of rituals of purification, by the fact that several women 
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speak of violation of a sacred territory, by the fact that after a 
robbery the victims tend to stay all the time in the house, become 
afraid to abandon it. The invasion of the territory is perceived and 
considered as far more traumatic than the material loss they suffer. 
Reactions to the loss of valuable objects 
What is of particular interest for us is that the economic loss 
people endure is not at all considered one of the most relevant 
aspects of the theft. Apart from the violation of the home, which is 
by far the most disturbing aspect of the crime, what the victims regret 
mostly is that the stolen objects are usually connected with mementoes 
and souvenirs of past experiences and persons, and therefore they have 
great symbolic and sentimental meaning and value attached to them. 
These losses deeply affect people: 
"I do not mind the economic loss Calthough it has been 
a considerable onej - but the sentimental loss. They 
stole all the mementoes I had of my husband Cthe inter- 
viewee is a widow]. I have nothing left of the things 
he gave me. They deprived me of all the most intimate 
and personal mementoes. Ply privacy was destroyed, 
they desecrated my home; I had to change house, I 
could not stay there any longer ". (Interview no. 12) 
"What really disturbed me was that they touched and 
rummaged everywhere, they even stole my correspondence. 
This is what annoyed me most. Make they read it, it 
was really persónal. I felt injured, as if they had 
touched me. I do not mind at all the money they 
stole (it was a conspicuous amount for someone who was 
not rich), but when I think of the letters I feel sick, 
I get mad ". (Interview no. 14) 
"This watch was very dear to me grandfather's present). 
I kept it in a drawer because I was afraid my wife or 
children could break it. I never used it because I 
was afraid to damage it. I did not mind the theft of 
the camera, although it was a very good one, because if 
you have the money you can buy a new one. But the 
watch was very dear to me ". (Interview no. i.6) 
This sudden loss of personal belongings induces people to reflect 
142 
on the real importance that things have for them; on the values and 
meanings they project on material goods. 
As I have said, the economic and financial side of the question is 
never considered the worst aspect of the burglary. Furthermore, the 
objects whose loss was most regretted were those having great sentimental 
value and not those of great monetary value. Some of the people inter- 
viewed said that they never realized before how important these objects 
were for them and showed anger toward the burglars because "they do not 
respect our feelings, our memories ". 
The great majority of the stolen objects were in fact presents 
received in important and special circumstances, in relevant moments of 
one's life (wedding, childbirth, etc.). 
The stolen objects which do not arouse particular reactions are 
just those to which there is no emotional and symbolic value attached, 
although they are generally the most used (stereo sets, television 
sets, cameras, etc.). 
"Well, I know I can buy a new one Cpolour T.V.' - 
although at the moment I have no money - but the 
ring was my mother's present. This is different ". 
(Interview no. 9) 
Neither economic value nor functional value can compete with the 
symbolic meanings and values attached to objects. 
Symbolic value and gender differences 
From the material I have collected a difference emerges in the 
symbolic meanings that men and women attach to things, in the kind of 
objects whose loss the two sexes most regret. While women show their 
sorrow for the loss of objects that symbolize family ties, kinship 
relationships, mementoes connected with the history of their family, 
(grandmother's silver plates, jewels, wedding presents, etc.), men 
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generally tend to suffer most for the loss of objects that have to do 
with their personal, individual achievements, with tokens of personal 
success, self -realization and action (sports trophies, things awarded 
to them at work, holiday souvenirs, etc.) 
"I must confess that the theft was an unpleasant 
experience because people you do not know get 
into your place and you feel disturbed. But I 
was not as upset as my wife for the loss of our 
silver. I remember I was far more angry and 
sorry when my car was stolen. I loved it very 
much. I enjoyed working on it, repairing it etc., 
I enjoyed driving. I had many memories assoc- 
iated with it." (Interview no. 38) 
"I am very sorry they stole a medal I received when 
I climbed the Matterhorn. ....It was a nice 
souvenir, I had enjoyed that climb very much. ... 
And then, what makes me very angry is the fact 
that it had no economic value, it was not made of 
precious metals ". (Interview no. 40) 
Many of the objects indicated by men as the most significant, as 
the ones they miss most, are connected with activities performed 
outside the home, with professional success, leisure activities, etc. 
These data present interesting analaogies with the results of the 
research carried out by Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg -Halton on the 
meaning of things.(19) In their work, similar findings are dis- 
cussed when they analyze which are the objects considered most impor- 
tant and significant by the two genders: men seem to prefer mementoes 
of professional or sport achievements, cars, tools that they use in 
"do- it- yourself" activities, etc.; women, even when they work and have 
an active public life, are far more tied to all that has to do with 
family life, relationships, etc. 
Other tools, even when not actually tools of the 
trade, are often central to man's identity as homo 
faber. Here is a tool and die maker whose main hobby 
is to build and fly model airplanes. He feels most 
at home in the basement where his tools are and where 
he says he has the 'most control over the environment' 
These tools allow him to express what is most uniquely 
individual about his self." (20) 
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In the building of personal identity men are more likely to find 
identificatory material in objects that have to do with action. 
Another interesting difference in the ways in which the two sexes 
relate to objects is the fact that even when they point to the same 
object as the most significant to them, they give two different explan- 
ations of their preference. In one case, for example, a silver frame 
containing a picture of the husband fishing, with the wife sitting along- 
side, was stolen. While both husband and wife regretted the loss of 
the object (not for the silver frame but for the picture that reminded 
them of past experiences) the wife observed: "I am sorry we lost it 
because it was a nice souvenir, we were a young happy couple at that 
time, it was taken just before we got married ". The husband's comment 
was typically different: "I regret the loss of this picture- (I don't 
have a negative to make another copy) - because that day I had a jolly 
good time fishing, I was second in the fishing competition ". The 
meanings attached to the same object are very different and the object 
is perceived in two different ways. The difference reflects the dis- 
tinction between instrumental male roles and expressive female ones 
that has been already stressed discussing the phenomenon of collecting. 
The meaning of the house 
In modern industrial society the house is strictly bound to the 
individual's self, it reflects his personality, social status and 
values.(21) The house becomes central for the person: a consider- 
able amount of time is spent in it, it is one of the most valuable 
(if not the most valuable) possession one may have, and it embodies 
deep affective meanings. The individual personalises it through 
furniture and objects and in this way expresses his self. 
Furthermore, through it messages are communicated about one's 
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taste, status, conception of family life, etc., and therefore it gives 
information on identity. At the same time the house plays an impor- 
tant role giving a sense of security to the individual: in the domestic 
setting we experience a sense of control and mastery over the environ- 
ment and this is fundamental to give us a sense of stability. This 
sense of security derived from the control over the environment is not 
necessarily and exclusively a prerogative of the house. It can be 
found also in other contexts. The house, from this point of view, 
plays an essential role for those individuals who do not find self - 
assurance and realization in other spheres, such as the professional or 
those connected with social achievements. 
Besides, in contemporary society, the house has become one of the 
central channels to communicate status. Through it we express and 
affirm our standing in the eyes of strangers. The house becomes less 
privatized (in societies based on extended family, lineage or tribal 
systems, the dwelling is almost exclusively a monopoly of women, while 
men have at their disposal public meeting places),(22) since men are 
far more present in it and a great part of social life and interaction 
with friends and acquaintances, which used to take place in specific 
public spaces, now go on within the house which, consequently, tends 
to become an arena of display. 
"Status seeking is manifested through a dependence 
upon objects to affirm identity, and it is this 
very dependence upon objects, especially the house, 
to affirm identity which modifies the privatis- 
ation of the house, for it opens the private world 
to outsiders. (...) Here can be seen the necessary 
link between the private (individualised) self and 
the more open, public house among individualistic 
groups 
". (23) 
The house therefore provides the individual with multiple meanings: 
it is a means for communication status and, contemporarily, it constit- 
utes an important sphere of self- expression and a sort of emotional 
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refuge from the external world; an environment over which one feels 
in control. This last aspect is particularly relevant among women 
who seem less inclined to perceive the house in terms of status but 
rely more than men on it as an emotional refuge, as a private territ- 
ory in which they feel confident.(24) Home, in fact, seems to 
provide them with an extremely important identificatory domain. In 
our social mythology women are, on the other hand, firmly lodged at 
the center of the home: the belief that woman's place is in the 
house is, after all, still deeply rooted in popular thinking. 
Besides, this major involvement in and attachment of women to the 
house, has to do also with the fact that women spend far more time, 
energy, and work in it. For all these reasons they probably perceive 
and experience it, more than men, as their private territory. Men 
are more likely to have at their disposal other territories, apart 
from the house, where they can enjoy a relative freedom of behaviour 
and a sense of intimacy with and control over the environment. In 
some cases public territories can become "private" ones in the sense 
that they are meeting places of particular groups of people who know 
each other very well. (For example, some pubs or clubs where people 
regularly meet, always sit in the same chairs, at the same table; 
where the waiter knows what to serve, without asking, etc.). Women, 
for social and cultural reasons are far more bound to the house and, 
consequently, it is quite reasonable that they find in it a main source 
of identification. 
The importance of the house as a source of identification and 
expression of territorial needs is clearly pointed out by Ardrey when 
he suggests that home is experienced as a private territory which 
provides satisfaction to three different territorial needs: that of 
control over space, of personalisation of space as an assertion of 
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identity, and that of stimulation which is achieved by defending one's 
territory.( 
25) 
From the analysis of the interviews with robbery victims, what 
emerges quite clearly is the importance of the house as an environment 
in which one feels safe, and the consequent strong resentment caused 
by the intrusion of strangers in it. From this perspective it is inter- 
esting to note that the victims had a strong emotional reaction even 
when the burglars - being disturbed - did not manage to steal anything, 
or even when the police recovered the stolen property after a few days. 
The identification, in the case of women, of home violation -with 
body violation, expresses quite clearly the emotional attachment, the 
symbolic meaning, the sacred character, projected on to the house. As 
a territory, the body is the most private one belonging to the individ- 
ual. The rights to view and touch it are subjected to great restric- 
tions and are of a sacred nature. Simmel pointed out brilliantly the 
importance for the individual of having at his disposal a personal 
space, a sort of invisible circle surrounding him and assuring a 
necessary physical and psychological space. 
"... The individual who fails to keep his distance 
from a great person does not esteem him highly, 
much less too highly (as might superficially 
appear to be the case); but, on the contrary, 
his importune behaviour reveals lack of proper 
respect. ... The same sort of circle which 
surrounds a man - although it is value- accen- 
tuated in a very different sense - is filled out 
by his affairs and by his characteristics. To 
penetrate this circle by taking notice, constit- 
utes a violation of personality. Just as 
material property is, so to speak, an extension 
of the ego, there is also an intellectual 
private property, whose violation effects a 
lesion of the ego in its very center ".(26) 
The house, for women, is a sacred place 'whose violation effects 
a lesion of the ego in its very center'. This fact, emerges even 
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more clearly if their reactions to the burglary are compared with 
those to the damage or even the destruction of the house caused by 
natural disaster. 
Since the loss of property, the damage or the destruction of the 
house in the case of natural disasters does not imply a direct, 
malicious and aggressive human intervention, the victims do not react 
as they do in the case of burglary. They do not perceive any kind 
of violation of their territory and tend to accept the destruction of 
the house and the consequent deprivation as fruits of a supernatural 
will. Therefore, they tend to interpret it as punishment.( 
27) 
This obviously does not mean that people do not regret the 
loss they have suffered, of the house and of cherished objects, but, 
since in many cases there is loss of human lives, too, they feel 
guilty about the sorrow they feel for the loss of material possessions. 
Immediately after disaster, the individuals usually consider 
themselves so lucyto be alive that they do not give great importance 
to the loss of personal belongings. When-the first shock is overcome, 
the sorrow and regret for the loss surfaces and one constantly fights 
and reacts against these feelings, realising that to be alive is 
already a great fortune, that others are worse off than them. People 
who were in the house when the disaster took place who, therefore, 
fully realize what a terrible experience it has been, and how lucky 
they have been to survive,tend to react more moderately than people 
who were absent at the time of the disaster, to the damage or destruc- 
tion of the house and the loss of belongings. The first impact on 
those absent at the time of the disaster is through the ruins of 
the house and damaged or destroyed personal belongings; only at a 
later stage dothey rationalize and reflect on their luck at not being 
there at the time of the disaster. Therefore, from this point of 
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view,the t7 reactions to the material loss are stronger and immediate. 
Even in disaster situations women tend to react differently. 
They, together with the old of both sexes, regret more than young or 
middle aged men, the loss of symbolic assets, particularly of their 
homes. Women and the old rely so much on the house as an identif- 
icatory domain that their stronger emotional reaction is quite under- 
standable. As M. Wolfenstein points out very clearly "the more 
belongings are included in the definition of the self, the more 
vulnerable one is to losing part of oneself ".(28) 
This brief discussion of a few elements of the reactions of 
individuals to loss and the destruction of belongings caused by 
natural disasters, highlights two important differences between the 
latter and the experience of being burgled. 
First, natural disasters cause loss (of human life and material 
objects) to a collectivity, unlike the burglary which causes loss to 
a single person or family. The collective aspect of such a phenomenon 
induceapeople to react differently. The victims of natural disasters 
constantly tend to make comparisons between their condition and that 
of the other victims, thus making loss and deprivation appear relative. 
The collective character of the tragedy greatly influences their 
reaction to the loss. 
Secondly, when the person does not feel threatened with the 
violation of personal territory by another individual, the loss of 
cherished objects and even of the house does not trigger off the 
reactions we already described analysing the victims of burglaries. 
The victims of disasters do not perceive "nature" as a violator of 
personal territory. The destruction and loss of belongings are 
therefore accepted with a sort of resignation, of awareness that it was 
unavoidable and that one is still luckier than others who lost even more. 
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These feelings are completely different from anger, distrust in 
humanity, etc., which characterize the reactions to burglary. These 
different reactions should contribute to emphasize the importance - 
too often neglected - of territoriality in the study of human behaviour, 
and, more specifically, of man's relation with the environment. 
Although there are these differences it seems important to 
emphasize a common attitude between the victims of these two different 
phenomena: in both cases women present an attitude toward the world 
of objects different from that of men; they attribute different 
meanings to, and project different feelings on the material world that 
surrounds them. 
Some conclusions 
I think that, at this point, some remarks and generalization can 
be made on gender differences in the way in which we relate to things. 
These distinctions are indeed deeply rooted in the individuals' 
identities since they are present in the most intimate symbolic envir- 
onment people can create to give meaning to their lives. 
Men act in accordance with masculine stereotypes even in those 
circumstances where they are not constrained by external social oblig- 
ations or contexts to do so, when they are supposed to choose and act 
freely for themselves. Women, on the other hand, even when they have 
an active public life (they are employed, they are engaged in public 
activities, etc.,) are far more tied to the household and family as 
sources of identification, as spheres of self realization. Therefore, 
it can be said that the selves of men and women represent different 
sets of intentions or habits of consciousness.(29) Their attention 
is turned to different things in the same environment and when they 
appreciate and value the same things they do it for different reasons, 
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they attach to them different meanings. 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg- Halton in their book distinguish 
between objects of action (such as tools, cars, etc.,) and objects of 
contemplation (such as furniture, pictures, etc.,) and argue that men 
usually are more attracted by and have a deeper tie with the first 
type of objects while women have with the second. 
"For men, action usually means exertion toward a 
goal of physical and mental supremacy. The 
active pursuits of women are often motivated by 
intentions that are broader than the self defined 
by its physical limits, whereas those of men tend 
toward the expression of individual intentionality. 
For men, objects often point outside the home, but 
the connection is rarely that of a part to a whole, 
as with women and elderly. Instead, the object 
connects different aspects of the person's self: 
the family man with the professional man and the 
man of leisure".. 30) 
These remarks confirm the observations I made in the course of 
my field work. In all the three groups I interviewed, (collectors, 
robbery victims, and as we shall see, nuns and monks), I constantly 
found a different attitude towards objects by the two sexes. The 
women of all three groups show more attraction toward 'contemplation 
objects' and rely on them far more than men for the construction and 
stability of their identity, while men tend to assign more value and 
meaning to objects that have to do with the outside world, with action. 
This fact shows how strong gender differences are rooted in our culture 
and how they are solidly transmitted through the process of social - 
ization.(31) 
They deeply permeate even the most private and secret areas of 
our personalities. Men seem to reproduce, even in the most personal 
behaviour, the same attitude asked of them in the working sphere and 
in every other public area. Women, even those who have a job, a 
high level of education, and live in large cities, seem to have 
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introjected very deeply values and meanings related to family, domes- 
ticity, kinship, etc. On the whole, women tend to have a more 
passive attitude toward the external world. They tend to identify 
themselves with a world of domesticity, memories, intimacy, family 
relationships. This attitude has already emerged when we discussed 
collecting. Above all, the fact that in the case of men it is a 
dynamic activity (searching, bartering, meeting, corresponding), 
while in the case of women it is more an accumulation, a hoarding, 
almost without any personal effort in searching, with no exchanging etc. 
Objects for the individual (whatever the sex) are emotionally very 
important, but the kinds of meanings attached to them are different 
and reflect two different attitudes toward the world: the instrum- 
ental and the expressive. By instrumentalism we mean the embodi- 
ment of the principles on which modern consciousness is based: 
rationalistic, emotionally controlled, self -interested, individual- 
istic. Instrumentalism stresses the work orientation of human 
activity. It includes the rational ethos of technocratic society, 
the self -interestedness of the archetypal male. It is a kind of 
answer to the fragmentation of the self that tends to the contain- 
ment, if not to the elimination, of the expressive emotional side of 
the individual's personality. By expressivism, on the other hand, 
we mean almost a mirror image of instrumentalism. Where the 
instrumentalist is rational, emotionally controlled and calculating, 
the expressivist is passional, instinctive, spontaneous. Subject- 
ivity and emotional involvement are central elements of this kind of 
personality. 
The kinds of meaning embodied in the objects not only reflect 
these two different attitudes toward the world, they reflect also 
the different positions of the two sexes within the world: the 
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subordinate one of the women and the dominant one of men. As 
Goffman pointed out, women in our culture are typified as being sub- 
ordinate, their role is clearly secondary to that of men.(32) In 
advertisements, women are pictured deferring to men in every situation, 
and even when they are pictured performing a more commanding role 
vis -a -vis a man, they are portrayed with an "I am only joking" smile, 
indicating that if things get tough they will defer to man. And 
this subordination is deeply rooted in feminine subjectivity. It 
is assimilated and accepted at a very unconscious level. In spite of 
the not too recent opening of the working sphere to them, women seem 
to be still deeply and emotionally attached to an ideal of domesticity. 
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TEE VOW OF POVERTY : ASCETISM AND IDENTITY 
The goal of this chapter is that of exploring what happens to 
the self and identity when the individual is deprived for most of his 
life of significant objects. I think that this is an interesting 
question since it provides us with a better understanding of the 
relationship existing between personality and objects, of the role 
things play in shaping and maintaining a stable self. 
In order to answer these questions I decided to study a sample 
of members of religious orders since these deliberately give up 
secular life and values, renounce material goods and gratifications, 
and live according to strict and rigid rules governing the use of 
time, space, money, information, etc.(1) In principle, monks and 
nuns, by taking a vow of poverty and thus experiencing a voluntary 
privation of material objects, experience most distinctly the roles 
and functions objects play in making up and shaping the personality; 
they show how the relevance of renunciation of the use and owner- 
ship of things bears on the process of subjugation of the personal- 
ity and of annihilation of the self that the fulfilment of the require- 
ments of religious life demands.(2) It seemed, therefore, inter- 
esting to understand how the destruction of one's previous identity 
and the laborious construction of a new one take place (among other 
things) through the privation of and the separation from material 
objects which are significant to the person. The questions I was 
interested in had to do also with the process of formation of a new 
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self and a new identity in a context characterized by the absence of 
personal objects, by the anonymity and uniformity of the environment 
in which the individual undergoes this change, the passage from a lay 
to a religious status.(3) 
The hypotheses I had in mind were: 
I). The more the individual experiences a situation of material 
privation the more he feels uncertain and insecure and the more 
he seeks in the few objects at his disposal a source of stability, 
a confirmation of self. 
II). In a context - like the monastery or convent - characterized by 
lack of personal spaces and of private spheres of identific- 
ation, it is to be expected that the individual tends.to conform 
to the norms and values of the group and to emphasize all those 
aspects of behaviour which manifest membership of and affilia- 
tion to the organization. Therefore, above all at the beginn- 
ing of their religious experience, when they find themselves in a 
transitional stage, it is to be expected that monks and nuns 
attach great importance to those membership tokens (like the 
uniform) which make their new religious status and identity 
visible to themselves, to the religious group, and to the 
external world. 
III). The behaviour of monks and nuns towards objects should reproduce 
the differences we noticed between the two genders while dis- 
cussing the cases of collectors and of the victims of robberies. 
Therefore, it should be expected that monks and nuns, when they 
enter the Order, bring with them different possessions and when 
deprived of them they react differently, and that when leaving 
their homes and, later on moving from convent to convent, they 
should have different reactions. 
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Visiting the religious Orders and interviewing monks and nuns, I 
immediately realized that life is very different within male and 
female monastic establishments, and these differences (mainly organiz- 
ational) had to be considered and taken into account in the analysis. 
Life in male Orders has changed considerably since the Second Vatican 
Council, whereas in the female Orders, it seems to fit my initial assump- 
tions and hypotheses. More specifically, the changes which are more 
relevant for us have to do with the way in which the vow of poverty is 
experienced and understood by the monks. The ascetic character of the 
monks' life has faded away and is considered an old- fashioned way of 
understanding the experience of poverty. The emphasis has shifted 
from a life based on austerity and ascetism (still very much corres- 
ponding to that led within female orders and by the old monks) to a 
life in which personal possessions and individual use of objects are 
admitted as long as the person perceives a "social utility" in what he 
does with these things and as long as he is willing to share them with 
others. (4) 
The young monks have at their disposal and use several objects; 
they do not experience either that dramatic change in life style, or 
those feelings of uncertainty and insecurity which the aspirant nuns 
encounter when they enter the convents and find themselves in deper- 
sonalized and anonymous environments. Thus, in the monks' case, it 
is possible to hypothetize that experiencing a less radical and strict 
process of socialization in the religious role, a condition of greater 
freedom in the use of time, objects, money, etc., they should keep a 
multiplicity of selves, they should not pass through a process of 
destruction of the previous identity but play a number of different 
roles, of which the religious is just one. Those membership tokens 
.which I hypothetized to be very important in order to create a 
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feeling of membership and identity, should, in the monks' case, be 
less fundamental as a source of identity. 
Thus, the following remarks upon the repercussions that the priv- 
ation of significant objects have on the individual's personality are 
therefore based essentially on the material collected interviewing 
nuns, while that obtained interviewing monks is used to contrast nuns' 
ascetic experience with a different reality. I think that such a 
contrast is reasonable and legitimate and not biased by gender differ- 
ences since the nuns' life appears to be very close to that of the old 
monks (that is to a religious socialization characterized by austerity 
and ascetism) and, on the other hand, the picture which emerges from 
my analysis of Italian male orders is very similar to that discussed 
in those studies of female religious orders made in different countries 
(mainly the U.S.).(5) 
Privation of objects and identity changes. 
The aspirant nuns, upon entering the convent, need to be resocial- 
ized in order to be able to fulfil the requirements of the new life 
they choose to lead. This is accomplished through a well institut- 
ionalized and precise programme (there are codified rituals, prescr- 
ibed behaviour, precise schedules, particular tests, controls over the 
person, etc.), which have to be complied with. This process of social- 
ization takes place over a long period of time and over three stages: 
postulancy, novitiate and professed religious life. This long and 
demanding apprenticeship is a very clear indicator of the complexity 
and difficulty that such a transition implies and of the graduality of 
the process. 
The aspirant nun who decides to abandon secular for religious life 
chooses deliberately to enter a total institution characterized by a 
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well -defined code of behaviour, precise rules and goals; the process 
of adaptation to and identification with the new values and meanings 
is gradual and progressive and involves an absolute and complete 
modification of her previous way of life, the laborious construction 
of a new identity, a new perception of the world. Both formal and 
informal mechanisms of control are forged in order to govern the behav- 
iour beliefs and thoughts of the aspirant nuns. Their life, above 
all during the first years spent in the convents before taking the 
final vows, is highly prescribed and routinized. Enforced isolation 
from the world and a strict resocialization within the religious comm- 
unity are often carried out in order to produce the radical change in 
identity, commitments and behaviour required by the new status of 
member of a religious order. Very often high geographical mobility 
is used too in order to prevent the development of strict personal 
bonds among the religious persons and feelings of attachment to part- 
icular buildings, rooms, environments. 
Entering the convents the female aspirants tend to bring with them, 
above all, tokens and souvenirs of their family and friends (photo- 
graphs, small presents such as pens, religious pictures, etc.). Male 
aspirants, on the other hand, tend to bring with them radios, stereo 
sets, tape recorders, cameras, musical instruments, typewriters and, 
above all, a considerable number of books, not only on theological or 
religious subjects. Women, furthermore, unlike men, report that 
they felt very strongly the separation from their homes, not only from 
parents and relatives, but also from the house itself, showing the 
relevance it has as an identificatory domain. 
"I missed that feeling of safeness and security that 
we have when we feel at home" (interview no. 8) 
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"At the beginning I missed my house almost in a 
physical way. ... After a certain period I 
found here other things which, to a certain extent, 
replaced my home, now I am used to this environ- 
ment; I have a sort of attachment and affection 
toward it and I feel well here too ". (Interview No. 9) 
These different attitudes and reactions which characterize the 
behaviour of the aspirant monks and nuns correspond to those pointed 
out discussing the cases of collectors and of the victims of robberies. 
This correspondence strengthens further what has been argued on differ- 
ences in the way the two genders relate to the material world and on 
the contribution things make to the construction and maintenance of 
our self -perception and identity. The objects the two genders bring 
with them denote also a different attitude toward the external world 
and different expectations for what concerns their future religious 
life. Women bring with them above all objects which remind them of 
significant persons and affective bonds, men, objects which allow 
them to keep in touch with the world outside the convent (radios, 
books, etc.), to pursue personal hobbies and interests (music, photo- 
graphy, etc.) which do not necessarily have any relation with their 
religious life. They claim that books and typewriters are essential 
tools to achieve the necessary preparation for their future pro- 
fession, and other objects such as a guitar, a camera, etc., will 
help them to interact and socialize with the lay people they will 
meet in their external activities. 
The future nuns, even those who will engage in external and 
public activities, such as nursing, teaching, etc., do not seem con- 
cerned about the world outside the convent and tend to emphasize 
their own retreat and withdrawal from the world. On the other hand, 
even during postulancy and novitiate periods characterized by tighter 
control over the persons and limited interaction with the external 
world - the aspirant monks experience far more numerous external 
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contacts and relationships than their female counterparts. 
In the female orders, both contemplative, cloistered and miss- 
ionary, there is a very tight control over the sisters' lives from 
every point of view: control over the use of time, of objects, of 
money, of space. The rule of dependence - that is the fact that the 
aspirant has to depend totally on the Superior's will, has to ask 
permission for everything she needs (even soap or tooth paste) - is 
far more rigid and literally respected than in the male orders. 
Sisters must ask permission for every action they intend to under- 
take. The control over the objects they keep in their rooms is very 
rigid (there are frequent inspections), every object they receive 
from parents and relatives must be presented to the Mother Superior 
who decides what do with it and to whom it must be given. Sisters 
are periodically allowed to write home and their correspondence is 
checked by the Superior. They are not allowed to keep any money and 
if they have to go out (i.e. to the Theology School) they are given 
the bus tickets or the money they need. They cannot therefore buy 
anything unless authorized, they cannot bring into the convent any 
paper or magazine (the daily paper of the Vatican is usually available 
for reading in the common room), they cannot watch television unless 
the Mother Superior decides there is something worth watching. Only 
a few old nuns were allowed to keep a radio in their rooms. But 
this was clearly defined as an exception. The books the sisters read 
are chosen by the Superior because of their potential contribution to 
the religious and theological knowledge of the nun and are kept by 
the single sister only for a limited period, after which the books 
are kept in the convent library. 
The deprivation of any significant object, the prevention of any 
individual initiative, the strict dependence on the Superior, the 
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depersonalization of the environment,bring as a consequence the 
annihilation of the individual's identity and the patterning of the 
sister's self after the religious ideal imposed by the Order: grad -. 
ually but systematically, every object which had some connection with 
the previous life of the aspirant nun is eliminated. The only per- 
sonal items that usually the sisters keep with them are a few pictures 
of their relatives, a watch and an alarm clock - essential tools to 
guarantee punctuality and routine, basic qualities of religious life. 
Nowadays sisters have at their disposal personal garments too, while 
until a few years ago they had common ones. They also have personal 
prayer books. 
"When I arrived I had a fountain pen which I was 
given by my friends when I left home to come here. 
I liked it very much and I was very happy to own 
it because I never had one before. When I unpacked 
my luggage the Mother who supervised this activity 
took the pen. She said I wouldn't need it. I 
felt very sorry; I hadn't even tried it, and then 
I did not understand why she behaved in such a way. 
Now ( after one year) I do./ 
terview no. 10) 
Monks: from conformity to individuality. The role played by possessions. 
The aspirant monks enjoy far more freedom for what concerns both 
the objects they are allowed to keep, the books and papers they are 
allowed to read, and the possibility to have external relationships, 
to use money, time, etc., according to personal criteria. Unlike 
sisters, they can smoke, help themselves freely with drinks and food, 
read novels or whatever they wish. When they receive a present from 
home or from friends they personally decide whether to keep it for 
themselves or to share it with the rest of the community. Usually 
they are more engaged than sisters in activities external to the 
monastery (both studying and working) and this makes almost imposs- 
ible a form of control over the brothers' life which is as tight as 
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that over sisters' behaviour. This life external to the monastery, 
gives to the monks a higher level of personal autonomy. Moreover, 
after the Second Vatican Council, male Orders in Italy have been more 
receptive than female ones to innovations which, to a certain extent, 
encouraged personal inclinations and gave a certain amount of freedom 
to express individual attidues. Conformity and uniformity, which 
were essential and predominant characteristics and principles of life 
in the religious Orders before the Vatican Council(6), gave way to a 
progressively more personally oriented vision of religious life within 
the Orders. As I said, this change in Italy has taken place and dev- 
eloped to a larger extent in male Orders, while in the female ones 
innovations have been far less radical and slower.(7) This is 
acknowledged by the religious Orders themselves, above all by the 
monks who are in touch with female Orders and can, therefore, make 
comparisons between their own and the sisters' conditions. 
'We (monks) constantly live with the temptation to 
become attached to some objects. I would say that 
this is probably nowadays the greatest risk we 
religious people have in the western world. The 
contacts with the external world push us 
towards new needs and it is very difficult to put 
up resistance. I think that in the female 
Orders (he is the confessor in a nuns' convent) the 
control over the persons and therefore over what 
they possess is greater. There is no doubt that 
they generally experience a far more rigorous 
poverty than ours, because they have fewer oppor- 
tunities to interact with the external world. .... 
In our cells we can do whatever we like, we can 
keep books, records, radio, etc.; we can hang 
posters on the walls, pictures, etc. The nuns' 
cells are completely depersonalized, they are cold; 
I feel they are terribly anonymous./ 
Interview No. 23) 
This new ideal of religious life, which has been developing 
since Vatican Council II, is reflected, for instance, in the dramatic 
differences in the ways of living and of conceiving the monk's 
experience between young and old monks.(8) Compatible differences 
which are not found among young and old nuns. 
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"Nowadays the communal use of goods is stressed far 
more than the ascetic character. As long as we 
do not perceive our relationship with objects as 
problematical - in the sense that we do not feel 
too dependent on them - we are allowed to possess 
whatever we want; really there is no problem. 
... The old monks have remained faithful to their 
ascetic way of living. They are very different 
from us. Although we live in the same monastery 
we are worlds apart., 
Interview no. )4 ) 
Brothers are allowed to personalize their rooms both with posters 
and objects of their taste. Their rooms have little to do with the 
ascetic austerity of the older monks' cells. Several of them have 
radios or record players, the great majority possesses a personal 
theological library, although they have at their disposal excellent 
common libraries in the monasteries. Some have collections of art 
books or of records of classical music etc. The personal ownership 
of these things is explained and justified by the fact that 
"The Order must develop the personality of the 
persons, allowing the single individual to 
exploit and expand his own attitudes and skills 
through the pursuing of personal interests and 
hobbies"., 
Interview no. 37) 
The great majority of monks, even before taking the final vows, hold 
paid jobs outside the monastery. They personally receive their salary 
and, according to the rule, they must give it to the bursar Father, 
whom they must ask for the money necessary to buy what they think they 
need. This passage of money from the monk to the bursar Father and 
from him back to the monk, is done in order to stress and emphasize 
the dependence of the single monk from the Order. Even if, according 
to those interviewed, the bursar Father usually does not oppose the 
requests of the monks, the simple fact that they are compelled to ask 
for every item they wish to purchase, constitutes a sort of filter, 
of self -limitation, and self -control over their requests. 
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Although monks' dependence on the Superiors is far less strong 
than that of nuns, since it is essentially connected with the giving 
and asking of money only, while they are quite free in their use of 
time, of food, etc., it is often scarcely tolerated by the young 
brothers who state it is a sort of common practice to keep some private 
and personal funds so that they do not feel obliged to approach the 
bursar every time they want something. Moreover, the fact that, as 
we said, they are allowed to keep the presents they receive without 
asking the Superiors, gives them the possibility to possess and use 
several objects. For this reason status differences among monks are 
visible and apparently they sometimes engender invidious attitudes 
which emerge in connection with the availability of goods, as well as 
success at school or university. 
In the case of nuns, the strict and rigid control over their whole 
life and more specifically over what they are allowed to keep in their 
rooms, makes almost impossible any feeling of envy among them for what 
concerns the use and ownership of objects. And even if, of course, 
there are intellectual, educational and cultural differences among 
them, the stress on conformity and dependence tends to make those differ- 
ences less visible and therefore less a source of conflict than (they 
are) among monks. 
The fact that monks use, possess, and personalize their environ- 
ments through objects, makes their relationship with things almost 
inevitably problematic. They are well aware of this fact and for 
this reason the great majority of those interviewed were induced to 
praise the practice of frequent moves from monastery to monastery 
which compels them to get rid of all that is not strictly necessary. 
Nuns, on the contrary, discussing the moving from one house to 
another, tend to stress the fact that they have to abandon associates 
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and environments which had become familiar, dear. 
The conflicting situation in which monks find themselves is 
reflected in the following quotation: 
"The greatest effort I have faced in my religious life is 
that of getting rid of things, of possessing nothing. 
Some time ago my parents gave me a guitar as a present. 
I asked for it because I thought it was useful to get 
in touch more easily with young people. Then I had 
no time to study it but I became strongly attached to 
the instrument and this created a great conflict in 
me. Eventually, having to move to another monastery, I 
decided to give it away. I felt really relieved. 
It was a sort of liberation. I noticed similar 
behaviour in other brothers. To move from monastry 
to monastery is very useful because we leave all that 
is not useful, and in this way free ourselves from so 
many ties".. 
Interview no. 38) 
The complexity of monks' relationship to things induces them to 
sophisticated rationalizations of the fact that they personally poss- 
ess and use several objects. So, for instance, one answered the 
question whether he did not find any contradiction in possessing a 
private library as follows: 
"All that is mine is in fact of the whole community, 
because I lend what I an asked; and even if I am 
the only one to use an object, it is the community 
that uses it through me". (Interview no. 40) 
Or, as another one observed: 
"The point is not that of possessing nothing but that 
of perceiving things as not yours and therefore of 
being able to lend them to everybody". (terview no. 33) 
"To have a personal library is now a common practice. 
I am very fond of history and art books. Books are 
the objects I love most and I often receive them as 
presents from my lay friends. When I travel (during 
the summer holidays) the knowledge I acquire reading 
these books is very useful. (....) I-am aware that it 
is definitely a private pleasure but, at the same time, 
it is a capital which I transmit to others. (He usually 
travels with a group of lay friends and he acts as a 
tourist guide). .... These books are stored in my room 
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but I do not perceive them as mine. Perhaps it 
would be better to store them in the monastery 
library, but in all large monasteries (like this 
one) the things which are common are neglected 
and then for us it is normal to keep our things 
in our rooms ".(Interview 
no. 23) 
It will be seen from these passages that monks tend to consider 
possessing acceptable, on condition that the individual perceives 
a certain degree of social utility in the use he makes of these 
objects (it is not by chance, in fact, that the most commonly possessed 
objects are books since one can almost immediately justify their social 
utility by the fact that through them one acquires useful information 
which can be given to others), and that he is willing to lend the 
things he owns. 
But to be willing to give one's beloved objects to others 
(usually other monks) is difficult even for monks. 
these exchanges often originate quarrels among them, they may spoil 
friendships and relationships within the religious community: 
"I do not like to lend my stuff, above all the things 
I am attached to I am a musician and I have several 
scores. When someone asks me for a score I feel sick 
at the idea of giving it because I think it can be 
spoiled or lost and I need it. It is a continuous 
struggle"./ 
Interview no. 34) 
This can be explained by the fact that some of these objects are very 
significant for the single monk who projects personal feelings on to 
them and who, therefore, when giving them away loses part of his 
self. This is relevant to our argument since it shows that the monk 
relies on spheres different from the religious one for the maintenance 
and the integrity of his self. Material objects which do not have 
any relation with his religious status, become nevertheless essential 
elements of his life and identity. At the same time the personal use 
and ownership of goods stimulates various conflicting feelings and 
reactions in the monks. 
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The problem of coming to terms with the ideal and the vow of 
poverty - essential features of the monks' life - and, at the same 
time, the tendency to accumulate goods, are aspects of the religious 
experience which often become difficult to solve. Several monks 
asserted that this is one of the most difficult and demanding problems 
they face in the religious life. Moreover, the increasing personal- 
ization of the religious experience, the recognition and the encourage- 
ment, by the Orders, of differences in attitudes, sensibility, skills, 
etc., the greater autonomy which monks enjoy today, have brought as a 
consequence a new emphasis on the monk as individual, with his tastes 
and personal aspirations, more than as member of a community which he 
has to respect and on which he depends. It becomes more and more 
difficult to respect the principles of dependence and obedience which 
are rooted in the idea of negation of the individual's personality and 
in the uncritical acceptance of God's will mediated by the Superior's 
plans. 
But discarding the ascetic ideal, which is no longer considered 
adequate to the active role monks want to play in modern society,(9) 
makes it very difficult to reach an equilibrium between a "legitimate ", 
self -limited and self -controlled, use of goods and the desire to 
possess. Besides, the greater personalization of the religious exper- 
ience has brought about a certain identification of the monks with the 
external activities they carry on, the objects they collect, the 
hobbies they practice. Some of them, for instance, during the inter- 
view, defined themselves as teachers, musicians, photographers, etc. 
To lend their working tools - books, scores, cameras - becomes a 
difficult matter since they invest so much emotionally in them. 
Moreover the fact that the ownership of some of these objects has been 
the result of a long and tiring accumulation of "secret" money or of 
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complicated bargaining with the bursar Father, that monks had to plan 
these purchases long before they were able to make them, engenders in 
the monks a greater attachment to their possessions which are perceived 
as the product of personal effort and achievement. The great majority 
of the monks, in fact, describing the efforts they went through in 
order to obtain something, clearly appeared proud of their enterprise: 
"This is the first camera I bought. It took me more 
than one year to accumulate enough money to buy it. 
But then I was very happy to have it. Now I do 
not use it agy longer De has a better onej but I 
am still very fond of it. It is the first object I 
bought. I get deeply attached to my things. I 
need them even physically. If I do not take photos 
for a while, I nevertheless feel the need to use it 
even without a film ".(In 
terview no. 31) 
By discarding the ascetic ideal, by personalizing the environment, 
by making use of the freedom to express one's personality, to diver- 
sify oneself from the others, to wear common clothes, to work outside 
without being detected as a member of a religious Order, the monk has 
obtained the possibility of maintaining a lay identity, of acting and 
behaving as a layman and therefore of experiencing a double perception 
of his self both as a lay and as a religious person. This means 
that monks do not pass through a process of destruction and annihil- 
ation of their lay identity; on the contrary they have several selves 
at their disposal. This brings as a consequence a greater psycho- 
logical autonomy from the religious role. 
Uniform and identity. 
The different conditions which characterize the nuns' lives, as 
has been argued above, compel them to a more radical change in life 
style, to a clearer cut with their previous lay status, to a necess- 
arily deeper transformation and change of values and attitudes. All 
these features engender a more complete and radical process of erad- 
ication of the previous identity, and a greater sense of insecurity 
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and uncertainty until a new self is completely shaped and accepted 
by the person. In this period of transition and change the aspirant 
nuns (aspirant because they have not yet taken the final vows) find 
themselves in an in- between condition: they are not yet nuns but, at 
the same time, they no longer feel lay persons. Being in such an 
unstable, precarious, poorly defined, status, not having the possib- 
ility to rely upon personal objects and familiar environments to 
support their identity and their self perception, they strenuously seek 
to conform as much as possible to this new life style, to integrate 
themselves into the religious community.(1o) During the interviews 
the postulants'and novices told me how important it was for them to 
learn how to walk properly, how to speak, how to make gestures in 
order to communicate silently with the other sisters. Moreover, an 
interesting indicator of the anxious desire to perceive themselves and 
be perceived as full members of the religious community, can be found 
in the strong aspiration to wear the religious habit. Such a desire 
is unanimously expressed by the aspirant nuns. All of them, in fact, 
claimed to have felt disappointed and frustrated by the fact that in 
the first year, and often also in the second, they had to wear ordinary 
clothes which they brought in from home. They longed for a visible 
sign of their changed condition, they would have liked to be identified 
as different from the "normal" people they mixed with when they went 
out, and would have liked to feel part of the religious world they had 
entered. 
"When I entered I wanted so much to wear the habit. .... 
Then when I had to go out Cto the theology school') 
and nobody recognized me as a postulant, I did not 
like it. This year Cshe is a novice now I have a 
uniform - although it is not the proper habit - 
and I am far happier because now people understand 
I am different, that I have made a religious choice ". 
(Interview No. 13) 
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Several aspirants during the first year create for themselves a 
sort of uniform (usually a black overall), they lengthen the dresses 
they use when they go out (dresses which have been selected according 
to the criteria of modesty and inconspicuousness). They are clearly 
disturbed by the idea of being perceived as young women instead of 
persons with a precise religious status. The insecurity and pre- 
cariousness linked to their transitional status make the interactions 
with the external world difficult and a source of anxiety. They tend 
to avoid contacts with the secular world: those who are allowed to 
go home for holidays (one week during summer) say they do not like it, 
that they feel uneasy within their family; they claim that they do 
not know how to behave. They do not yet feel secure about their 
choice and their new status and going back home may often stimulate 
conflicts and open wounds which have just healed or have not yet healed. 
They claim it is enough for them to know their parents and relatives 
are well and that they do not like to spend more than a couple of days 
at home: 
"When I go back home I long to come back here in the 
convent. This is the place in which I feel at home 
now, here I feel I am in the proper place. I no 
longer feel at home when I am with my family. 
(Interview No. 11. She entered the 
convent two years before). 
In some Orders I visited, a uniform is given to the young aspir- 
ant nuns when they become novices (usually one year 'after their 
entering the convent). This symbolizes the first important step 
towards full affiliation to the order and it is highly appreciated by 
the novices. They now feel visibly different from the lay persons and 
accepted by the religious community. This strengthens their percep- 
tion of themselves as persons with a religious status. 
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"At least now it is evident that I am a member of a 
religious Order. Many people ask me what this 
uniform represents because it is not very common. 
I am happy to wear it, now I feel more confident 
when I have to go out because my choice is visible. 
I like to wear it in the convent too because it 
shows that I am a novice, that I am a member of 
this community" 
'(Interview No. 17). 
It is immediately obvious that they seek a confirmation of their 
role from the external world - by being perceived as members of a 
religious Order and not as young women - as well as from the convent's 
world - by feeling accepted by and integrated into the community. 
Their need to show, through the uniform, their different status prob- 
ably reflects the psychological need to reject their femininity and 
to be recognized as sexually non -accessible persons. But, first of 
all, they must accept themselves as persons who devote their lives to 
God, therefore, they need to deny all those aspects of their personality 
which go against this perception of their selves: if they are not 
given a uniform, they lengthen their dresses, their hair is kept tidy 
without any refinement. They make an effort to de- emphasize all those 
external aspects which could make them sexually attractive and feminine. 
It is quite evident that if their religious status is not apparent they 
often feel uneasy and embarrassed when they go out, since they may 
become the object of sexual attentions and this puts them in a conflic- 
ting situation. 
Gradually this need to rely so much on appearances to support their 
identity and self -perception seems to diminish: the nuns whom I inter- 
viewed, who occasionally wore lay clothes to go out (i.e. to accompany 
their students to the theatre, etc.), declared they did not feel 
embarrassed or uneasy. This suggests that when the new status has 
been completely accepted and the transitional period of discarding the 
previous self has been overcome, the new self takes shape and there is 
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less need to use objects as identity pegs. The individual is suff- 
iciently confident of his identity to appear in public without any 
distinctive mark which makes known his status. 
It is possible to generalize and say that the more the individual 
is insecure and lacking confidence the more he will depend on those 
tokens of membership to a particular group or institution which play 
the role of supporting and strengthening his sense of affiliation, 
his perception of the self as member of a group. 
As has been suggested, the life monks carry out within the monas- 
tery gives them room enough to express their individuality. It does 
not compel them to a strict dependence on the superiors, to rigid 
timetables, etc., and therefore it does not require such a complete 
and extreme reshaping of their identity. The aspirant monks there- 
fore do not manifest the same need of conformity to the rules of the 
Order and of being considered and perceived as full members of the 
religious community. Their use of the habit, for example, gives us 
a clear indicator of the different condition they experience. 
Although all the aspirant monks are given a habit shortly after 
they enter the monastery, they apparently use it very rarely. When 
they were interviewed, all but one wore lay clothes personally bought 
according to their taste (mainly T- shirts or jumpers and jeans) and 
declared they wear the habit only very rarely, apart from the situa- 
tions in which they are compelled to do so, (celebration of the mass, 
common prayers, etc.), that is situations typical of the monastic 
life. In their activities outside the monastery, which occupy a 
large part of their time, the monks are free to choose how to appear, 
how to dress. This liberty makes them quite soon well aware of the 
symbolic value of the habit, and they soon become able to establish 
when to use it or not, according to the messages they want to convey. 
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So, when they go out, they freely choose whether to present themselves 
as monks or as ordinary individuals. Unlike the aspirant nuns, they 
do not feel at all embarrassed to be considered "normal" people; 
actually, above all at the beginning, they are often embarrassed at the 
idea of going out wearing the habit, that is of being identified as 
religious. 
' They assert the habit is less comfortable than trousers 
and makes them appear clumsy, awkward, ridiculous. Some of them, for 
instance, say they do not like to go home wearing it: "I always go 
home wearing lay clothes; wearing the habit I would feel ridiculous, 
out of place ". (Interview no. 37). Others claim that in certain 
contexts the habit constitutes an obstacle to their activities (i.e. 
working with drug addicts), because it emphasizes and creates differ- 
ence and distance between them and the others. "The habit can be 
a barrier between us and the lay persons we work with ". (Interview 
No. 24) . 
From the data I collected a different attitude emerges towards the 
religious garb between aspirant monks and nuns. While, as has been 
said, the young women seem to look for a uniform which distinguishes 
them from the others and makes their choice clear to the world, the 
young men seem to show a certain difficulty at being identified as 
persons with a religious status. They prefer to present themselves 
as lay persons, to work and go out without being detected as members of 
a religious community. This difference between nuns and monks can 
probably be explained by the fact that the aspirant nuns entering the 
convent face a faster and more dramatic change than their male counter- 
parts, and react to the situation with an attempt to adapt themselves 
as fast as possible to this new context. The aspirant monks, a the 
other hand, experiencing a fax more gradual change ln life skie, 
remain more attached to their previous secular identity amp lm1 
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slowly and gradually accept their own identification with the 
community they chose to join. 
"At the beginning four years before I hated to wear 
the habit. Since I had this strong dislike to use 
it, my spiritual father suggested I made an effort 
to use it all the time. I remember it was terrible, 
above all when I went home. I really felt horribly 
ashamed. I couldn't face my parents, at night I 
couldn't sleep. I liked the life in the monastery, 
but I couldn't stand to be identified as a monk. 
Now I have overcome this problem and I tend to use 
the habit quite often ".(Interview 
No. 23). 
Gradually, those who decide to remain in the monastery, learn to 
accept themselves as religious persons and progressively they overcome 
the difficulties they had about the use of the habit, (although they 
do not wear it very often anyway) and feel confident enough to face the 
world as monks. 
Nevertheless, the fact that they are not compelled to use the 
habit all the time, and, above all, that they can go out to work or 
attend conferences, etc., using lay clothes, makes it possible for 
them to be perceived by and to interact with others as "normal" 
individuals. They are therefore allowed to maintain a multiplicity 
of selves, to play a wide set of roles of which the religious one of 
monk is just one among others. This twofold persona which they have 
at their disposal for use in interactions, allows them to present 
different selves according to what they think more suitable. 
"It depends entirely on me to wear the habit or not. 
It depends on what I plan to do, where I go. I 
frequently go to the theatre and I often associate 
with actors. Sometimes I go to these places 
wearing the habit (when I want my religious choice 
to be clear and evident), sometimes I wear lay 
clothes because I do not like to embarrass these 
persons, since the habit influences my interactions 
with them, their relationships towards me and among 
themselves in my presence. The habit is a symbol 
and just for this fact it can be despised or 
worshipped. There is no doubt that it cannot be 
ignored and therefore the interaction is necessarily 
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modified. Over this period I tend to use it more 
often than before because I consider it as a way 
of manifesting my faith. It is a sort of silent 
sermon I give to those I meet.(In terview 
no. 38) 
It is undeniable that to interact with a person wearing a habit 
has certain consequences for the other individual who may perceive the 
uniform wearer as either a peer or an outsider, and will have partic- 
ular expectations as to how the monk should behave, and will manifest 
these expectations in the interaction. But the uniform wearer him- 
self is influenced by the uniform he wears: since no other statuses, 
or any touch of individuality are acknowledged in the person wearing 
the uniform by others, he is induced to act as an occupant of his 
"uniformed" status. In this sense the habit, as any other uniform, 
plays the role of binding the wearer to his peers and differentiates 
and separates him from outsiders.(h1) 
The fact that monks are allowed to wear lay clothes gives them a 
greater freedom, since they cannot be immediately detected as relig- 
ious and therefore can enjoy the privileges of anonymity when they go 
around wearing normal clothes. But it may also bring as a consequence 
the weakening of the ties with their peers and the strengthening of 
those with outsiders. This may happen because as the distinctions 
and the differential markers which made the monks always visible and 
recognizable are weakened, the boundaries which separate the group 
from the external world are weakened too, and the individual's 
qualities and peculiarities are stressed and emphasized instead of 
those of the group. 
From what has been said up to now, the symbolic relevance of 
objects such as uniforms (which are emblems of groups and organiz- 
ations) emerges both in making apparent certain values which the 
public associates with the organization, and in keeping those wearing 
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them from projecting many personal characteristics. The interaction 
between "ordinary" people and those wearing uniforms is special 
since the uniform wearer tends to be perceived as a member of a group 
more than as an individual. The uniform, in fact, tends to monopol- 
ize all the meanings and messages we usually derive from someone's 
appearance, it tends to eliminate the perception of personal and 
individual characteristics and to stress the uniformity and confor- 
mity of the uniform wearer to the characteristics of the group of 
which he is a member. Since social intercourse involves mutual adjust- 
ment, the uniform wearer, being used to interact with persons who act 
towards him on the basis of his role, becomes conditioned to respond 
to their actions in the way in which they expect him to answer. From 
this it follows that: 
"The greater the number of situations in which an 
individual wears uniform relative to the number of 
situations he experiences in which uniform is not 
worn, the more his conception of Self will be 
influenced by the nature of the role signified by 
his uniform, and the more his actions in all 
situations will correspond to abroad definition 
of the actions appropriate to the uniformed role ".(12) 
This means that the possibility of choosing whether to present oneself 
wearing the uniform or not has deep and significant repercussions 
on the individual's conception of his self and of his identity. Some 
studies(13) suggest how the abolition or even the modification of the 
habit have made an impact on the likelihood of monks and nuns giving 
up their religious life. 
"The respondents Cnunsj mentioned the pleasure of being 
able to move unnoticed in everyday circles - shopping, 
browsing, attending meetings, going to classes - and 
being treated 'like everyone else'. In this way, nuns 
had greater opportunity to pick up the small routines 
and skills of secular living and to practice and refine 
them in unobtrusive ways. 
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These ramifications of changes in the habit also had 
an impact on the imagery with which the respondents 
identified themselves. New 'selves' were opening 
up. Being a nun became just one of a number of 
existential possibilities. As the nuns became more 
aware of what else they could be, what selves were 
latently subsumed under their role as nuns, their 
close identification with the religious role dimin- 
ished ". (14) 
The changes and modifications described in the above quotation 
are not at all surprising because by discarding the uniform one 
rejects those things which have the function of abolishing individual 
idiosyncracies in behaviour and appearance as well as in self -image. 
As the word uniform suggests, to wear it means to make a person 
similar to others, to conform to the rules of the group, to suppress 
individuality. It also means to exert a strong form of control over 
the people wearing it: deviations are much more apparent - a police- 
man drinking alcohol while on duty, a nun embracing a young man, are 
immediately noticed by the public which expects different behaviour 
from them. The person wearing a uniform is not just an individual but 
a representative of a group which is responsible for the individual's. 
actions. 
Some conclusions. 
What has been analyzed and discussed so far shows the great 
relevance objects have in shaping and supporting our identity, in 
structuring and influencing our perception of ourselves as well as 
of others. In a situation of transition from one role to another, 
from one status to another, objects constitute the essential tools 
the individual relies upon in order to successfully overcome the 
passage. Their use, in fact, may help the person to separate and 
differentiate from the previously played roles,and to make evident 
and signal the change which has taken place. 
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Objects become membership tokens, they make differences visible 
and therefore make the external world intelligible and understandable. 
Through the use and manipulation of objects individuals create dis- 
tinctions, convey messages, play roles, present a multiplicity of 
selves according to their appearance. Objects are means of expression: 
they can express membership of a group or an organization and therefore 
influence interaction among individuals. 
Different attitudes towards objects among nuns and monks have 
been described. They are caused both by gender and by organizational 
differences between male and female Orders. The gender differences 
which have been pointed out confirm what has been already said con- 
cerning the collectors and burglary victims: that women, far more 
than men, tend to rely upon "contemplation objects" (objects which 
remind them of bonds and ties with the family or the religious Order) 
for the construction and stability of their identities, while men 
tend to rely upon, and to give more importance to, objects connected 
with action and with the external world (radios, cameras, books, papers, 
etc.). Secondly, but not secondary, the aspirant nuns experience a 
real privation of significant objects and this has a considerable 
influence on the process of annihilation of their lay identity and on 
their acceptance of the religious one as the only identity. Monks, 
on the contrary, living in a personalized environment, not experiencing 
the privation of significant possessions, do not pass through such a 
destruction and reshaping of their identity. They have at their dis- 
posal several identificatory roles of which the religious is just one 
among others - even if it may be the most important. These differ- 
ences explain why the aspirant monks do not experience the same sense 
of insecurity and uncertainty the aspirant nuns 4o, and why, therefore, 
they do not feel with the same urgency the need to conform to the rules 
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of the Order, to perceive themselves as full members of the religious 
community, but actually find it hard to identify themselves totally 
and completely in the role of monk. 
The results of this argument quite clearly show how the deper- 
sonalization of the environment, the abolition and the exclusion of 
every personal object which may remind the persons of past experiences 
or ties, (which may therefore embody their projections), and the tight 
boundaries imposed on external contacts and relationships, engender 
and stimulate a complete transformation of the individual's identity, 
and the urgent need to find other identificatory domains which give a 
new sense of identity and a new meaning to life. 
In this context óbjects become very important since they provide 
the individual with tokens of membership in the new world of which they 
are a part. Above all in the period of transition from one role to 
another, they play a relevant role contributing to the structuring and 
supporting of the individual's new self and identity. 
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NOTES: 
1. The following considerations are based on a series of inter- 
views I conducted with individuals who decided to enter 
different Catholic Religious Orders. Interviews nos. 1 -20 
were conducted with females; 21 - 40 with males. For more 
details cf. the methodological appendix. 
2. On this conception of religious life reference may be made to 
G.G. Coulton, Five Centuries of Religion, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1923, vol. (i).; E. Beaglehole, Property, A 
Study in Social Psychology, London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931. 
3. For this reason most interviews were conducted with people who 
had very recently entered religious Orders and found them- 
selves in the middle of the transition from a lay to a religious 
identity. On the problem of role passage, cf. the classic 
and famous work by A. Van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1960. 
4. On the contemporary vision of the role of monks see 
Confederazione dei Padri Provinciali dei Frati Minori d'Italia, 
La vocazione delle ordine oggi, Capitolo Generale dei Frati 
Minori: Madrid, 1/6 - 8/7 1973. 
5. This is what emerges from my data. Studies carried out in 
other countries show an image of nuns' life similar to what I 
found in monasteries. On this subject cf., for example, L. 
San Giovanni, Ex Nuns: a Study of Emergent Role Passage, 
Norwood (New Jersey) : Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1978; 
H.R. Fuchus Ebaugh, Out of the Cloister, A Study of Organiz- 
ational Dilemmas, Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 
1977. 
6. On this subject see R. Carli, F. Crespi, G. Pavan, Analisi 
dell'Ordine dei Frati Minori Cappuccini, Milano: Etas Kompass, 
1974. 
7. In the U.S. for example, these changes took place also in 
female orders; cf. L. San Giovanni, op. cit., H.R. Fuchus 
Ebaugh, op. cit. 
8. On age related differences in the conception of religious life 
cf. R. Carli, F. Crespi, G. Pavan, op. cit. 
9. On this subject cf. Confederazione dei Padri Provinciali e 
dei Frati Minori Cappuccini, op. cit., e G. Carli, F. Crespi, 
G. Pavan, op. cit. 
10. Interesting data emerge from the BBC programme Decision . 
Poverty, Chastity, Obedience, Post Production Script, London: 
1980, broadcast on 15th January 1980. 
11. cf. S.M. Wood, "Uniform. Its Significance As a Factor in 
Role- Relationships ", in Sociological Review, vol. 14, n.1, 
1966, pp.139 -151; J. Nathan and N. Alex, "The Uniform: 
A Sociological Perspective ", in American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 77, n.4, 197172, PP. 719 -30; G. Simmel, 
Fashion in D.N. Levine, George Simmel. On Individuality 
and Social Forms, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1971, pp.294 -323; G. Stone, Appearance and the Self, 
in A.H. Rose, Human Behaviour and Social Processes, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1962. 
12. S.M. Wood, "Uniform", op. cit. 
13. cf. L. San Giovanni, op. cit. and H.R. Fuchus Ebaugh, 
op. cit. 
14. cf. L. San Giovanni, op. cit. p.43. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this work has been that of shedding light on some 
specific and limited aspects of the everyday life of contemporary 
individuals which can help us to understand the peculiarities of 
modern social experience. More specifically, this contribution 
refers to a tradition of social thinking which is mainly concerned 
to clarify some features of modern contemporary society and to 
stress some of the problems modernity raises for the establishment 
and maintenance of personal identity. 
Within this tradition of sociological and socio- philosophical 
thought, the main objective of the dissertation has been that of 
exploring and understanding the functions performed and the roles 
played by objects in providing the individual with useful material 
for shaping his self, interacting with others, and building safe 
identificatory domains where his quest fo^:identity can find an answer 
(although usually a partial and transitory one). 
This topic has been chosen since it has been almòst completely 
ignored by sociology. Analyses of the relationship which binds 
people and objects are very kw and unsatisfactory. The prevalent 
sociological approach to the above question has in fact generally con- 
sidered objects as consumption goods able to satisfy human needs and 
wishes and to communicate status differences among individuals. Accord- 
ing to these contributions, people would surround themselves with 
objects both to satisfy personal or socially- induced needs and to keep 
up with the competition for social standing. 
The objective of the dissertation has been that of pointing out 
how restrictive such an interpretation is since the meanings and the 
projections attached to objects are multiple and complex. Things 
perform several other functions apart from those stressed by the 
sociological analyses of consumer behaviour and consumption society. 
Indeed, I believe that those are only some, and not the most important, 
reasons which drive us to buy and surround ourselves with inanimate 
objects. It is therefore necessary not to over -rate these functions 
but to regard them as some among several others. 
An interdisciplinary approach to this subject seems better suited 
to understand the various roles played by objects and some particular 
features characteristic of the contemporary relationship between indiv- 
iduals and material things. Disciplines such as anthropology, 
history and psychology provide valuable evidence and relevant infor- 
mation on-the individual's relationship to things in different social 
and cultural contexts. From a comparison of different ways of rel- 
ating to objects it is possible to highlight some of the general and 
basic functions they perform which are present in every social context 
and cultural system. In the thesis I discussed especially the role 
things play as cultural markers, as the visible part of the cultural 
system. 
In every culture meanings are attached to things. Through their 
production, use, exchange, accumulation, destruction and consumption, 
society defines and redefines its symbolic system; meanings, values, 
social definitions of reality are created, confirmed, or undermined. 
An analysis of the symbolic meanings attached to things provides 
general information on the structure and the characteristics of the 
social system as a whole. For example, the way in which we dress 
indicates our definition of time, of age, of gender differences, of 
private and public situations, of formal and informal occasions, of 
social stratification within society. 
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It is the cultural system which provides the definitions of 
utility, value, scarcity, etc., on which our vision and perception of 
the world are based. Changes in society are brought about through a 
struggle between old and new meanings, old and new definitions of 
reality: in this respect, objects are just the battle -ground where 
the contest takes place. In other words, where culture is shaped. 
The only recently acknowledged cultural and artistic signific- 
ance of some objects which were produced at the beginning of the cen- 
tury, is an example of how values, meanings and tastes change in 
society and of how the material world is the tangible and visible 
expression of these modifications. 
(1) 
This aspect is totally neglected by those sociological analyses 
which regard the utility of things as a fixed and clearly defined 
quality, while it changes considerably not only from culture to cul- 
ture but also within the same symbolic system in a very short space 
of time. 
Besides, in a social system as complex and differentiated as 
to- day's, different cultural patterns co -exist and, with them differ- 
ent meanings are attached to things. Objects are often used to 
communicate diversity from the dominant values and culture: through 
an often provocative use of objects, groups and minorities signal 
and make visible their existence and their resistance towards the 
system. In this context the study of different sub -cultures supplies 
not only information about social standing, but also several examples 
of the multiple meanings attached to things, and the use we make of 
them to communicate values, beliefs, membership, consent or refusal. 
To study the relationship between people and things means to 
throw light on crucial aspects of social life, on the role things play 
in contributing to satisfy different and multiple needs of the 
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social actor. In particular, in the thesis I have pointed out the 
role objects play in shaping and supporting the individual's identity 
in a social context characterized by the objectification of social 
relations, by impersonal interactions among individuals. In such a 
situation objects become the main channel through which it is possible 
to exchange information on people's definitions of themselves and of 
the world. 
The ways in which we present ourselves, and organize the environ- 
ment we select for public and social activities - the front region -(2) 
have become extremely important features of modern life, where other 
reference points or distinctive criteria,apart from appearance, are 
missing. Appearance has become a basic aspect of our lives, the yard- 
stick to judge ourselves and others: what one appears to be, and not 
what he is, has become relevant to us. Objects have therefore taken on 
a fundamental importance since appearance is grounded in the manipul- 
ation and use of things, which have the task of communicating and 
making easily understandable the messages we want to convey. 
Things take on the function of 'identity pegs' on which we rely 
to present ourselves, to sustain our performance in the interaction 
with others. But appearance is important not only to communicate 
feelings and information to others but also to shape our self and 
identity. As has been argued when discussing the attitude of nuns 
toward the habit, the meaning of the uniform for the aspirant nuns was 
not only that of communicating their membership and social position to 
the world, but also that of an identificatory token which helped them 
to accept their new status, their new self. 
Whilst people behave differently on meeting someone wearing 
uniform, whether they despise or appreciate what the person represents, 
at the same time, the behaviour of a person wearing uniform is 
189 
influenced by how he feels he appears to others. The way in which we 
appear has a great relevance in providing us with self -confidence and 
psychological stability; it deeply influences both our behaviour and 
self -perception and the behaviour of others toward us. 
Not only are objects important as a communicative channel through 
which we exchange information on our cultural system, values, beliefs, 
social standing, etc., they also support our selves both in social 
contexts and public situations, and in our private life. 
Indeed, it can be said that we feel and act about certain objects 
which are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves, since the 
objects are part of ourselves, they are extensions of the self, and we 
identify totally in them. This explains why, in certain circumstances, 
the person deprived of some significant objects experiences not only a 
material deprivation - that incidentally, when discussing robbery 
victims, was seen to have very little impact on the individual - but a 
real loss in psychological terms. The reactions of the victims of 
robberies show quite clearly how strong can be the emotional tie bind- 
ing people and things. Since there are many layers aî meaning, several 
different projections embodied in them, it is just this embodiment of 
emotional feelings into objects which explains why we get so upset 
when we are deprived of some significant things, when our private 
world, which is so crucial for the stability of the self and identity, 
is invaded by strangers. 
The reactions to the territorial invasion of one's own house by 
burglars are a very clear indicator of the great significance we 
attach to it as a safe identificatory domain where anxieties and 
anguishes connected with our public life can be, at least partially, 
discharged, where, in fact, we feel "at home ". For these reasons we 
resent so much the intrusion of strangers in our house since they 
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threaten our safest and most precious refuge. 
This, among other things, should emphasize the significance of 
the territorial dimension in our social life and therefore the 
necessity for further and detailed studies of this neglected but 
crucial aspect of human social behaviour. Additional studies and 
researches on human territorial behaviour could in fact provide us 
with a better understanding of the meaning of possessing, of the 
reactions we have when our territory is threatened not only physic- 
ally but also when we aré victims of psychological territorial viol- 
ation as, for example, when we are robbed of ideas, of intellectual 
products, of affections, etc. When our privacy is in some way 
violated. All these are common experiences to all of us which 
have not drawn the attention they deserve from scholars interested 
in the study of everyday life. 
Our ties with objects and the environment we build and person- 
alize around us, have to do with our emotional life since things 
embody memories, past relationships and achievements, since they 
reflect parts of our personal history and respond to our psychol- 
ogical needs. The symbolic ties, the embodied projections, the 
meanings attached to things are numerous and different. In this 
sense it is not an overstatement to say that they constitute a crucial 
element of the person's identity. As I argued when discussing the 
nuns' experience of deprivation of significant objects or from 
Goffman's description of the inmate's condition,(3) to be deprived 
of one's most personal things compels the individual to renounce his 
identity and to build a new image of himself, a new self which is 
not in contradiction with the expectations of his new surroundings. 
On this point, I have referred to the dramatic needs nuns have 
to adjust themselves to their new life style, to be identified with 
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their new status, to feel part of the new world they have entered, 
as well as to the great significance that in such a context, the objects, 
which symbolize and communicate membership, take on, signifiying pass- 
ages of role and changes of status. 
To deprive a person of his personal belongings,to move him out 
of his place, means to deprive him of a culturally defined frame for 
structuring the experiential living space. This frame is crucial for 
establishing a sense of personal continuity and meaning in an other- 
wise impersonal environment. This is even more evident and clear if 
one takes into consideration people like the elderly, who do not have 
an active life, who spend the majority of their time in a single 
environment: the house. In such circumstances the deprivation of 
objects structuring the person's environment can cause the destruc- 
tion of the self. There is indeed some evidence that objects which 
represent memories, relationships, family, etc., i.e., possessions 
which embody belonging to a human community, have a fundamental sig- 
nificance for us and that this significance is felt more strongly 
the more we retire from active life, from public and external activ- 
ities, as in the case of the elderly.(4) Indeed, differences in age 
and living conditions seem to alter the way in which we relate to 
things, in which they become significant to us. These questions need 
to be further developed and analyzed. New contributions could throw 
further light on these problems and could provide interesting insights 
and information on, for example, the consequences that can sometimes 
be caused by moving old people from their houses to more functional 
settings.(5) The relationship of children to objects could give us 
some information on the formation of gender stereotypes, on the conn- 
ections between the formation of a personal identity and the need to 
possess and have at one's disposal certain objects. Some of these 
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aspects have been already analyzed and pointed out by psychological 
and psychoanalytic studies; what is missing and overdue is a 
sociol @gical approach. 
I have also argued that there are relevant gender differences in 
the way in which we relate to objects, and in the kind of meanings and 
projections we attach to them. This, I think, is a very interesting 
aspect. It shows that the ways in which men and women perceive and 
experience the world are different: women, even when they are very 
active in the public world, seem to be very deeply and emotionally 
attached to ideals of domesticity, of family relationships, of affec- 
tive ties. Men, on the other hand, are attached to ideals of action, 
of personal achievement and success, of self realization through indiv- 
idual effort both in work and in leisure activities. Women, then, if 
we take the results of our enquiry on collectors, or the literature on 
shoplifting, seem to have a less rational and more passionate relation- 
ship with the objects they hoard. 
These differences, (as has been suggested), find their origin in 
the different socialization of the two genders within society, in the 
different values and goals which are instilled into us throughout our 
upbringing. The two genders tend to attach to and project on to 
objects different meanings and feelings, and they tend to use different 
spheres and areas to give vent to their anxieties and dissatisfactions. 
I have discussed, for example, how the house is a fundamental and 
crucial identificatory domain above all for women, how some compulsive 
and obsessional attitudes which in their case may be manifest in the 
care and effort they devote to tidying and cleaning it, are, in the 
case of men, expressed in different ways, (i.e. the love for order 
and classification which characterizes male collectors). What emerge 
from this comparison of the relationship to objects by the two genders 
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are, to a certain extent two different visions of reality, two differ- 
ent ways of relating to the external world. 
As has been suggested the Parsonhian categories of instrumen- 
talism and expressivism seem to be still very useful to understand 
these differences. Nevertheless, my thesis clearly demonstrates 
the need for further and detailed analyses of these problems. 
The study of collectors has stressed another function performed by 
objects: that of becoming a substitute for human interaction. In 
the case of the collector, there is in fact a complete and exclusive 
identification with objects an unbelievable emotional attachment to 
things. Objects become a substitute for human interactions, and a 
far more tranquillizing one, since they reflect what we project on to 
them, since we define the rules of the game, the boundaries of our 
private world. In this way subjectivity can express itself in a 
rather unproblematical way. Objects, unlike persons, acquire a special 
quality: they do not judge, they do not challenge or compete they are 
owned by a particular person who recognizes himself in them as an 
absolutely particular human being. 
A study of the relationship which is created between persons and 
objects like, for example, home computers, should give us further infor- 
mation on how, and to what extent, things may replace human sociability 
and interactions with others. A study of our relationships with 
pets and plants i.e., with 'animate beings', would provide further 
evidence of how much and how often we rely on substitutes for social 
contacts in a situation characterized by anonymity and impersonal 
interactions such as that which marks our social experience. 
Moreover, objects can sometimes offer an answer., although often 
a partial one, to the individual's needs and aspirations which do not 
find a way of expressing themselves in other ways. The discussion of 
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the collectors constitutes, from this point of view, an example of 
private attempts to find an answer to problems whose solution is 
difficult if not impossible in the public sphere. Collecting must 
be understood as a private and personal attempt to excape anxieties, 
dis- satisfaction and routine typical of our everyday experience. 
Other hobbies and leisure activities, which have not been taken 
into consideration in the dissertation, can be interpreted as differ- 
ent ways to solve these problems. So, for example, do- it- yourself 
activities or other forms of bricolage can be practised because of 
the feeling of self -realization involved in actually doing something, 
manufacturing a particular object in the face of the extreme frag- 
mentation of the work process which has made it almost impossible for 
the individual to be involved in every stage of production. Collec- 
ting, like do- it- yourself activities, implies planning, actual pur- 
suing and final outcome. 
In such a context objects are the tools to build private enclaves 
and small artificial worldswhere - although often only partially and 
transitorily - we feel at home, free to express our personality and 
inner needs, which do not find a way to manifest themselves in public 
life. 
It is often in these private contexts that the contemporary 
individual succeeds in freeing himself from the constraints of social 
life and in recovering a relationship with himself and the outer world 
which is not objectified but emotionally and symbolically satisfying. 
In this sense, we can say that the symbolic value, as opposed to the 
sign value, (to use Baudrillard's typology ) is still present - although 
probably only in marginal and rare situations - in our relationship to 
things. 
What I am suggesting here is the necessity to investigate further 
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these areas which, it seems to me, have become progressively more 
relevant and crucial for the individuals who only in these spheres, 
are able to express those needs and feelings which cannot find adequate 
manifestation in the over -institutionalized public world. 
Obviously, more than providing a comprehensive explanation or a 
definitive answer to such questions, the dissertation emphasizes the 
necessity of further studies and analyses, in order to reach a deeper 
understanding of phenomena and problems which have been neglected 
and undervalued by the sociological reflection and which are of 
fundamental importance to explain the strategies pursued by individ- 
uals to give a sense to their lives and to cope with the difficulties 
brought about by modern society. 
196 
NOTES: 
1. cf. M. Thompson, Rubbish Theory, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979. 
2. On this subject see Goffman's analysis of front and back 
regions in Ibidem, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969. 
3. E. Goffman, Asylums, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968 
L }. cf. M. Csikszentmihalyi and E. Rochbergh Halton, The Meanings 
of Things, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
5. E. Sherman and E.S. Newman, "The meaning of cherished personal 
possessions for the elderly ", Journal of Ageing and Human 
Development, Vol. 8, n. 2., pp. 181 - 192. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
The empirical part of this work is based on one hundred and 
twenty interviews I carried out in Northern Italy during the years 
1981/82. For each group analyzed in the research (collectors, 
victims of burglaries and members of religious orders) I interviewed 
forty persons (twenty males and twenty females). Although - quite 
clearly - not statistically significant, the sample is diversified 
according to the age, the level of education, the occupation and the 
social status of the interviewees. 
The interviews, which were taped, generally took place in the 
homes of the interviewees and were in the form of conversation. They 
usually lasted for more than one hour each. They were not structured 
so as to leave the person a very high degree of freedom for the 
expression of personal feelings and opinions. Nevertheless some 
basic questions on age, occupation, family background, etc., were asked 
of all interviewees. In addition to this common background infor- 
mation each of the three groups was asked specific sets of questions. 
As to the first group, the persons to be interviewed were selected 
both from a list of collectors printed in Italy in 1977 and from a 
series of advertisements which appeared in an Italian specialized mag- 
azine published in 1981. 
The specific areas and topics covered by the interview were the 
following: 
- when the individual started collecting; 
- what he /she collects and why; 
- the perception his /her family had of this "hobby "; 
- collecting and sociability; 
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- envy, competition and collecting: 
- the pleasures of discovering and classifying; 
For the victims of burglaries, I had to rely on an insurance 
company to give me a list of names of claimants,since the Police 
refused to give me any addresses of the victims of burglaries. Through 
the people I interviewed from that list I obtained the names of 
others who had been recently burgled. All those interviewed had been 
robbed quite recently (from two weeks to ten months previously). 
The interviews covered the following topics: 
- victim's reactions to the discovery of the robbery; 
description of the environment; 
description of the stolen objects; 
behaviour and reactions in the period immediately following 
the burglary; 
lasting changes in behaviour and attitudes toward the house and 
the possibility of a repetition of the experience (feelings of 
insecurity, loss of confidence in people, etc.). 
As to the members of religious Orders, I directly approached the 
Superiors of eight Orders which I thought interesting since they 
differed in the organization of religious life and in the possibility 
of contacts with the external world. I interviewed members of both 
contemplative Orders and of Orders engaged in external activities. 
Thirty out of forty interviews were conducted with persons who had 
entered the Orders only recently, since I was interested in under- 
standing how they experienced the passage from a lay to a religious 
status. To this purpose the questions I asked them dealt with the 
following subjects: 
- background information on their lives; 
- the decision to enter a religious institution; 
family's reactions to the entrance into the convent /monastery; 
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- emotional effects of the separation from home and from 
objects of personal significance; 
- role passage and adjustment to religious life; 
- use of money, objects, etc; 
- identity changes and contacts with the external world; 
- manifestation of their religious status (especially the use 
of Habits); 
- depersonalization of the environment and changes in self - 
perception and identity. 
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